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Abstract 
 
Win, Lose, and Draw:  Civil War and the Determinants of State Concessions 
 
by Frank Vaughan 
 
This research develops an explanation of the causal factors that influence state 
concessions offered in negotiated settlements ending civil wars.  It proposes an 
explanation drawn from bargaining theory, existing literature addressing the likelihood of 
negotiated settlements, and inductively derived variables.  Specifically, it integrates the 
link between several general factors associated with conflict – the costs of war, incentives 
to cheat, the divisibility of stakes, the degree of democracy of the state, the presence or 
absence of a stalemate, and the timing and location of the settlement – and the degree to 
which states make concessions to the rebels.  The relationships between these factors are 
analyzed quantitatively using probit and Tobit models as well as with qualitative case 
narratives using a dataset that describes all civil wars beginning between 1945 and 1997.  
The basic conclusion of this research is that bargaining theory by itself does not 
adequately identify the factors that influence state concessions.  It does, however, provide 
some explanatory power and can be enhanced by the inclusion of existing literature and 
the results of the inductive analysis.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
What political price will states pay to end a civil war?  Given the nearly limitless 
range of possible outcomes – ranging from a fight to the finish, at one extreme, to the 
abdication of territory and power, at the other – this is a question that has both theoretical 
and practical relevance for many who have an interest in understanding the political role 
of conflict within states, including civil war specialists, international relations theorists, 
peace study scholars, area specialists, and policymakers.  Although many aspects of civil 
wars have received substantial amounts of scholarly attention (including conditions that 
affect the onset, duration, and severity of civil wars; when civil wars are more likely to 
end in a negotiated settlement; and the conditions that affect the success of negotiated 
settlements)1, this is a topic that to date has not been addressed.  As a result of this 
                                                 
1 Influential works on the onset of civil war include:  Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Eckstein 1964; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993, 2000; Roseneau 1964; Rule 1988; and Tilly 1978.  Works on duration include: 
Fearon 2001; Ikle 1971; Licklider 1993, 1995; and Walter and Snyder 1999.  For severity, see Brass 1985; 
and Brito and Intrilligator 1990.  For the likelihood of a negotiated settlement, see:  Mason and Fett 1996; 
Mason, Fett, and Weingarten 1999; and Zartman 1989.  Finally, on the longevity of negotiated settlements, 
see:  Walter 2002 and Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002. 
omission we know very little about the process by which negotiated settlements are 
constructed.   
As detailed below, strong theoretical and practical reasons have been presented 
within the literature contending that negotiated settlements are notoriously difficult to 
achieve in civil wars.  However, an examination of the empirical evidence clearly 
indicates that many civil wars are resolved at the negotiating table.  Yet we have little or 
no knowledge of how the terms on which these negotiated settlements rest are 
determined.  Thus, the purpose of this research is to develop a cohesive explanation of 
the process by which states seek to appease rebel political demands instead of pressing 
for a military defeat of their adversaries.  To do so, this research will focus on the factors 
that influence the type and degree of political concessions made by the state to the rebels.  
This research specifically addresses the following question:  What factors influence the 
political concessions states are willing to grant to their rebel adversaries in order to 
bring about peace?    
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the fundamental 
concepts on which this research is based.  In what immediately follows, the gap in the 
literature addressing how states are compelled to make political concessions to their 
military adversaries is developed.  The issue is addressed from the context of the 
perceived difficulty of concluding a negotiated settlement in civil wars and the 
prevalence with which they do in fact occur.  Next the contributions this research hopes 
to make to our understanding of civil wars are developed, which is followed by an 
overview of the theoretical argument on which this research rests.  The concluding 
section outlines the organization of the remainder of this research. 
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The puzzle 
 Current thinking within the political science literature presents strong theoretical 
and practical arguments that describe negotiated settlements of civil wars as being 
especially difficult and problematic to construct.  However, the empirical evidence on 
this point directly contradicts the prevailing wisdom.  As discussed below, by any count a 
significant portion of civil wars are resolved through some type of negotiated settlement.  
This raises several puzzling theoretical questions, such as:  Why do negotiated 
settlements occur in the face of such difficulties?  When are negotiated settlements more 
likely to occur?  How do such settlements occur?  The first two questions – the why and 
when – have both received significant amounts of scholarly attention, often with 
impressive results.  Because of these efforts, the political science community has 
developed a good understanding of the factors that make a negotiated settlement more or 
less likely.  However, the third question – the “how” – has yet to receive substantial 
attention.  This research intends to address that gap.  To do so, it focuses on the factors 
that compel the state to make political concessions to its rebel adversaries in order to 
bring about peace.   In what follows, the theoretical difficulties associated with the 
resolution of civil wars by negotiated settlements and the preponderance with which they 
occur are addressed. 
 
The difficulties of negotiated settlements 
Until recently, few attempts to explain the occurrence of negotiated settlement of 
civil wars were made in the scholarly literature.  This oversight is easily attributed to two 
 3
conditions.  First, most civil wars end in the unqualified military victory by one side.  As 
Modelski (1964, p. 122) writes, “The outright win, the complete and unqualified victory 
of either the incumbents or the insurgents, is the most usual outcome of an internal war,” 
a contention which is supported by the empirical evidence.  Second, within the literature, 
strong theoretical and practical arguments are proposed that describe the resolution of 
civil wars by negotiated settlement as being especially difficult, if not impossible, to 
construct.  In direct contradiction to the prevailing thinking within the field, however, 
negotiated settlements do occur and do so quite frequently, albeit less so than military 
conclusions.  Two major obstacles to a negotiated end to civil war are prevalent within 
the literature.  The first addresses the political relationship of the combatants, while the 
second argument is based on territorial and geographic considerations.  Each is discussed 
below. 
First, according to Pillar (1983, p. 24), the likelihood of a negotiated settlement is 
conditioned by the extent to which compromise is possible.  He argues that, unlike 
international wars, negotiations are less likely to be successful in civil wars because:  
the very fact that a civil war has broken out indicates the weakness of any mechanism for 
compromise, and the war itself tends to polarize whatever moderate elements may have 
existed.  Furthermore, each side in a civil war is a traitor in the eyes of the other and can 
never expect the enemy to let it live in peace.  The struggle for power becomes a struggle 
for survival as the options narrow to the single one of the fight to the finish.  (Pillar 1983, 
p. 24) 
 
Pillar goes on to note that “in such conditions, not only is successful negotiation next to 
impossible; even a capitulation may be ruled out” (p. 24, fn 11). 
Second, territorial concerns present considerable problems when seeking a 
negotiated resolution of a civil war.  Territorial concerns center on the close proximity of 
two or more former combatants.  The conclusion of a negotiated resolution directly 
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implies the continued existence of both parties of civil wars, both of which must live 
either within the same state or, in the case of a territorial secession, as neighbors.   This 
present an additional difficulty not commonly present in international conflicts.    As 
Licklider (1993) explains, 
It is particularly hard to visualize how civil wars can end.  Ending international wars is 
hard enough, but at least there the opponents will presumably eventually retreat to their 
own territories …. But in civil wars the members of the two sides must live side by side 
and work together in a common government to make the country work.  How can this be 
done?  (Licklider 1993, p. 4) 
 
 Thus, good theoretical reasons exist to explain why negotiated settlements are 
difficult to achieve and therefore less likely to occur in civil wars than in interstate wars.  
But does this contention hold up to the scrutiny of the empirical evidence?  Counts of the 
frequency with which civil wars are resolved via negotiated settlements vary 
considerably.   Yet by any count, a significant number of civil wars are resolved through 
some form of negotiation.  The wide disparity in the counts of negotiated settlements 
necessitates a discussion of the source of the discrepancies.  The following discussion, 
then, is intended to establish the prevalence of negotiated settlements ending civil wars as 
well as to illuminate the source of the variation in the number of such agreements. 
 
The prevalence of negotiated settlements 
Despite the theoretical and practical considerations addressed above, the empirical 
evidence clearly indicates that a significant number of civil wars do end in negotiated 
settlements.  For example, Modelski (1964, pp. 123-124), counts 100 civil wars between 
1900 and 1962 and finds that 80% end in an outright victory.  But, as he points out, the 
inclusion of several successful coup d’états (while not considering those that were 
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unsuccessful or resolved via negotiation) biases his list towards over-counting military 
defeat as the primary manner in which civil wars end.  Pillar (1983, p. 12) develops a 
different list of civil wars by applying Wright’s (1965) definition of civil war to a list of 
civil wars developed by Singer and Small (1972), which covers a time frame of 1800 to 
1980.  On this list, Pillar counts 19 civil wars, 6 (or slightly less than 32%) of which are 
resolved via negotiation rather than military defeat.  Stedman’s (1991) counting shows 
that negotiations contributed to the resolution of 20 of 56 of civil wars, or about 31%.   
More recently, Walter (2002, p. 5 fn 2), who focuses on the processes by which 
negotiations produce lasting resolutions to civil wars, contends that “fifty-one percent of 
all civil wars that started between 1940 and 1992 experience formal peace negotiations at 
some point during the conflict.”  Walter (2002, p. 6) also indicates that about 62% of civil 
war negotiations ultimately produced signed agreements and that 57% of those 
settlements were successfully implemented.  Analyses by Hoddie and Hartzell (2003)  
Table 1.1 
Counts of negotiated settlements in civil wars, by author 
Author (date of publication) Time frame Number of 
settlements/civil 
wars 
Percent resolved 
via negotiated 
settlement 
Modelski (1964) 1900-1962 80 of 100 80 
Pillar (1983) 1800-1980 6 of 19 32 
Stedman (1991) 1974-1981 20 of 56 31 
Walter (2002) 1940-1992 13 of 72 18 
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) 1945-1998 38 of 103 47 
 
also support the conclusion that the most frequent way in which civil wars are resolved is 
by a militaristic conclusion.  They find that about 48% of all civil wars meeting the 
definitional criteria of Singer and Small’s (1982) Correlates of War Project ended in a 
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military victory by one of the adversaries, while about 40% were concluded by a 
negotiated settlement.     
Thus, the empirical evidence makes two points clear.  First, many, if not most, 
civil wars end in the military defeat of one side than end in a negotiated settlement.  
Second, and more central to the purpose at hand, a significant number of civil wars are in 
fact resolved via a negotiated settlement.  Since negotiated settlements are a common 
means by which civil wars are brought to an end, it is worth understanding the why, 
when, and how of negotiated settlements as a means of resolving civil war.  Clearly our 
lack of understanding of the factors that influence state concessions produces a void in 
the literature, a point which is developed below. 
 
What is Missing 
 Existing research has substantially contributed to our understanding of the 
resolution of civil war and has done so on several counts.  First, it has highlighted what 
kinds of civil wars are more or less open to resolution by negotiated settlement.  Second, 
it has advanced our knowledge of how the presence or absence of certain actors can 
affect outcomes.  Third, existing research has illustrated how different types of actors can 
influence the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.  And finally, we currently have a good 
understanding of the conditions under which a negotiated settlement is more or less likely 
to occur.  Thus, we know: (1) the conditions under which conflicts are more or less likely 
to be resolved; and (2) what types of civil wars are more or less likely to be successfully 
resolves by a negotiated settlement.  However, this tells us little (if anything) about the 
dynamics of the negotiating process itself.   
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Understanding how state concessions are determined makes several important 
contributions to existing research.  First and most importantly, this effort shifts the 
emphasis of existing research from being able to determine when a negotiated settlement 
is more or less likely to understanding the process by which mutually acceptable 
alternatives to war (negotiated settlements, in other words) are developed.  In this way, 
the current effort builds on and extends our understanding of the process by which civil 
wars are resolved.  Second, by understanding how the terms of settlement are 
constructed, we will gain insight into the process by which the political dispute 
underlying a civil war is resolved.  This is important because the point of a civil war is 
the resolution of the underlying dispute, not who wins or loses on the battlefield.  Third, 
understanding what factors influence terms of settlement will give us a better 
understanding of when negotiated settlements are likely to occur because it is logical to 
expect the content of a negotiated settlement to be a primary determinant of a 
combatant’s decision to accept or reject a deal.  And finally, by viewing civil war as an 
extension of or alternative to the domestic political process, this research will contribute 
to our understanding of the role played by civil war as a means of reconciling domestic 
political disputes because it highlights the extent to which the combatants are willing to 
bargain and compromise to resolve political disputes. 
 Based on existing research, we have little direct knowledge about how the 
concessions promised by one side affect the likelihood that negotiations are successful.  
We also know little about the role civil war plays as a political force.   That is, we have 
little understanding of how civil wars may be used as a strategy of interest articulation 
and aggregation and how these demands may be reconciled by an existing state.  Given 
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the contention that civil war is at its core a political dispute carried out by militaristic 
means, understanding this aspect of the phenomenon is essential if researchers are to 
understand the role that civil wars play in domestic society and the process by which they 
are (or are not) resolved.  The theory outlined below (and fully developed in Chapter 5) 
goes to the heart of the matter of both the political nature of civil war and its resolution. 
  
The approach 
To address the question at hand, this research draws on what has become know as 
the bargaining theory of conflict.  Largely attributed to the works of Fearon (1995), 
Morrow (1988), and Wagner (1994, 2000), bargaining theory is an extension of 
traditional rationalist explanations of conflict (Lake 2003).  But bargaining theory and 
rationalist thought by no means view negotiated settlements as being the outcome of 
similar processes.  The two schools of thought sharply diverge on the role that militarized 
conflict plays in influencing the final terms of settlement. The key difference between 
rationalist thinking and bargaining theory is the process by which the terms of a 
negotiated settlement are developed.  Whereas rationalist explanations contend that the 
terms of settlement each side is willing to accept are determined exogenously to the 
conflict, bargaining theory views the content of a negotiated settlement as an endogenous 
product of fighting (Fearon 1995, Werner 1998).  Rationalist thinking, then, is useful in 
that it allows us to understand whose terms are accepted but it does little to inform us 
about what those terms will be.  The victors in a civil war, rationalists argue, are able to 
impose their predetermined terms on their defeated opponent, who must accept or reject 
the terms as offered and has no say in their content.  Conversely, bargaining theory 
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contends that the final terms of settlement as are causally linked to events on the 
battlefield and that the resulting agreement will reflect the relative might and will of the 
adversaries.  In other words, bargaining theorists argue that the fighting itself is at the 
heart of the process by which the terms of settlement are constructed and that the final 
terms will reflect the relative degree of military success enjoyed by each side.  As such, 
this research offers a competing viewpoint to the prevailing expectation within the 
literature that the terms of settlement are imposed by the dominant combatant by viewing 
fighting as a form of negotiation in which the final terms of settlement are developed. 
 The application of bargaining theory developed below essentially views civil war 
as a part of a larger political process – a demand for change – in which the start and end 
of militarized conflict represent only a portion of the overall process.  In the extreme, 
civil war can be viewed as an attempt by one side to impose its political will on its 
adversaries – to force them to accept its demands without reservation or compromise, as 
contended by rationalists.  Such a characterization of civil war is supported by the 
relatively large number of conflicts that end in a militaristic conclusion.  What it does not 
address, however, is the substantial number of civil wars that are resolved through a 
negotiated settlement in which each side makes sacrifices in order to resolve the dispute.  
From this more common, but less extreme perspective, civil war can be viewed as an 
attempt by one side to force its adversaries to acquiesce to its demands – if not in whole, 
then in part.   
 By viewing civil wars as an extension of domestic politics and as an inherently 
political process all its own, the decision facing combatants is whether their interests will 
be best served by negotiating and compromising, thereby achieving some, but not all, of 
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their goals, or by continuing to fight, with the possibility of achieving all of their goals.  
Of course, the first option – negotiation and compromise – is the least risky, but provides 
fewer benefits, whereas the second – continuing to fight – is the most risky, but provides 
the combatants with possibility of fully achieving their goal.  In what follows, a 
conceptual definition of civil war is developed, followed by an explanation of what is 
meant by negotiated settlement. 
 
What is civil war? 
 Within the literature, two dominant perspectives of civil war exist.  The first takes 
a narrow view of civil war and focuses on it as a militarized contest between groups, at 
the expense of a political component.  Within this body of literature civil wars are defined 
in terms of the characteristics of the actors and the violence.  The second perspective 
takes a broader view of civil war and views it as an outcome of an underlying political 
dispute.  As this research is based on the contention that civil wars can be viewed as an 
extension of or alternative to domestic political processes, it seeks to maintain the view of 
civil war as a military contest while emphasizing the political component.  Each of these 
perspectives is more fully developed below, followed by a discussion of the ways in 
which civil wars can end. 
 
Civil war as a military contest 
The political science community has reached a loose consensus as to what 
constitutes a civil war.  Clearly civil war is different than and must be distinguished from 
interstate war as well as other forms of civil violence. It is distinguished from interstate 
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conflict by the presence of an opposition group that resides within the borders of the 
challenged state and is differentiated from other types of widespread civil violence (such 
as bloodless or nearly bloodless coups, street crimes, looting, and riots) by the magnitude 
of the violence and the presence of an organized opposition2.  With respect to the view of 
civil war as a military contest, this research adopts the conventional definition developed 
within the literature, which describes civil wars as having the following characteristics: 
(1) civil war is an armed conflict in which the sovereignty of a recognized state is 
challenged; (2) armed violence is widespread; (3) fighting occurs predominantly within 
the recognized boundaries of the state; (4) an organized opposition (meaning that both a 
leadership and a command structure exist) is involved; and (5) the state is one of the 
primary participants in the fighting.  Thus, civil war can include a range of political 
claims ranging from policy disputes (such as demands for the equal status of a minority 
group or for a redistribution of political or economic resources) to territorial claims for 
autonomy and can even include a direct attempt to alter or replace an existing 
government, as in a revolution. 
 Some debate does, however, occur over the characteristics a conflict must possess 
in order for an episode of civil violence to be considered a full-fledged civil war.  For 
example, the definition of civil war developed by Charles Tilly (1978) and adopted by 
Licklider (1993, 1995) differs slightly from most others on the point of sovereignty.  
Whereas most definitions require a challenge to an existing sovereign, Tilly and Licklider 
require the presence of multiple sovereigns, meaning that at least some members of the 
rebellious population demonstrate their support for the alternative “government” by 
                                                 
2 For an in depth discussion of the difficulties of defining civil war and distinguishing it from other forms 
of violence, see Rule (1988) and Eckstein (1964). 
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engaging in activities such as paying taxes, serving in its armed forces, and symbolically 
expressing their support for it (Tilly 1978, p. 192; discussed in Licklider 1993, p. 9).  
While seemingly minor, this difference plays an important role when one considers the 
case of “failed states”, which King and Zeng (2001, p. 623) contend occurs when a 
government loses its political authority or its ability to impose the rule of law.  These 
authors note that, by their definition, 127 state failures occurred between 1955 and 1998, 
many if not all of which involved civil war (p. 625).  
 Another issue addresses whether civil violence must, by definition, involve the 
state.  Some scholars (Sarkees and Singer 2001, for example) drop the requirement that 
the state be an active participant and contend that large-scale social or communal 
violence may meet the criteria to be considered civil wars.  As a result, their definition of 
civil war expands to include widespread violence that may or may not be directed 
towards the state.  Civil war can therefore include hostilities between two or more non-
state actors, according to this definition.  Because the present effort focuses on 
concessions made by the state to the rebels, only those episodes of violent conflict to 
which the state is a party are included as a characteristic of civil war for the purposes of 
this research. 
Other points of disagreement center on the severity of the conflict, as measured by 
the number of deaths that can be attributed to a particular episode.  Minimum levels of 
violence vary according to the number of deaths and the time period in which the deaths 
must occur.  A wide range of minimum thresholds is used by researchers to determine 
whether the level of violence is severe enough for an incidence of civil violence to be 
considered a civil war.    The most commonly used threshold is that provided by the 
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Correlates of War Project (Singer and Small 1972, Sarkees and Singer 2001), which 
requires a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths annually.  Regan (2002), however, uses a 
relatively low threshold of 200 deaths over the course of the conflict in his investigation 
of the conditions that draw third parties into civil conflict.  Other scholars (Gleditsch, et 
al 2001) contend that a minimum of 1,000 battlefield deaths is necessary to differentiate 
civil war from other, less severe forms of civil violence.  Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and 
DeRouen and Sobek (2004) also relax the requirement that the threshold of 1,000 be 
reached annually and only require that it be reached over the course of the conflict.  
Debate also exists over whether counts of battle deaths should consist solely of 
combatants or also include non-combatant deaths measure the severity of civil violence.  
The latter measure would more accurately reflect the number of deaths due to war, it is 
argued, because noncombatant civilians are frequently the targets of violence in civil 
wars (Sambanis 2001a).   
Clearly the emphasis within this perspective is on defining civil war based on 
military outcomes, particularly the number of deaths that can be attributed to combat.  
Such an approach is valuable for two reasons.  First, this approach separates major 
episodes of political violence from minor ones, which is important because researchers 
frequently wish to focus on large-scale violence.  Second, it distinguishes civil war from 
other forms of political violence, which the evidence suggests behave differently than 
civil wars.  However, one of the drawbacks of this emphasis on outcomes is that it 
minimizes the considerations on the political aspects of civil war.  Because civil war is at 
its core a militarized contest between two or more actors intended to resolve a 
disagreement or eliminate a party to a disagreement, one of the central premises of this 
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research is that civil war inherently involves dispute resolution.  This shifts the focus 
from events on the battlefield to the resolution of the underlying source of the conflict, as 
discussed below. 
 
Civil war as politics 
 Civil war is inherently more than widespread violence that meets the previous 
conditions, though.  It also necessarily requires a political component, a feature which has 
frequently been overlooked within the literature.  This point is emphasizes by Eckstein 
(1964, p. 12), who highlights the political component when he defines civil war as “any 
attempt to alter state policy, rulers, or institutions by the use of violence, in societies 
where violent competition is not the norm and where well-defined institutional patterns 
exist.”  Zartman (1993, pp. 27-28) as describes civil war (or internal violence) in political 
terms when he describes it as a failure of the normal political process.  According to him 
in order to fully understand what constitutes civil war, 
one has to go back to the basic notion of politics.  In an ideal condition of internal 
governance that may be referred to as ‘normal politics,’ issues are brought before 
government as petitions and are disposed of through appropriate policy responses.  
Absolute (or time comparative) grievances would be handled through measures to 
increase production or other causes of resource availability; comparative grievances 
would be handled through just divisions, allocations, and compensations….  Internal 
conflict occurs when this process breaks down.  
 
From this perspective, civil war is a failure of the existing political system to 
resolve disputes.  Looked at from a different perspective, however, civil war is politics, in 
the sense that it is a demand for change.  The point of a civil war isn’t simply who wins 
or loses the military contest, but who wins or loses on the political front.  If politics is the 
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process of who gets what, when, and how, as suggested by Harold Laswell, then conflict 
is simply an extension (albeit a costly and extreme one) of the normal political process.   
Civil war can, and should, be viewed as a part of the process by which competing 
demands between a rebel group and a state are reconciled.  Civil war should be 
characterized as a strategy by which a dissatisfied group pursues the resolution of a 
grievance.  This is not a new or original idea.  In fact, this idea was first explicated by 
Clausewitz, who pointed out that: 
… war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.  
We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we…want to 
make clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into 
something entirely different.  (Clausewitz 1976, p. 605; quoted from Wagner 2000, p. 
471) 
 
 
But why do civil wars begin?  To date, no generally accepted explanation of the 
onset of civil wars has been developed, although significant amounts of research have 
identified many conditions that make civil war more or less likely.  Because this research 
focuses on the resolution of civil wars and not its onset, for present purposes it is more 
important to understand the role civil war plays as a domestic political process than it is 
to understand the covariates of its onset.  For this purpose, the answer proposed by 
Zartman (1993) serves well.  According to him, civil war is the outcome of an 
unreconciled political dispute in which the rebels press their claim through 
unconventional means.  As he writes, 
In the beginning [the rebels] seek a redress of grievances within the rules established by 
the government.  But when they get no satisfaction, their rebellion enters a new phase, 
protesting both the government’s inattention to their grievances and its right to decide the 
rules by which protest shall be conducted.  They contest the legitimacy of the government 
itself and take on a total and exclusive commitment to rebellion.  (Zartman 1993, p. 25) 
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While this viewpoint emphasizes the presence of a political dispute underlying the 
military conflict, it tells us little about the extent to which events on the battlefield 
translate into a political resolution.  The extent to which the means (civil war) is 
connected to the desired end (political change) can, of course, vary considerably.  As 
Holl (1993, 270-271) argues, the extent to which military goals reflect political goals can 
range from “the perfect coincidence of military and political objectives to the complete 
disarticulation of the two”.  In the first instance, “if political aims have been translated 
clearly into battlefield objectives, the military effort in a war will more likely conform to 
a larger, coherent policy designed to achieve a set of objectives thought otherwise not 
obtainable,” whereas “at the opposite extreme, however, military accomplishments hold 
little political significance.” 
Thus, Holl describes two situations – one in which military outcomes affect 
political outcomes and another in which the two are not related.  Realistically, one could 
expect that most civil wars fall somewhere in the middle – that each represents a degree 
of linkage of political and military goals – rather than at one of the extremes.  Given this, 
understanding the role militarized conflict plays as a political process is of primary 
importance.  Because civil war at its most fundamental level is an extension of the 
political process, to understand the factors that influence the terms of  negotiated 
settlements is necessary to understand the role wars play as an agent of political change.  
Thus, the literature presents two different views of civil war – one that 
emphasizes the magnitude of the violence and another that includes a political 
component.  Since the purpose of this research is to uncover the factors that influence a 
state’s willingness to make concessions to the rebels and because such concessions are 
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primarily political in nature, this research integrates the two viewpoints and addresses the 
extent to which military and political outcomes converge. 
 
 
The resolution of civil wars 
 
 Given that, for the purposes of this research, civil war is viewed as a demand for 
change, it follows that the resolution of conflict becomes the mechanism by which 
competing claims may be reconciled.  For the purposes of understanding civil war as 
politics, the process by which the resolution of the fighting is translated into a political 
resolution is of central importance.  Civil wars can end in one of two ways.  First, a civil 
war can result in a militaristic conclusion, which occurs when one side defeats its 
adversary on the battlefield.  Pillar (1983, pp. 13-15) offers two types of military defeat 
that are relevant to this discussion.3  Generally speaking, conflict can end in 
extermination/expulsion when an adversary “has rendered its opponent incapable of 
continuing to fight” (Pillar 1983, p. 14).  Similarly, a capitulation can result when an 
adversary acknowledges it is no longer able or willing to fight.  Both types of defeats 
share a common political resolution – the victor on the battlefield is able to impose a 
political resolution on the loser, who is either unable or unwilling to oppose it.  In this 
case the victor is able to achieve most, if not all, of its political goals, resulting in the 
nearly perfect achievement of its political goals. 
The second way a civil war can end is in a negotiated settlement.  This occurs 
when both the combatants voluntarily choose to stop fighting and sue for peace.  In 
                                                 
3 Pillar also addresses absorption, where a conflict is absorbed into a larger conflict; withdrawal, where 
combatants remove themselves from the conflict without a written agreement; and the imposition of a 
resolution by outside actors, but without the acquiescence of the combatants.  None of these, however, is 
relevant for present purposes. 
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contrast to an outright defeat, the process by which the underlying dispute is resolved in 
this case is much more complex.  An effective negotiated settlement only occurs when 
the combatants are able to develop a mutually acceptable solution to the underlying 
political dispute.  Bargaining and compromise play a crucial role as each side makes 
concessions to develop a settlement, which may addresses military as well as the required 
political issues.  
Both negotiated compromises and clear-cut military victories do share something 
in common, though, in that they both frequently produce agreements addressing how the 
fighting will end (Pillar 1983; Walter 2002).  The product of negotiations in a military 
defeat, however, should not be seen as being the same as a negotiated settlement.  The 
difference is clear and substantive.   In a military defeat, it is common for adversaries to 
agree to terms that govern the end of fighting, as is common with a negotiated settlement.  
But when one side is defeated, agreements disentangle military forces (Pillar 1983, pp. 
14-16; Walter 2002, pp. 50-54).  These types of agreements, which Stedman (1991) 
refers to as a “negotiated surrender,” address issues such as the withdrawal and disarming 
of troops, the exchange of prisoners, and the disbanding or integration of military forces 
but do not, by definition, address the underlying political complaints.  Pillar (1983, p. 15) 
phrases the distinction succinctly:  “negotiation suggests at least the possibility of give-
and-take, whereas capitulation is a matter of one side signing on the dotted line.”  Thus, 
whereas a negotiated surrender is imposed by the winner on the loser and addresses the 
disentanglement of fighting forces, a negotiated settlement is developed cooperatively by 
the combatants and addresses the underlying political dispute.  Negotiated settlements are 
discussed in more detail in what follows. 
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 Negotiated settlements 
At the heart of a negotiated settlement is bargaining.  Through the process of 
bargaining the combatants are able to develop a mutually acceptable resolution that they 
were unable to agree to prior to the onset of the fighting.  According to Pillar’s (1983, 37-
40) foundational work on conflict as a part of the bargaining process, bargaining has 
three primary components.  First, both sides must be able benefit by reaching an 
agreement.  Benefits can be viewed from two contexts – as capturing the gains offered by 
the other side or as reducing the costs of continuing to disagree.  
The second requirement, according to Pillar (1983), is that both sides agree to 
involve themselves in negotiations.  Until both sides are willing to compromise, the 
underlying disagreement will persist.  This component is especially relevant to civil war 
because adversaries must coexist after the war within the same state or, in the case of a 
partition, as neighbors (Licklider 1993).  In contrast, combatants in an international war 
may simply walk away and leave the dispute behind, thereby providing some means of 
resolution.   
The third and final component to bargaining addressed by Pillar is the divisibility 
of the stakes over which the war is being fought.  Divisibility directly affects the range of 
agreements that can be realized.  As Pillar (1983) notes,  
Peace terms are often subject to minute variation – with quantitative issues 
the number of possible variations can be infinite – and if both sides find 
one possible set of peace terms preferable to continued disagreement they 
are likely to find several others preferable to it as well.  Besides, war costs 
often become sufficiently great to produce a bargaining range large 
enough to accommodate even gross differences among possible 
agreements.  When one side rejects a proposed settlement, neither 
opponent may know for sure whether it was rejected as being worse than a 
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continued war or rejected in an attempt to make acceptable terms even 
better. … It is only if the range vanished entirely, as it would if either side 
became willing and able to exterminate or expel the other, that a 
bargaining situation would no longer exist. (p. 40). 
 
But what differentiates a negotiated settlement from agreements following a clear-
cut military victory?  In order to qualify as a negotiated settlement for the purposes of this 
research an agreement must meet two conditions.  The first criterion a negotiated 
settlement must meet is that it must be one or more documents signed by the state and 
one or more rebel factions.  It may be argued that a better measure would be to identify 
those negotiated settlements that are actually implemented, but the emphasis of this 
research is on the factors that influence the content of the agreement and not its success.  
Since the process of implementing negotiated settlements comes with its own set of 
problems and difficulties, this research will focus its efforts of the conclusion of an 
agreement and not the implementation of agreements. (For a detailed discussion of the 
problems associated with the implementation of peace agreements, see Walter 2002 and 
Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). 
 The second criterion that must be met for an agreement to considered a negotiated 
settlement is that the agreement must contain some type of political concession made by 
one side to the other.  The purpose of this criterion is to distinguish between what 
Stedman (1991) refers to as a “negotiated surrender” (which address the disengagement 
of fighting forces) and a compromise settlement (which, as Pillar 1983 notes, entails 
compromise).   
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Summary 
The purpose of this research is to expand our current knowledge about civil wars 
by developing an explanation of the process by which combatants engaged in civil war 
develop a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement that both sides prefer to fighting.  To 
do so, it will focus on the factors that influence the extent to which the state is willing to 
make political concessions to the rebels and will adopt a view of civil war as being 
widespread conflict carried out primarily within the borders of a single state by an 
organized group that is directly challenging the decision-making authority of the existing 
state.  To qualify as a negotiated settlement, agreements must contain political 
concessions made by the state to the rebels. 
 In form, the remainder of this dissertation will begin with an in-depth discussion 
of the conditions under which negotiated settlements are more or less likely in Chapter 2. 
To date, a significant amount of research has been conducted that highlights the political, 
economic, and especially military factors that affect the likelihood of a negotiated 
settlement while a second school of thought addresses the characteristics of the 
combatants as predictors of the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.  Chapter 3 more 
fully develops the logic of bargaining theory and applies it to the process by which terms 
of settlement are developed.  The key theoretical construct of bargaining theory – the 
bargaining space – is developed here as are specific hypotheses to be tested.  Chapter 4 
will address methodological issues, including the creation of the dataset that will be used 
for testing the theoretically-derived hypotheses. In Chapter 5, a descriptive and graphical 
analysis of the data is presented.  The purpose of this is to familiarize the reader with the 
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data used in this research and to highlight the presence of several trends and patterns in 
the resolution of civil wars.   
Tobit models, probit models, and case studies will be used to assess the factors 
that affect the extent to which the state offers concessions along three dimensions – 
policy concessions, power-sharing concessions, and territorial concessions.   To account 
for factors that may simultaneously affect the decision of whether or not to negotiate and 
the content of the terms of settlement, an overall model utilizing Tobit analysis will be 
presented in Chapter 6, as will a quantitative analysis of policy and power-sharing 
concessions . Because only three civil wars in the data set contained territorial 
concessions quantitative analysis is inappropriate.  A qualitative analysis will therefore be 
presented in Chapter 7.  A summary of findings is presented in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2: Existing literature 
 
 
 
 The empirical evidence supports the conclusion that fewer civil wars end through 
negotiated settlements than via military resolutions.  However, the empirical evidence 
also clearly indicates that civil wars do commonly produce negotiated settlements.  This 
raises a question that logically precedes any discussion of state concessions:  When are 
civil wars more likely to be concluded by negotiated settlements rather than an outright 
military defeat?  Several fruitful research agendas have made substantial progress 
towards explaining the factors that make a negotiated settlement more likely.  Two 
general approaches have emerged that account for the willingness of combatants to 
resolve their differences at the negotiating table.  The first focuses on conflict processes.  
The second addresses the willingness and ability the actors involved to negotiate a 
mutually acceptable resolution.  In order to place this research within the context of prior 
efforts to understand civil wars, the existing research is reviewed below. 
 
Conflict processes 
Explanations based on conflict processes address the political, economic, and 
especially military factors that condition the likelihood of success of war as a means of 
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achieving political goals.  The focus of this approach is to identify the characteristics of 
the fighting that increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.  Three major conflict 
characteristics are addressed: the “ripeness” of the conflict for resolution, the costs of 
fighting, and the divisibility of the stakes. 
 
Ripeness 
One popular theme with the literature follows the thinking of Zartman (1989), 
who contends that negotiations result only when a conflict is “ripe for resolution”.  This  
group of scholars contends that negotiated settlements occur only as “a function of 
economic, military, or political conditions that exist on the ground” and that these factors 
can encourage combatants to seek a negotiation resolution (Walter 2002, p. 7).   
For negotiations to be productive, the timing of the negotiations is considered to 
be at least as important as the negotiation process itself.  Timing is crucial because the 
combatants will not be able to conclude a mutually acceptable resolution until the conflict 
is ripe.  A conflict is “ripe” when “both parties lose faith in their chances of winning and 
see an opportunity for cutting losses and achieving satisfaction through accommodation” 
(Zartman 1995, p. 18).  Civil wars produce negotiated settlements only when the warring 
factions face conditions such that both sides are ready to seek a non-military resolution.  
When war is no longer seen as a viable or the best means of producing the desired results, 
combatants will seek to resolve their dispute through negotiation, bargaining, and 
compromise.   
This raises the question of when or under what conditions a conflict become ripe 
for resolution.  A ripe moment, says I. William Zartman, (2001) is based on a “mutually 
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hurting stalemate”, or a condition such that “the parties find themselves locked in a 
conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of 
them”.  Thus, a mutually hurting stalemate brings about the conditions necessary for the 
conflicting parties to seek an alternative resolution.  Two conditions are necessary for a 
ripe moment to emerge.  First, combatants must perceive war as being an inefficient or 
ineffective means of achieving their goal.  Second, combatants must believe that a 
solution other than war exists.  In short, this line of reasoning suggests that in order for 
the parties to agree to meet at the negotiating table, they must first decide that fighting is 
no longer a viable means by which their goals can be realized.   
 
Rational choice arguments 
Rational choice theories of civil war, otherwise known as expected utility, draw 
most directly from international relations and ultimately from theories of economic 
behavior4.  In essence, expected utility theorists view war as a "costly lottery” in which 
both sides impose and incur costs in order to maximize the benefit each side gains 
(Wagner 2000, p. 470).  These theorists view the onset and termination of war as being 
inextricably linked.  According to their logic, civil war begins when the benefits of 
fighting exceed that of not fighting and ends in a negotiated settlement when the benefits 
of doing so exceed the benefits of pursuing a military victory.    
Participants in a war are viewed as rational actors because it is assumed that each 
side bases its decision making process to maximize its expected utility.  An actor 
calculates its expected utility based on three factors – its perceived likelihood of being 
successful on the battlefield; the benefits of an outright military victory relative to the 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Whitmann (1979), de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) 
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benefits of a negotiated settlement; and the costs it must endure in order to achieve 
military victory.  The combatants’ decision-making process hinges on what each 
perceives to be in its own best interest.  The goal of combatants, according to rational 
choice theorists, is to convince their opponent to surrender because either the costs of 
winning will be too great or the probability of success too low to win an outright defeat.  
The rationalist logic Whittman (1979, p. 744) applies to the settlement of international 
war holds equally true for civil wars: “an agreement (either explicit or implicit) to end a 
war cannot be reached unless the agreement makes both sides better off; for each country 
the expected utility of continuing the war must be less than the expected utility of 
settlement.” 
Empirical assessments of rational choice theories of the termination of civil wars 
build on the work of Whitmann (1979), who identifies the conditions under which an 
international war is likely to be resolved through negotiations.  His results indicate that a 
combatant will seek a negotiated settlement only when it believes that it will be better off 
by doing so than by continuing to pursue a military victory.  Mason and Fetts (1996) 
apply this same logic to the resolution of a civil war.  These authors use six independent 
variables to predict whether or not a conflict will be resolved by a negotiated settlement:  
(1) the size of the government’s forces; (2) the casualty rate; (3) the duration of the 
conflict; (4) whether or not an intervention by an outside power occurred; (5) the stakes 
of the conflict (political control versus control over a potion of territory); and (6) whether 
or not the conflict addressed ethnic or religious divisions.   
 Mason and Fetts (1996) conclude that only two variables – duration and the size 
of the government forces – demonstrated a statistically significant effect, with duration 
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being positive and the size of government forces being negative.  The authors draw 
several interesting and relevant conclusions from the analysis.  First, “the longer a civil 
war lasts, the more likely the participants are to seek a negotiated settlement as the 
conflict draws on” (p. 563).  Second, “the fact that the size of the army is negatively 
related to the probability of a settlement indicates that unless the government can subdue 
the rebels quickly, a settlement becomes more appealing” (p. 563).  And third, those 
variables measuring the “stakes” – revolutionary versus territorial conflict and 
ethnic/religious versus political divisions, have no perceptible effect.  This model 
provides support for the contention that the costs of war do influence the choices made by 
combatants of how to end the war.  A slightly modified version of this research, in which 
additional information regarding the presence of outside interventions and an interactive 
term to account for effects of inventions on the duration of conflicts, corroborate their 
findings (Mason, Fetts, and Weingarten 1999).  The second model correctly predicts the 
outcome of 86% of the civil wars reviewed by these authors.   
 
Divisibility of stakes 
 It is commonly asserted within the scholarly community that “negotiations in civil 
wars are futile because the stakes are indivisible” (Stedman 1996, pp. 345).  Pillar (1983, 
p. 24) makes a similar observation:  “Stakes are usually less divisible in civil wars than in 
other types of war; the issue is whether one side or the other shall control the country.”  
This line of thinking emphasizes the difficulty with which the stakes of the conflict can 
be subdivided and therefore shared by the combatants.  However, the proposition that 
indivisible goals account for the lack of negotiated compromises in civil wars is a matter 
of dispute.  Strong arguments have been proposed attributing the dearth of negotiated 
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compromises to the divisibility of the stakes but theoretical explanations differ as to the 
why stakes might be indivisible and the degree to which they are indivisible. 
 Civil wars start for a seemingly infinite numbers of reasons and are fought to 
achieve a wide range of political change.  On a conceptual level, the goals of the state are 
relatively simple and straightforward – to reject the demands of the rebels and maintain 
the status quo.  The goals of the rebels, however, can address a wide range of political 
issues.  Generally speaking, rebels can demand changes in three areas.  At the most 
comprehensive level, the rebels can demand changes to the political structure of the state 
and its operation.  Such demands can include changes to the constitution of the state, 
changes in leadership, or the dissolution of the existing government.  Second, the rebels 
can demand changes that affect a geographic region within a state’s borders.  In these 
territorial disputes some degree of autonomy or even complete independence for the 
region of the state may be sought.  Finally, the demands of the rebels can address the 
outputs of the policy process of the state.  These disputes may include equalizing a real or 
perceived maldistribution of political or economic rights for a segment of a population or 
the status of a group within the state, for example.  Some stakes are easily subdivided and 
therefore shared, which makes it at least possible for the combatants to construct an 
agreement in which each gets some, but not all, of what it wants.  Conversely, other goals 
are considered to be indivisible, thereby producing a situation that can only create 
winners and losers.   
Clearly some goals are more amenable to a negotiated compromise because they 
allow for success to be addressed as a matter of degree, as in the degree of reform of 
existing political systems, changes in the allocation and distribution of political goods, or 
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degrees of autonomy.  On the other hand, some goals are total in nature and therefore not 
subject to division, such as the dissolution and replacement of an existing system of 
government, change in leadership, or complete and total territorial succession.  Variations 
in the extent to which stakes are divisible (as well as the willingness of belligerents to 
divide them) carry important implications the resolution of a civil war.  As Pillar (1983, 
p. 24) notes, 
The likelihood that the two sides in any dispute can negotiate a settlement depends 
greatly on whether compromise agreements are available.  If the stakes are chiefly 
indivisible, so that neither side can get most of what it wants without depriving the other 
of most of what it wants, negotiations are less apt to be successful.  
 
Of course, not all civil wars are fought over stakes that are divisible or among combatants 
who are willing to make such bargains, thereby significantly reducing or even eliminating 
the prospect of a negotiated resolution and contributing to the prevalence of military 
victories (Walter 2002, p. 13). 
 Other scholars take a different approach to the matter.  The core impediment to a 
negotiated compromise brought about by the indivisibility of goals, according to Zartman 
(1993, pp. 24-27), is the nature of the relationship between the state and the rebels rather 
than the stakes themselves.  He contends that “the government enjoys an asymmetry of 
power, but the rebels compensate with an asymmetry of commitment” (1993, p. 25).   
The rebels, according to this view, exist solely to pursue the stakes of the conflict and are 
therefore committed to the stakes with little room to redefine or reduce their demands 
without losing legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents.  As a result, the commitment 
of the rebels leaves “little possibility of tradeoffs and compromise” because “recognition 
is their top and bottom line, with nothing in between to contribute to the give and take of 
negotiation and compromise”  (Zartman 1993, pp. 25-26).   
 30
 Another factor proposed by Zartman addresses the legitimacy with which 
combatants view each other.  According to him (1993, p. 27), parties to a civil war 
“retrench on their element of strength and harden their positions” in response to an open 
challenge posed by their adversary.  The parties to a civil war may not be willing to meet 
with their adversary to discuss subdividing the stakes because doing so simply lends 
legitimacy to their opponent. 
 Thus, disagreement regarding the source of indivisible stakes and to the extent to 
which they are actually indivisible exists, but whether or not stakes are indivisible is 
conditioned by the perspectives and choices made by the adversaries themselves and 
influenced by political and military issues on the ground.  As Horowitz (1985) and 
Lijphart (1977) point out, alternatives do exist but may be difficult to recognize or accept.  
For example, in cases where a demand is made for the removal of a ruling party, a less 
extreme demand may be ensuring adequate representation through power-sharing 
arrangements or alterations in the constitutional structure to limit the power of the 
government.  In the case of territorial stakes, if independence is demanded, an alternative 
may be to increase the political and economic independence of a particular region within 
the state or to take other measures that promote autonomy short of independence.  Of 
course, not all alternatives may be viable or acceptable to the combatants, but should the 
combatants chose to revise their aims and goals a negotiated settlement may be possible 
in many cases. 
Given that some stakes of a civil war are at least treated by the combatants as 
being indivisible, how might the likelihood of a negotiated settlement be affected?  Two 
arguments have been suggested (Walter 2002).  First, in political conflicts addressing the 
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composition or organization of the government, differences may be observed according 
to the type of stakes.  Where the goals of the rebels pose a direct threat to the existence of 
the present government, the state can be expected to refuse to negotiate.  For example, 
when the rebels assert a claim for complete and total control of the government the state 
may be reluctant to join in a negotiated settlement for fear of losing control.  However, 
when the claims of the rebels are limited, such as seeking a revision of discriminatory 
political or economic policies, a negotiated settlement may present an attractive 
alternative to going to or continuing war.  Second, in the case of territorial conflicts, the 
situation may be less clear.  On one hand, states may be reluctant to give up parts of their 
territory, especially if the territory in question is strategically located or contains valuable 
resources and the rebels may be reluctant to acquiesce on their demands for total 
independence.  However, in the extreme the logic becomes clearer.  In civil wars where 
states are forced to choose between giving up territory or facing destruction the choice 
becomes clear – the existing government may choose a modified existence over no 
existence at all.  In the case of the rebels, partial autonomy and the ability to continue to 
press their claims in the future outweigh the destruction that a capitulation or clear-cut 
military defeat will bring about.  Therefore, because territorial conflicts do not 
necessarily threaten the continued existence of either party, negotiated compromises may 
be easier to construct in territorial conflicts than in non-territorial ones.   
 
Actors and participants 
 Explanations focusing on the actors and participants in a civil war address the 
political make-up of the state, the presence of external actors, and the social identification 
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of the participants.  The focus is on isolating the effects of the social and political 
organization of the combatants and the presence of outside actors on the resolution 
process.  Three major issues are raised within the literature – the degree to which the state 
is democratic, the presence of outside actors, and the ethnic makeup of the participants.  
Each of these is discussed in detail below. 
 
Democracy  
 One factor that has been proposed to explain the occurrence of negotiated 
settlements focuses on the institutional makeup (or polity type) of the state involved in 
the conflict.  Although civil wars are relatively rare events in democracies and 
democratizing states, 5 it is well documented that these states do experience intrastate 
warfare (Gurr 1993; Hegre, et al 2001, Mansfield and Snyder 1995).  In fact, the 
evidence strongly suggests that fledging democracies are more prone to civil war than are 
consolidated democratic or authoritarian forms of government (Hegre, et al 2001; Snyder 
2000).  Also, democracy is not an either-or case, but a matter of degree, which raises the 
possibility that how democratic a state is may be as important as whether it is a 
democracy.  For these reasons the degree to which a participant state is democratic is 
worthy of consideration.  
Drawing from an extensive literature that explains the absence (or reduced 
incidence of) interstate conflict between democracies, three reasons have been proposed 
that address the likelihood of a civil war ending in a negotiated settlement as a function of 
the political makeup of the state.  The central theme in these explanations, which parallels 
the democratic peace literature that addresses the lack of interstate war between 
                                                 
5 The American Civil War is a prominent an exception (Hegre, et al 2001). 
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democracies, is that “the decision to negotiate depends on the domestic political 
constraints placed on individual leaders” (Walter 2002, p. 10).   This literature contends 
that states exhibiting a higher degree of democracy will be more likely to resolve a civil 
war through a negotiated settlement. 
 The first reason that democratic states may be more willing to seek a negotiated 
settlement addresses the relationship between the decision-makers of a state and its 
populace.  In states exhibiting a high degree of democracy, elected leaders are expected 
to be more responsive to public opinion than their more authoritarian counterparts.  
Therefore, in democratic state the decision to resolve civil wars short of a complete 
victory may be conditioned by the degree of popular support within the populace (Russett 
1993).  Civil wars are relatively bloody conflicts in which a significant degree of the loss 
of life and destruction, much of which is borne by civilian non-combatants (Snyder 
2000).  Because the impact of a civil war directly affects the populace, civil wars are 
likely to evoke opposition among the masses.  Leaders in more democratic states may 
therefore choose to avoid certain wars altogether and when civil wars do occur, public 
pressure may compel leaders to end the fighting by the quickest or least bloody method 
available.  A negotiated settlement may provide the best option for democratic leaders to 
avoid a prolonged and bloody conflict because it does not require the absolute defeat of 
an opponent.  
 The second reason addresses the credibility of leaders of democracies versus 
authoritarian governments.  According to some scholars (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
1992, for instance), the democratic leaders enjoy more credibility with dissatisfied 
members of the populace than their authoritarian counterparts.  Credibility enables 
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democratic leaders to be more successful in their efforts to end a conflict via a negotiated 
settlement because their promises are more apt to be trusted by the opposition, according 
to the logic with this school of thought.  When democratic leaders make agreements, they 
do so based on the authority bequeathed them by the public that they represent.  Their 
promises of future behavior, then, reflect the collective decision of their constituents. The 
decisions are directly linked to the collective will of their constituents, which constrains 
leaders from diverging from the promises they have made.  As a result, democratic 
leaders are less likely to renege on the promises made to their adversaries because doing 
so entails consequences not just from their adversaries but also from those they represent.  
This offers a measure of protection to the opponents, which makes them more willing to 
enter into agreements because of the additional credibility of the promises.  As a result, 
negotiated settlements are considered to be more likely to occur because the adversaries 
of a democracy have more reason to engage in negotiated settlements. 
 The third reason that democracies may be more likely to pursue a negotiated 
settlement draws from normative (or cultural) explanations of democratic peace theory 
(Russett 1993).  Normative explanations of the democratic peace are based on the theory 
that democratic leaders are more accustomed to accommodating differences of opinion.  
This vein of thought contends that the leaders of democratic states will be more likely to 
negotiate a compromised settlement because the leaders are culturally predisposed 
towards considering compromise as a means of dispute resolution, whereas the leaders in 
less democratic or more authoritarian states may be more reluctant to do so.  In sum, by 
drawing on the expansive literature that explains the absence of interstate conflict among 
democracies, strong theoretical reasons exist to suppose the contention that degree of 
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democracy of a state combatant may increase its propensity to resolve ongoing fighting 
via a negotiated compromise.  
 
Interventions 
The involvement of external third parties has also been addressed as a significant 
factor that affects the likelihood of a negotiated settlement of a civil war.  As with 
international conflicts, states and international organizations frequently have an interest 
in the outcome of the conflict and so it is common for external third parties to become 
involved in an ongoing or burgeoning conflict.  The aim of the third party can range from 
helping the combatants settle the dispute, to influence who or how the dispute is resolved, 
or even to ensure the continuation of the dispute (Regan 2002). 
The intervention of third parties who are not direct participants in a civil war is 
well-documented.  Walter’s (2002) data indicate that 89 out of 138 (or about 65%) of 
civil conflicts with at least 1,000 annual deaths occurring between 1942 and 1992 
experienced mediation by outside forces.  Regan’s (2002) data indicate that military or 
economic interventions occurred in 31 of 72 (about 43%) of all civil wars with at least 
200 battle deaths annually between 1944 and 1996.  The extensive use of interventions in 
not limited to states, either, as evidenced by the significant increase in the number of 
United Nations peace keeping operations (Bobrow and Boyer 1997).   
What, then, constitutes an intervention?  Conceptually interventions are easy to 
define.  Focusing on unilateral interventions, Regan (2002, p. 9) defines an episode as 
“the use of one state’s resources in an attempt to influence the internal conflict of another 
state”.  The definitional logic can easily be broadened to include the use of resources by a 
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state, a group of states, or an international organization. Thus, interventions can be 
carried out by a number of actors, acting in concert or alone.  Actors can be unilateral, 
multilateral, or international organizations and can pursue a variety of goals.      
The purpose of an intervention is to influence the decision-making calculus of the 
belligerents in favor of the intervener’s desired outcome (Regan 2002, pp. 10-12).  To 
achieve their purposes interveners can apply “soft” efforts such as diplomatic and 
symbolic measures to more forceful “hard” measures intended to coerce.  At least one of 
three policy tools can be used by a third party to influence outcomes.  Diplomatic 
interventions can be as simply as symbolically demonstrating the support or disapproval 
for the actions of one side or can utilize mediation to alter the flow of information and 
enhance communication between belligerents (Walter 2002; see also Touval and Zartman 
1985).  Symbolic efforts may include making public statements that advocating talks or 
condemning combat, or actions such as recalling officials and canceling meetings.  
Mediations can influence outcomes by encouraging communication between combatants, 
assisting the transfer of important information, and facilitating the discussion of issues 
and the agenda (Walter 2002, pp. 14-15; Touval and Zartman 1985).  Diplomatic 
interventions are the most common form of external involvement, but are considered the 
least effective, possibly because they do not allow interveners the ability to coerce 
belligerents (Regan 2002).   
“Hard” measures involve the application of coercive force via economic or 
military pressures, including economic sanctions or the threat or actual use of military 
force intended to pressure combatants to value one outcome over other possibilities.  
Coercive forms of interventions enhance the ability of outside actors to manipulate the 
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costs and benefits of the combatants’ decision-making calculus, but do so at the expense 
of imposing costs and risks on the intervener.  Coercive interventions can involve either 
economic or military tools of statecraft.   
Empirical assessments of the effects of interventions on civil wars focus 
predominantly on the duration of such wars.  The consensus of these studies is that 
interventions are associated with or directly cause conflicts to last longer in most cases.  
Addressing interventions by both the United Nations and the United States into Bosnia, 
Somalia, and Haiti, Betts (1994) presents a twofold argument.  He first argues that when 
an intervention is biased to the benefit of one side, the duration of a civil war will be 
shortened.  This is so, he argues, because when a combatant gains support from external 
sources, the additional strength can easily tip the balance of power in its favor, thereby 
enabling that combatant to bring about a quicker defeat. However, impartial 
interventions, in which no side is given preferential support, the duration of the conflict is 
likely to last longer than otherwise because neither side is able to achieve a dominant 
position.   
Similarly, Regan (1996), in an analysis of 101 civil wars between 1945 and 1999 
in which interventions took place, builds on Betts’ (1994) observations.  Regan finds that 
in general interventions are associated with prolonged conflicts, although biased 
interventions are likely to shorten a conflict.  In addition, he concludes that multilateral 
interventions are more apt to be successful than unilateral ones.  His extended book-
length analysis (Regan 2002) extends and broadens his findings.  Here, he first finds that 
interventions are more likely to be successful when the state is supported and that mixed 
interventions, or those combining economic and military measures, are more successful 
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than those employing one or the other.  Finally, he replicates his previous conclusion that 
interventions are associated with longer conflicts.  Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) reach 
similar conclusions, finding that interventions are more likely to be associated with 
longer conflicts and with higher levels of violence.  
Shifting the emphasis to diplomatic initiatives, Walter (1997) finds that 
diplomatic interventions do not affect outcomes unless the intervening state is willing to 
enforce an agreement once it is accepted by the combatants.  She also finds that 
combatants are 39% more likely to engage in negotiations when a mediator is present, 
which she attributes to the ability of mediators to manage communication and the flow of 
information between combatants. 
 
Ethnicity 
 Another factor prevalent in the literature that may affect the likelihood of a 
negotiated settlement addresses ethnic politics as a source of conflict.  This literature 
contends that civil wars in which ethnicity plays a role are fundamentally different from 
ideological civil wars, ot those that are driven by political concerns.  Within the literature, 
the most common assertion is that ethnic wars are less tractable and therefore less apt to 
be resolved by a negotiated resolution (Walter 2002, Kaufmann 1996, Sambanis 2001).  
However, Regan (2002) argues that ethnic civil wars are more easily resolved as long as 
an intervention is present. 
 At the root of the debate is the contention that ethnic civil wars are inherently and 
fundamentally different from non-ethnic or ideological civil wars.  As Sambanis (2001) 
succinctly observes, “Not all civil wars are the same.”  What, then, differentiates the two 
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types of conflict?   Kaufmann (1996, p. 446) contends that the loyalties of the belligerents 
and the goals of the combatants makes the two types of conflict distinct: 
Ethnic conflicts are disputes between communities which see themselves as having 
distinct heritages, over the power relationship between the communities, while 
ideological civil wars are contests between factions within the same community over how 
that community should be governed.  The key difference is the flexibility of individual 
loyalties, which are quite fluid in ideological conflicts, but almost completely rigid in 
ethnic wars. 
 
 The most common viewpoint in the literature is that ethnic civil wars are more 
difficult to settle by a negotiated settlement than ideological wars.    As Walter (2002, p. 
12) observes, ethnic civil wars are “thought to be less amenable to rational calculations of 
costs and benefits than conflicts between combatants drawn from similar identity groups” 
because ethnic civil wars are “frequently depicted as intense value conflicts over issues 
close to the heart”.  Or, as Kaufmann (1996, pp. 445-46) describes it, in ideological 
conflicts, loyalties are “quite fluid”, whereas in ethnic conflicts they are “almost 
completely rigid”. 
Regan (2002, pp. 77), however, reaches the opposite conclusion in the special 
case of interventions in ethnic civil wars.  He contends that ethnic civil wars more likely 
to be successfully resolved via a negotiated settlement when than ideological civil wars in 
the presence of an intervention by an external third party.  His reasoning is that in an 
ideological civil war both sides are likely to gain support from an external third party, 
whereas in an ethnic civil war the possibility is reduced because group affinities are 
limited.  Therefore, in an ideological civil war, an intervention on one side is more likely 
prompt a counter-intervention.  A counter-intervention reduces or nullifies the advantages 
gained by the recipient of external support, which increases the likelihood of prolonged 
fighting.  When group affinities are limited a counter intervention is less likely to occur.  
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No one side will gain an advantage as a result of an intervention which makes a quicker 
resolution more likely. 
Thus, strong theoretical reasons exist to expect ethnic civil wars to behave 
differently than ideological ones.  In large part this distinction is attributed to the 
differences between ethnic and ideological civil wars.  However, disagreement exists as 
to the direction of the effect and conditions under which such an effect may be observed.  
Despite the current lack of agreement of the effect of ethnicity on the resolution of civil 
wars, the scholarly community has made significant progress towards understanding its 
role.  What has yet to be addressed, however, is what factors affect the content of 
negotiated settlements in those cases where they occur. 
 
What is missing  
 Existing research has substantially contributed to our understanding of the 
resolution of civil war and has done so on several counts.  First, it has highlighted what 
kinds of civil wars are more or less amenable to a negotiated resolution.  Second, it has 
advanced our knowledge of how the presence or absence of certain actors can affect 
outcomes.  Third, existing research has illustrated how different types of actors can 
influence the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.  And finally, we currently have a good 
understanding of the conditions under which a negotiated settlement is more or less likely 
to occur.  Thus, we know: (1) the conditions under which conflicts are more or less likely 
to be resolved; and (2) what types of civil wars are more or less amenable to a negotiated 
resolution.  Yet this knowledge does little to inform us about the factors and conditions 
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that influence the content of a negotiated settlement.  As a result, our understanding of 
civil war as a political process is at best incomplete. 
 Based on existing research, we know little, if anything, about how the concessions 
promised by one side affect the likelihood that negotiations are successful.  We also 
know little about the role civil war plays as a political force.   That is, we have little 
understanding of how civil wars may be used as a strategy of interest articulation and 
aggregation and how these demands may be reconciled by an existing state.  Given the 
contention that civil war is at its core a political dispute carried out by militaristic means, 
understanding this aspect of the phenomenon is essential if researchers are to understand 
the role that civil wars play in domestic society and the process by which they are (or are 
not) resolved.  The theory outlined in Chapter 3 below goes to the heart of the matter of 
both the political nature of civil war and its resolution. 
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Chapter 3:  Bargaining theory and state concessions 
 
 
 
 In order to identify those factors that influence concessions offered by states 
involved in civil war, this research draws on what has become known as the bargaining 
theory of war.  Described by Lake (2003, p. 81) as one of the most revolutionary recent 
advances in international relations theory, bargaining theory explains conflict as an 
inherent part of the political process.  This description is intended to emphasize the 
inability of rationalists to explain why decision-makers are unable to resolve political 
differences without encountering the risks and costs of war (Fearon 1995 p. 380).   
Despite different theoretical explanations of the factors that condition a combatant’s 
willingness to negotiate, bargaining theory builds on rationalist logic by integrating the 
same rationalist decision-making process. 
 The rationalist school of thought contends that political actors make decisions 
from a slate of options based on a comparison of the expected utility (net benefits 
conditioned by the probability of success) of a range of choices.  Actors then select the 
option that provides the greatest expected utility (or net benefits).  Although bargaining 
theory utilizes this aspect of rationalist explanations, it differs in its explanation of the 
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mechanisms by which conflicts begin and end.  According to rationalist explanations the 
determination of acceptable terms of settlement is exogenous to the conflict.  Fighting, 
then, does not directly affect the terms of any possible agreement, but only determines 
which side gets to impose their preferences.   
 Bargaining theory, on the other hand, contends that fighting is an integral part of 
the process by which the terms of settlement are actually developed.  According to this 
school of thought, the content of political resolution that brings fighting to a halt is 
determined through combat.  Thus, in this approach, the onset and resolution of war are 
inextricably linked and the final political resolution will reflect the extent to which each 
side is able to gain concessions from the other.  War begins, bargaining theorists suggest, 
when both sides fail to identify or implement a mutually acceptable resolution to a 
political dispute.  War ends when both sides are able to reach an agreement on the 
distribution of political goods.  In essence, war is an outcome of bargaining failure, or the 
inability of the combatants to final a mutually agreeable settlement prior to the onset of 
hostilities.  Thus, in order to fully understand why two or more political actors may 
choose to stop fighting short of a military victory, it is necessary to understand why two 
or more political actors start conflict.  As discussed below, this is a function of what 
bargaining theorists refer to as a “bargaining space”. 
 
Bargaining theory and state concessions 
 The key theoretical construct of bargaining theory is the presence and 
identification of a bargaining space.  A bargaining space is a range of one or more 
outcomes that are mutually acceptable to the combatants.  When two or more political 
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actors have a disagreement but are unable to create or recognize the presence of a 
bargaining space, conflict can (and often does) occur.  As long as the combatants are 
willing or capable of continuing to fight but are unable to reach a negotiated settlement 
that is acceptable to both sides conflict continues.  However, when the preferences of the 
combatants are such that a slate of possible resolutions that are acceptable to both sides is 
developed (bargaining space emerges, in other words), a negotiated settlement can result.  
For a bargaining space to develop once war has started, “it is necessary that for both sides 
the expected utility for settlement increases relative to their expected utility for continued 
fighting” (Goemans 2000, p. 20), otherwise conflict will continue. 
 Conceptually, the decision-making process described by bargaining theory is 
straightforward.  Take two political actors, A & B, each of which has well-defined 
preferences that can be arrayed along a single dimension.  In the extreme case, A’s ideal 
point is that A receives everything and B receives nothing.  B’s ideal point is the 
opposite:  B gets everything and A gets nothing.  The problem here is that there is no 
mutually acceptable compromise.  In Figure 3.1 below, B demands b1, but A is only 
willing to concede a2, which is far short of B’s minimally sufficient outcome and 
therefore unacceptable to B.  Similarly, A demands a1, but B is only willing to concede 
b2.  Again, the demand is short of what is acceptable to A.  Because there is no mutually 
acceptable position that satisfies both A and B, a resolution is not possible because, in the 
parlance of bargaining theory, a bargaining space does not exist.  
 At this point, both actors have to make a decision between two alternatives – 
accepting the status quo or increasing the pressure with which they make their demands.  
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Conflict represents the ultimate way in which pressure can be increased.  Both A and B 
then compare their perceived expected utility for the two alternatives:  accepting the 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  No bargaining space exists 
 
<--b1--------b2------------------------------------------------a2---------a1--> 
              A                                                                                                         B 
           (B’s ideal point)                                                                       (A’s ideal point) 
 
a1 = A’s initial (or ideal) preference   a2 = A’s initial compromise offer 
b1 =B’s initial (or ideal) preference   b2 = B’s initial compromise offer 
Adapted from Lake 2003. 
  
status quo and fighting. When one or both sides value the possibility of a better 
settlement gained through fighting more than they value the existing status quo, war is 
possible as long as the expected utility for fighting is higher than it is for accepting the 
status quo.  Fighting allows each side to manipulate the expected utility of its adversary 
by threatening or engaging in combat because, in addition to imposing costs on itself, an 
actor also imposes costs on its adversary, albeit while simultaneously imposing costs on 
itself.  By increasing the costs its adversary must bear, a combatant is able to decrease the 
expected utility of conflict for its opponent, which has the effect of increasing the 
likelihood that the adversary may acquiesce or decrease its demands. 
 By applying this logic to the process by which political actors decide to end 
combat, bargaining theory supplies insight into the decision-making process that brings 
fighting to an end.  Once fighting begins, the calculations change, although comparisons 
between competing choices still occur, but now the options are to continue to fight 
(which involves both costs and risks) or to seek a negotiated settlement.  According to 
bargaining theory, in order for a negotiated settlement to occur, a bargaining space must 
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open up, which can only happen when one or both sides reassess or otherwise alter their 
expected utility for fighting versus that of accepting a negotiated compromise.   
 A bargaining space emerges only when one or both parties re-evaluate and modify 
their minimally acceptable terms for resolution.  For a bargaining space to develop, the 
preferences of both sides must overlap so that a set of one or more resolutions that both 
sides are willing to accept exists.  This is indicated in Figure 3.2 below.  In this diagram, 
Actor A is willing to only accept point a1 prior to the onset of fighting.  Once fighting 
begins, however, the combatant re-evaluates its preferences.  Although point a1 is still the 
preferred outcome, Actor A is willing to accept the less than ideal outcome indicated at 
point a2.  The willingness to accept outcomes that are not ideal is conditioned by the 
integration of the costs of fighting and the probability of success into the decision-making 
calculus.  Actor B behaves similarly by shifting its minimally acceptable outcome to b2.  
The result is the creation of a bargaining space, or a range of mutually acceptable 
outcomes that is indicated by the space between a2 and b2.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Adapted from Lake 2003. 
Figure 3.2:  Bargaining space exists 
 
<----------b1-----a2------------------------------b2---------a1-----------> 
              A                                                                                                     B 
        (B’s ideal point)                                                                       (A’s ideal point) 
 
a1 = A’s preferences without fighting 
b1 =B’s preferences without fighting 
 
a2 =A’s preferences accounting for the costs of fighting 
b2 = B’s preferences accounting for the costs of fighting 
 
a2:b2 = bargaining space 
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By comparing the expected utility for continuing to fight with that of a negotiated 
settlement, some outcomes that were unacceptable prior to the onset of fighting become 
acceptable after fighting begins.  When the expected utility for a resolution exceeds that 
of fighting, a negotiated settlement can be reached.   Given that in cases where negotiated 
settlements have been reached, agreements are clearly possible (because they have 
occurred) the question becomes:  Why didn’t the combatants reach the agreement before 
incurring the costs associated with fighting?  It is in this sense that bargaining theory 
contends that war is the result of a bargaining failure.   
  
The Model 
 Given that war is inherently costly, both sides would clearly be better off if they 
were able to reach an agreement prior to the onset of conflict (Morrow 1989).  By 
fighting, each side incurs costs and decreases the overall value of the political good that is 
the center of the dispute.  Fearon (1995) contends that bargaining may fail when at least 
one of three conditions hold:  (1) adversaries have incomplete or inaccurate information 
regarding a potential opponent’s capabilities or commitment; (2) an incentive to disregard 
agreements exists for either adversary; or (3) at least one side is unable to develop and 
accept a compromise position.  War ends only when (1) one side or another is defeated 
and no longer able to fight (a capitulation, in other words); or (2) one side or another 
adjusts its preferences so that a bargaining space – a range of one or more mutually 
acceptable resolutions – emerges.  The question, then, is: what mechanisms alter the 
expected utility of fighting for one or both adversaries?  Or, in other words, what factors 
 48
force the combatants to re-evaluate their perceptions of the bargaining space so that a 
negotiated settlement becomes possible? 
               
Costs and incentives to misrepresent 
 According to Fearon (1995), one of the three possible conditions that must be 
present to prevent rational actors from identifying a mutually acceptable resolution short 
of war is the presence of private information about the adversary’s capabilities or resolve.  
“Private information is knowledge an actor possesses that is not available to others” and 
can include information regarding “the actor’s own preferences as well as the strategies 
of bargaining and fighting it might use” (Lake 2003, p. 82).   As Fearon (1995, p. 381)  
explains, “Leaders know things about their military capabilities and willingness to fight 
that other states do not know, and in bargaining situations they can have incentives to 
misrepresent such private information in order to gain a better deal”.  In essence, private 
information makes it less likely for adversaries to conclude deals that each finds 
acceptable after a period fighting that were unacceptable before fighting because neither 
side is able to accurately assess its position.  As a result, the presence of private 
information makes it difficult for either side to determine the true preferences or 
intentions of its adversary. 
 Drawing from and extending traditional rationalist explanations of conflict, 
bargaining theory attributes political decision making to a comparison of the expected 
utility of a range of alternatives.  An actor’s expected utility is conditioned by three 
important criteria – the costs and the benefits of each alternative, and probability of 
success of each possible alternative.  The presence of private information artificially 
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manipulates an actor’s assessment of the costs and probability of success, which leads 
adversaries to make bad (i.e. inefficient) decisions.  The presence of this condition is 
especially problematic when combat is looming because, as Lake (2003, p. 82) notes, 
“war plans are especially prone to misrepresentation and, thus, bargaining failures” 
because such knowledge, when shared, enables the opponent to be better prepared to 
respond, thereby creating an incentive to misrepresent such information.  However, from 
the time fighting begins, each side gains important information about its adversary’s 
strategies and tactics, its willingness to fight, and its ability to impose and withstand 
costs.  As a result, once the fighting begins and as it continues, each side is better able to 
assess its expected utility for fighting versus negotiating a settlement.  This is so because 
both sides gain information regarding the intentions and capabilities of its adversary. 
 In the context of civil war as a political process, when the initial demand is posed 
by the future rebels to the government, each side has limited information about the 
capabilities and resolve of each other.  The problem is compounded because each side 
has an incentive to maintain or improve its bargaining position by keeping such 
information private or even by misrepresenting its capabilities and/or resolve.  In other 
words, each side has reason to bluff in hopes of gaining a better deal.  From the 
perspective of the rebels, a better deal might constitute gaining concessions above and 
beyond what it is willing to accept as a minimum.  From the perspective of the 
government, a better deal is giving less or giving nothing. 
 However, once fighting begins the situation changes.  As soon as combat is 
underway, information is necessarily transferred between the rebels and the state.  And it 
is this transfer of information (referred to as “strategic learning by Goemans 2000) that is 
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vital in determining the final outcome of the dispute.  By simply engaging in conflict 
each side demonstrates its willingness to fight and also gives up some information about 
its strategy and abilities.  As each side gains new information reveled by the fighting, 
leaders are better able to assess their own expected utility.   
 Should a combatant’s adversary perform better than expected on the battlefield, a 
combatant should, according to bargaining theory, downgrade its demands accordingly.  
In this case, bargaining theory contends that the combatants will decrease its perceived 
probability of success in response to the increase in the expectation of costs that it must 
endure in order to achieve a complete victory.  Its perceived expected utility for fighting 
will then decrease relative to its perceived expected utility of negotiating a resolution.  
The end result is that the combatant whose adversary performs unexpectedly well on the 
battlefield will be more willing to compromise than it was prior to fighting.  Conversely, 
should an adversary’s battlefield performance be less than anticipated, its opponent 
would be expected to be less willing to extend concessions (or even expect to receive 
greater concessions) than prior to the start of the fighting. 
 Although directly measuring perceptions is empirically difficult (if not 
impossible), it is reasonable to assume that leaders have some knowledge of their own 
capabilities and resolve at the outset and that they gain some knowledge about their 
adversaries through fighting.  Based on this assumption, it is possible to develop some 
testable hypotheses derived from the logic of bargaining theory.  Generally speaking, as 
combatants become more knowledgeable about their own military abilities and 
willingness to engage in conflict, as well as that of their opponents, they become more 
knowledgeable of their strength relative to that of their opponent.  Leaders are then better 
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able to assess their bargaining position and are better able to determine what demands 
they are able to make or what concessions they may be required to offer in order to 
maximize their expected utility.  Therefore, when states are more successful at fighting, 
they will require more or concede less to the rebels in order to end the fighting.  
Conversely, when the rebels are more successful than the state, the state will concede 
more to the rebels in order to reach a negotiated settlement. 
If civil war is in fact a means by which to achieve a desired outcome, it is 
presumably better to achieve that outcome by expending the fewest costs.  Conflict is an 
inherently costly endeavor in which costs increase monotonically.  Costs can be real, in 
which each side loses something of value, or they can be opportunity costs in which each 
side foregoes the benefits of an unrealized compromise.  In the case of civil war, real 
costs include human losses from causalities and dislocation; material costs due to 
destruction and the use of military resources.  Opportunity costs can include the loss of 
the benefits both sides may realize through cooperation, the inability to pursue other 
productive endeavors (including improvements to infrastructure, education, health care), 
the loss of economic productivity, growth, trade, and investment that frequently occurs 
during war, and the loss of support (financial and otherwise) from the international 
community.  
Viewing the terms of settlement from the perspective of the state, this leads to the 
general hypotheses that the more successful the state is at fighting, the less extensive the 
concessions made by the state will be.  The less successful the state is, the more generous 
the concessions to the rebels will be.  Success, or the lack thereof, can of course be 
measured in many ways.  Two commonly used measurements that capture the concept 
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are battle deaths and the duration of fighting.  Presumably a combatant is more successful 
in war when an outcome is achieved by minimizing the number of deaths to its side.  In 
other words, fewer deaths indicate a higher degree of success, whereas a high casualty 
rate infers a relative lack of success.  This is so simply because a combatant is better off 
gaining a particular outcome with fewer rather than more deaths, thereby minimizing 
costs.  In general, then, the more successful combatants will experience a relatively low 
casualty rate.  Viewing the terms of settlement form the perspective of the state, this leads 
to a concrete hypothesis: 
H1:  As the number of deaths suffered by the state involved in civil war 
increases, the political concessions to the rebels will be more extensive.   
 
 Similarly, the duration of fighting can also be an indicator of the degree of 
success simply because the longer a war lasts, the more it costs.  By achieving its goals 
sooner, a political actor incurs fewer real and opportunity costs in achieving its goal.  
Simply put, if war is inefficient, then more war is more inefficient.  Thus, the more 
successful a combatant is, the sooner it will achieve its goals.  Conversely, the less 
successful a combatant is, the longer it will take to achieve its goals.  Again viewing the 
terms of settlement from the perspective of the state, this implies that the state is better of 
a given resolution sooner rather than later, which has the effect of ending the fighting 
sooner.  In order to end the fighting sooner rather than later, the state will presumably be 
more willing to make greater concessions to the rebels.  By doing so, the state decreases 
its costs, which has the effect of increasing the state’s expected utility of a negotiated 
compromise.  Therefore, if bargaining theory is correct, the fighting will end sooner 
rather than later, which produces the following hypothesis: 
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 H2:  The longer a civil war lasts, the greater the political concessions 
offered by the state to the rebels will be. 
 
Incentives to cheat 
 The second condition offered by bargaining theory that can prevent rational actors 
from concluding a mutually acceptable resolution short of war addresses commitment or 
credibility problems.  Commitment problems are present “in situations in which mutually 
preferable bargains are unattainable because one or more states would have an incentive 
to renege on the terms” (Fearon 1995, p. 381).  When one side or another (or both) have 
reason to suspect that their adversary will renege or cheat on the agreement, neither side 
is likely to enter into an agreement, he argues.  According to Lake (2003, p. 83), 
credibility problems can be created by two conditions.  First, the problem may be the 
result of the informational problems because “when one side is unsure of the other’s 
preferences (its ‘type’), it may not put great faith in its opponent’s promises of future 
behavior.”  The second source, according to Lake (2003, p. 83), is “that problems of 
credible commitment may also arise when relative capabilities shift exogenously over 
time or there are random shocks that affect capabilities.”  Thus, even though a mutually 
acceptable resolution to a dispute may exist, commitment problems may prevent the 
implementation of a viable resolution. 
 If incentives to cheat are a cause of war, then resolving these problems by 
creating what Walter (2002) calls “credible commitments” should also enable combatants 
to more successfully reach a resolution to war.  One common way credible commitments 
are achieve is through the involvement of third parties.  These outsiders “can guarantee 
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that groups will be protected, violations detected, and promises kept” (Walter 2002, p. 
26).  Such a third party intervention is likely to increase the probability that an agreement 
is reached because it increases the likelihood that it will be enforced and both sides 
protected.  Presumably the best bet for each party (without regard to costs or the 
likelihood of success) is to fight until its adversaries are eliminated – capitulation of an 
opponent, in other words.  In case of civil wars that the end in a negotiated settlement, 
though, such an outcome clearly has not occurred because such agreements require at 
least two parties.  Negotiated settlements, then, are reached when at least one of two 
factors are present.  First, the military capabilities of one side or another must be unable 
to completely defeat its adversaries to the point of causing a capitulation.  Second, one 
side or another may be able to bring about a capitulation but then may be unwilling to 
devote the resources or endure the costs necessary to bring about a capitulation.  The 
conclusion, then, is that in cases where credible guarantees are present to enforce the 
terms of settlement, it is because at least one side is willing to make the political 
concessions necessary to at least appease its adversaries in order to bring an end to the 
fighting.  Viewed from the perspective of the state, then, if an incentive to cheat 
prompted the onset of civil war, then the presence of a guarantee should increase the 
willingness of the state to make concessions to the rebels.  This leads to the third testable 
hypothesis: 
H3:  Political concessions made by the state to the rebels will be greater when a 
third-party guarantee is present. 
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Divisibility of the stakes 
 The third factor offered by bargaining theory that can prevent rational actors from 
concluding a mutually acceptable resolution short of war addresses the issues over which 
the war is being fought.  Indivisible issues, Fearon (1995) contends, potentially present a 
problem when the stakes over which the conflict is being fought over are such that 
subdivision into increasingly smaller increments is either impossible because of the 
nature of the stakes or is unacceptable to one or more sides.  Because compromise 
necessarily entails the subdivision and sharing of a political good, issue indivisibility can 
make it difficult or even impossible for the combatants to reach an agreement.  As Fearon 
(1995, 382) observes, “some issues, by their very natures, simply will not admit 
compromise.”  In the words of Pillar (1983, 24), “if the stakes are chiefly indivisible, so 
that neither side can get most of what it wants without depriving the other of most of 
what it wants, negotiations are less apt to be successful.”     
  As both Fearon (1995) and Lake (2002) note, however, issue indivisibility is the 
least likely of the three conditions outlined by bargaining theory to create insurmountable 
problem.  “Despite the attempts of diplomats to persuade one another other wise,” notes 
Lake (2003, 83), “few issues truly take an ‘all-or-nothing’ form.”  Fearon (1995, 389) 
points out two general ways in which problems of issue indivisibility can be overcome in 
the international realm: 
In the first place, most issues states negotiate over are quite complex – they have many 
dimensions of concern and allow many possible settlements.  Second, if states can simply 
pay each other sums of money or goods (which they can, in principle), or make linkages 
with other issues, then this should have the effect of making any issues in dispute 
perfectly divisible. 
 56
Considering that the issues over which civil wars are fought are potentially as complex, if 
not more so, than those of international wars, presumably the logic applies to civil wars 
as well.   
 However, two issues over which civil wars are commonly fought may present 
significant indivisibility problems.  Civil wars fought over the control of territory 
represent one possible form of indivisibility.  While territory may in fact be divisible, 
conflicts over land may be less apt to be resolved easily because the essence of the stakes 
is political control of territory, which is not easily shared.  Therefore, territorial disputes 
may be less susceptible to compromise, which produces the fourth testable hypothesis: 
H4:  Territorial disputes will result in less extensive concessions being made by 
the state to the rebels.   
 
 Another issue that potentially poses problem of issue divisibility addresses the 
makeup and organization of the participants.  Conflicts in which the combatants divide 
themselves along ethnic lines may also be less open to compromise and therefore 
susceptible to problems of issue divisibility.  This may be so because, while not 
immutable, ethnic identification is a relatively fixed characteristic by which groups of 
people define themselves and their enemies.  This logic leads to the fifth testable 
hypothesis: 
H5:  Conflicts in which combatants are organized along ethnic lines will result in 
less extensive concessions being made by the state to the rebels. 
 
 Thus, bargaining theory presents three conditions that may lead to a less-than-
efficient outcome:  the conclusion of a compromise settlement that they combatants were 
not able to reach prior to the onset of hostilities.  Based on the explanations proposed by 
bargaining theory, it seems at least plausible that if the presence of these conditions leads 
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to war, then their removal may pave the way for a negotiated compromise.  Furthermore, 
by applying the logic of bargaining theory to the resolution of civil war, several factors 
are proposed that may influence the extent to which combatants are willing to 
compromise. 
Table 3.1 
Hypotheses generated from bargaining theory 
Number Statement 
H1 As the number of deaths suffered by the state involved in civil war increase, 
the political concessions to the rebels will increase.   
H2 The longer a civil war lasts, the greater the political concessions 
offered by the state to the rebels will be.  The shorter the duration, the 
less expansive the political concession will be. 
H3 Political concessions made by the state to the rebels will be greater when a 
third-party guarantee is present.  
H4 Territorial disputes will result in fewer concessions being made by the state to 
the rebels. 
H5 Conflicts in which combatants are organized along ethnic lines will result in 
fewer concessions being made by the state to the rebels. 
 
Alternative Hypotheses 
 The literature addressing the likelihood of negotiated settlements present two 
additional hypotheses that might provide insight into the factors that affect the terms of 
settlement in civil wars.  The relationship between each of these two variables – the level 
of democracy of the state and the presence of a hurting stalemate – and the terms of 
settlement will be used to control for causal factors in addition to those outlined by 
bargaining theory.  The application of these of each of these for the purposes of 
determining the terms of settlement in civil wars is developed below. 
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“Ripe moments” 
As previously discussed, one argument prevalent within the literature is that what 
Zartman (1989) calls a “ripe moment” must emerge prior to the onset of negotiations.  
These windows of opportunity for a negotiated settlement emerge when neither adversary 
is able to gain a dominant position in combat.  As a result, both sides incur costs – a 
“mutually hurting stalemate” in Zartman’s (1989) words – and neither side is able to 
advance its goals.  Essentially the logic is that when both sides are evenly matched and 
neither side is able to achieve its goals through the use of military force, one or both sides 
will seek an alternative means by which to do so.  A negotiated settlement offers such an 
alternative.   
By turning to a negotiated settlement, the combatants are able to reduce their 
losses and possibly even claim some gains by removing themselves from the conflict.  As 
Zartman (1995, p. 18) writes, when a “mutually hurting stalemate” emerges, “negotiation 
offers a way to an alternative somewhere between unattainable triumph and unlikely 
annihilation”.  Thus, when a “hurting stalemate develops on the battlefield, the 
combatants second-best option – a negotiates settlement – becomes their first-best 
because a total victory becomes unattainable” (Zartman 1995, p. 18). 
 The outcome of this process, it is reasonable to expect, is a set of concession 
granted by each side to its adversary.  The terms of settlement should reflect a resolution 
that is less than ideal in the eyes of each combatant, but one that is also superior to 
continuing a “mutually hurting stalemate”.  Since the ultimate goal of the rebels is 
unclear, it is necessary to focus exclusively on the state in observing this effect.  For the 
state, as discussed above, the ultimate goal is easily observed – maintaining the status quo 
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of the pre-war state.  But if the state engages in civil war that produces a “mutually 
hurting stalemate” it is unable to achieve a clear-cut military victory and must endure the 
costs of maintaining a costly stalemate unless it settles.  Any settlement, then, should 
represent some degree of disarticulation between the military and political outcomes, but 
in the end the extent to which the state makes concessions to the rebels should be greater 
when a mutually hurting stalemate develops than when one does not.  This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 H6:  When a civil war produces a “mutually hurting stalemate”, the concessions  
 made by the state to the rebel will be more extensive than when such a stalemate  
 does not occur. 
 
  
Democracy 
 The literature on the likelihood of negotiated settlements also provides theoretical 
reasons to expect that the level of democracy of the state may also affect the content of 
the terms of settlement.  Based on the reasoning within the democratic peace literature, 
democratic states may be more willing conclude a negotiated settlement and may also be 
willing to grant greater concessions to do so.  As discussed above, the democratic peace 
literature presents three reasons that explain why states with a high degree of democracy 
may be more willing to resolve a conflict through a negotiated settlement.  In the 
paragraphs that follow, the explanations are applied to the content of negotiated 
settlements to explain why democracies may be willing to make more generous 
concessions than less democratic or authoritarian states. 
 The first reason presented by the literature contends that democracies may be 
more willing to seek a negotiated settlement to end a civil war because the decision to do 
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so is conditioned by the degree of popular support for the war by the citizens.  If, as the 
literature asserts, democratically-elected leaders are more likely to enter into a negotiated 
settlement to appease the public (who bear the brunt of the costs of the war, both in 
economic and human terms) by extension these very same leaders should be willing to to 
offer the rebels a better deal in order to end the bloodshed more quickly.  When 
comparing the concessions made a highly democratic state to those of a less democratic 
or authoritarian state, then, we should expect greater concessions from more democratic 
states and less extensive ones from authoritarian governments. 
 The second reason democracies may be more willing to conclude a negotiated 
settlement centers on the credibility of the state.  However, the causal link proposed by 
this literature explains the increased likelihood of a negotiated settlement as a function of 
the decision-making process of the rebels, which is beyond the scope of the present 
effort.  The theoretical processes discussed below are only for the purposes of explication 
and will not be directly tested.  According to the literature, offers made by democratic 
leaders are more believable and therefore more attractive to their opponents.  Because 
democratic leaders are considered to be less likely to renege on their promises, the 
concessions they offer are more valuable, in other words.  If the promises made by the 
state are more valuable and more believable to the rebels, it follows that the rebels may, 
as a result, be willing to make more generous concessions to the state.  However, as 
previously discussed, measuring the extent to which the rebels make concessions is, at 
best, a tricky proposition, which relegates the testing of any formal hypotheses generated 
from this logic to future efforts. 
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 The third and final reason the literature proposes to explain why democracies may 
be more willing to negotiate addresses the norms of dispute resolution in democracies.  
According to this vein of thought, democratic leaders are more accustomed to 
accommodating differences of opinion than their more authoritarian counterparts.  
Because democratic leaders are more culturally disposed towards compromise as a means 
of dispute resolution, it seems at least plausible that democratic leaders may be willing to 
offer greater concessions to resolve an underlying political dispute and bring an end to 
the fighting.  If this is so, the terms of settlement offered by the state to the rebels should 
increase in their generosity when considering highly developed democracies.  Similarly, 
few concessions can be expected from less democratic or authoritarian states.  Thus, the 
prevailing wisdom contained within the democratic peace literature leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H7:  The more democratic the state is, the more the concessions granted to 
the rebels will be. 
 
Table 3.2 
Hypotheses generated from existing literature 
Number Statement 
H6 When a civil war produces a “mutually hurting stalemate”, the concessions 
made by the state to the rebel will be greater than when such a stalemate does 
not occur. 
H7 As the level of democracy of the state increases, the concessions made to the 
rebels will also increase. 
  
Summary 
 The purpose of this research is to develop an understanding of the process by 
which states determine what concession they are to offer rebels in order to achieve a 
negotiated settlement to a civil war.  To do so this research will utilize a popular theory 
within international relations – bargaining theory – as well as existing explanations from 
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existing literature.  Bargaining theory emphasizes the role of misperceptions, incentives 
to cheat, and the indivisibility of the stakes of fighting as explanatory factors of the onset 
of conflict.  This research is based on the idea that if these three factors provide an 
adequate explanation of the onset of conflict, then their absence should explain the 
resolution of conflict.  In addition, this research also addresses explanation based on the 
degree of democracy of the state involved in conflict and the presence or absences of a 
stalemate.  In addition, a review of the data produces two more factors worthy of 
consideration, a topic which is addressed in Chapter 5.  In the following chapter, the 
development of a dataset is discussed.  
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Chapter 4:  Research design and data collection 
  
 
 
Having addressed the application of bargaining theory to the end of civil wars, 
this discussion will now turn to the data collection and the process by which the variables 
in each of the hypothesis were operationalized.  Developing measurements of abstract 
concepts such as civil war, negotiated settlements, and state concessions is at best 
imprecise and necessarily involves some degree of uncertainty because of measurement 
biases and random error.  To counter these threats to the validity of this research, what 
follows is an attempt to make the process of translating abstract ideas into quantified 
measurements as transparent as possible, thereby permitting an informed and critical 
assessment of the techniques and methods employed.  
 The first section of this chapter builds on the previous discussion of civil war to 
detail the process by which the term “civil war” is operationalized and is followed by an 
explication of the operationalization of “negotiated settlement”.  The development of a 
case list of all civil wars meeting the research parameters is then discussed, followed by a 
discussion of the process by which the measurement of “state concessions”, the 
dependent variable, was created.  The last section of this chapter addresses the 
measurement of the dependent variables. 
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Operationalizing civil war 
 The first step in building a dataset is to establish what is meant by “civil war” in 
order to distinguish this form of civil violence from other types of domestic unrest.  As 
discussed above, for the purpose of this research a political event must contain two 
essential characteristics to be considered a civil war – large-scale militarized conflict and 
a political demand made by the rebels to the state.  The operational definition of civil 
war, then, must capture both the motive (the demand for change) and the means by which 
the demand is pressed (widespread armed conflict) of civil war.  To identify when a civil 
war has occurred, this research utilizes the operational definition of civil war developed 
by the Correlates of War (COW) Project, which is commonly employed by scholars 
conducting quantitative analyses of civil war (See, for example, Mason and Fetts 1996; 
Mason, Weingarten, and Fett; Hartzell and Hodie 2003; Hodie and Hartzell 2003; Walter 
2002).  In order to be considered a full-fledged civil war according to the definition 
developed by the COW Project, an episode of intrastate violence constitutes civil war 
when each of the following five criteria:  (a)  the sovereignty of a recognized state is 
challenged; (b) at least 1,000 deaths occur annually; (c) fighting must occur 
predominantly within the recognized boundaries of the state; (d) an organized opposition 
must be involved; (e) the state must be one of the primary participants in the fighting.  
The COW criteria are appropriate for the purposes of this research in several respects, as 
discussed below.   
 The first reason the COW definition of civil war is appropriate is that it captures 
the necessary political component of civil war discussed above.  It does so by requiring 
that an episode of political violence include a challenge to the sovereignty of a state in 
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order to qualify as a civil war.  As such, it goes beyond identifying a civil war simply in 
terms of violence.  Second, the required annual death threshold differentiates civil war 
from other small-scale violent episodes, such as coups, riots, assassinations, and violent 
protests, and allows this research to focus on its intended purpose – the analysis of large-
scale conflict.  The third criterion – that fighting must occur predominantly within 
recognized borders of a state – effectively differentiates civil wars from international 
ones.  The fourth criterion eliminates other forms of political violence that are 
qualitatively different from civil war.  This would include events such as: revolutions, 
which are more widespread and far-reaching than civil wars and generally focus on 
leadership or ideology; coup d’etats, which come from within the state and may or may 
not involve the actual use of violence; genocides, or an attempt to eliminate a group of 
people with common ethnic or biological traits; or politicides, or an attempt to eliminate a 
group of people who hold common political ideas or beliefs.  Finally, the requirement 
that the state be one of the primary participants eliminates instances of widespread 
communal violence in which a claim is not pressed against the state.   
 
Operationalizing negotiated settlements 
 The second step in creating the dataset is to establish what constitutes a negotiated 
settlement because the purpose of this research is to gain an understanding of the process 
by which states make concessions to their rebel adversaries in order to end a civil war.  
To identify instances in which states have made such concessions, this research will limit 
itself to incidences in which the state formally extends concessions to the rebels through a 
negotiated settlement that is intended to resolve an ongoing civil war.  This research will 
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take a broad definition to determine what constitutes a negotiated settlement.  In order to 
qualify as a negotiated settlement for the purposes of this research an agreement must 
meet two conditions.  The first criterion a negotiated settlement must meet is that it must 
be one or more documents signed by the state and one or more rebel factions.  It may be 
argued that a better measure would be to identify those negotiated settlements that are 
actually implemented, but the emphasis of this research is on the factors that influence 
the content of the agreement and not its ultimate success.  Since the process of 
implementing negotiated settlements comes with its own set of problems and difficulties, 
this research will focus its efforts of the conclusion of an agreement and not the 
implementation of agreements. (For a detailed discussion of the problems associated with 
the implementation of peace agreements, see Walter 2002 and Stedman, Rothchild, and 
Cousens 2002). 
 The second criterion that must be met for an agreement to considered a negotiated 
settlement for the purposes of this research is that the agreement must contain some type 
of political concession extended by the state to the rebels.  The purpose of this criterion is 
to distinguish between what Stedman (1991) refers to as a “negotiated surrender” (which 
address the disengagement of fighting forces) and a compromise settlement (which, as 
Pillar 1983 notes, entails one or both sides accepting terms that are less than ideal).  
These criteria will be instituted by applying the operational definition of “state 
concessions” (developed below) to the text of peace agreements. 
 To identify those civil wars that ended in a negotiated settlement, this research 
relied on Hartzell and Hodie’s (2003) Institutionalizing Peace data set.  These 
operationalize negotiated settlements occurring between 1945 and 1998 written in 
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agreements in which  direct talks were be held between the combatants6 and that the 
settlement at least temporarily ends the fighting.  Where possible, the analysis of the 
documents was done by examining copies of the text of the documents themselves.  The 
United States Institute of Peace7 and INCORE8 have gathered a sizeable database of 
documents texts that served as the primary source for the text of the agreements.  Where 
necessary, other sources of particular documents were utilized, such as in the case of the 
Lancaster House Agreement9.  In cases where the actual text of agreements was not 
located, secondary resources sources including Europa World Year Book, Keesing’s 
Contemporary Archives, The CIA World Factbook, SIPRI Yearbooks, Library of 
Congress Country Studies, and case studies conducted by area specialists were used to 
augment or in place of primary documents. 
 
Case selection 
 To test the theoretically-derived hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, 
this research begins by identifying all episodes of civil wars (according the criteria 
established by the Correlates of War Project) that started between 1945 and 1992.  For 
wars that did not end within this timeframe, data was collected until 1999 to provide the 
combatants with the opportunity to reach a resolution, whether resolved by a negotiated 
settlement or not.  To do so, data were integrated from three existing datasets describing 
civil war:  The Correlates of War Projects (1997) Intrastate Wars; Barbara Walter’s 
(1992) Civil War Resolution Data Set; and data developed and used by Hartzell and 
                                                 
6 This criterion eliminates from the case list those instances in which third parties imposed a resolution.  
The Korean Conflict and two civil wars in Cyprus are offered as examples. 
7 www.usip.org 
8 www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/ 
9 Available at: http://www.zwnews.com/issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=6623 
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Hoddie in their 1992 analysis of the durability of negotiated settlements, 
“Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management”.   
 This approach provides several major benefits to this research effort.  First, the 
time frame of 52 years provides a large number of civil wars (91 total) to reduce the 
influences of biases in the data that occur as a result of time.  As Walter (1992) notes,  
including civil wars fought both during and after the Cold War reduces any influences 
that the bipolar structure of the international political system may have had on their 
conduct or resolution.  Such an effect, however, will be limited simply because of the 
short post-Cold War timeframe that is included produces 11 of the 91 wars.  
Unfortunately, given the relatively recent end of the Cold War and the lack of data 
availability extending the analysis is impractical at this time. In addition, this time frame 
reduces possible influences that may be present as a result of global economic conditions 
by including cases from a wide variety of economic time periods.  And third, the time 
frame reduces biases that may occur as a result of “waves” or stages of political or 
economic development. 
 The second benefit of this approach is that it provides enough cases to permit the 
quantitative analysis of a large number of civil wars, including those that have been 
resolved in a negotiated settlement and those that ended otherwise or are ongoing.  
Finally, because each of these three datasets employ the same operational definition of 
civil war (that developed by the Correlates of War Project), it allows for comparisons to 
be made across datasets. 
 It must be emphasized that the dataset includes civil wars in which the state made 
concessions through a negotiated settlement as well as those that ended in a military 
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victory by either side as well as those that were ongoing as of the end of 1992.  Given 
that the intended purpose of this research is to develop an understanding of the factors 
that influence the concessions made by the state, the inclusion of civil wars in which the 
state did not make any concessions to the rebels may be surprising.  The reason for 
including these wars, however, is quite simple.  If only those civil wars that were 
concluded by a negotiated settlement are analyzed, it is at least possible, if not likely, that 
a bias in the case list is introduced.  This is so because many of the factors that influence 
the content of the concessions offered by the state may concurrently influence the 
likelihood that concessions are even offered by the state.  To avoid this potential bias, all 
cases of civil war are included regardless of the means of resolution. 
 Several issues, however, arose in the construction of the case list despite the 
uniform application of the Correlates of War Project’s operational definition of civil war.  
Although all three datasets use the same operational definition of civil war, differences 
did in fact exist in the three case lists.  Presumably these differences are the result of the 
use of different sources of information used to determine which violent episodes within 
states met the criteria for a civil war and which did not.  Generally speaking, three types 
of discrepancies existed, each of which is discussed below as is the remedy applied10. 
 The first type of discrepancy addresses the coding of the start and/or end dates for 
individual civil wars.  This was considered to be a relatively minor problem, and one with 
an easy fix.  In five cases, the start and end dates differed between the COW data and the 
Hartzell and Hoddie data.  In the case of Azerbaijan, COW indicates at start date of 1991, 
                                                 
10 Walter (2002) draws her case list directly from the Correlates of War Project’s Intrastate Wars.  
Therefore the only discrepancies that exist between these two datasets are cases that Walter chose to 
exclude because they were revolutions or colonial wars and where multiple cases of civil war within a state 
were collapsed into a single case. 
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while Hartzell and Hoddie record 1989 as the initial year.  In the cases of Sierra Leone 
and Mozambique COW data documents an earlier start date than Hartzell and Hoddie 
(1991 versus 1992 and 1972 versus 1982 respectively).  For Nicaragua, both the start 
dates and end dates vary (1982-1990 according to COW, but 1981-1989 according to 
Hartzell and Hoddie).  In the case of Yemen, COW data records an end date of 1969, 
while Hartzell and Hoddie indicate 1970 as the last year of fighting.  These discrepancies 
do, of course, alter the measurement of the duration of the conflict (discussed in more 
detail below), but given the fairly small time-frame of the discrepancies and the small 
number of cases (relative to the total of 92 cases), the effects of this measurement error 
was considered to be relatively minor.  In order to reduce the introduction of bias into the 
analysis, each of these cases were treated consistently by uniformly taking the start and 
end dates for each conflict that were provided by the Correlates of War Project’s 
Intrastate War Dataset. 
 The second group of discrepancies between COW data and Hartzell and Hoddie 
data involve more severe timing issues that directly affect both the number of civil wars 
and the types of resolutions.  In this category, the number of wars, their duration, and the 
manner in which some wars were resolved was called into question because in eight 
states, a civil war similar to the one referenced by Hartzell and Hoddie appears on COW, 
but the precise war referenced is unclear.  The discrepancies in these cases, which are 
summarized in Table 4.1 below, were resolved on a case-by-case basis.   
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The resolution of this group of discrepancies was based on the application of three 
decision rules and a thorough examination of the historical record.11  In cases where civil 
war was recorded by either dataset as reoccurring between the same participants or over 
similar political issues, the historical record was examined to determine whether or not  
Table 4.1 
Discrepancies in the duration of civil wars 
Country COW dates Hartzell and Hoddie dates Coded dates 
Angola 1975-91; 1992-1994 1975-1989; 1989-1991 1975-1991; 1992-
1994 
Cambodia 1970-75 and 1978-
91 
1970-91 1970-1991 
Colombia 1948-49; 1959-62; 
1984- 
1948-57 1948-1961; 1984- 
Guatemala 1954-54; 1966-72; 
1970-71; 1978-84 
1963-96 1954-1954; 1963-
1996 
Iraq 1961-63; 1974-75; 
1985-93 
1961-70 1959-1959; 1967-
1975; 1983-1993 
Laos 1960-62; 1963-73 1959-73 1959-1973 
Liberia 1989-90; 1992-95 1989-93; 1994-96 1989-1990; 1992-
1995 
Philippines 1950-52; 1972-80; 
1972-92 
1972-96 1950-1952; 1972-
1992 (NPA); 1972-
1996 (Moros) 
 
large-scale conflict was reported as having continued.  In cases where conflict was 
continuous, the 1,000 annual battle-death requirement contained in the COW 
operationalization was relaxed and the incidences of civil war were coded as a single 
case.  This applies to Angola (1975-1994), Cambodia (1970-1991), Colombia (1948-
1962), Guatemala (1963-1996), and Laos (1959-1973).  In the case of Iraq, the COW 
conflicts of 1961-1973 were collapsed into a single event as well.  The second rule 
applied was that conflicts between separate rebel groups or over different political issues 
                                                 
11 Sources consulted include Europa World Yearbook; Keesing’s International Archives, INCORE Conflict 
Data Services, The Minorities at Risk Project, Conciliation Resources, Uppsala Conflict Database and 
country specific area studies conducted by area experts. 
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be coded as separate wars.  This rule applied to Liberia (against the anti-Doe rebels of 
1989-1990 and the NPFL and ULIMO of 1992-1992) and the Phillipines (versus the 
Huks of 1950-1952, the Moros of 1972-1980, and the NPA of 1972-1992).  Throughout 
this process every reasonable attempt was made to utilize the information contained in 
the COW dataset.  
The third type of discrepancy that was encountered involved all three data sets – 
COW, Walters, and Hartzell and Hoddie.   In several instances one or more of the 
datasets contained cases of civil war that were not included on the other data sets.  In 
other words, each dataset had coded civil wars that were unique to that dataset.  To 
resolve this problem, the dataset constructed for this research integrated all cases.  This 
resulted in several cases that were not listed in all three of the datasets being added to the 
final product in order to develop the broadest possible list of cases.   
 
 Measuring “maximum concessions” 
 The purpose of this research is to gain a better understanding of the process by 
which states engaged in a civil war are willing to make political concessions to their 
adversaries in order to bring about a quicker or more certain end to a civil war.  The 
emphasis here is on the factors that influence the terms of settlement offered to the rebels, 
rather than one the likelihood that a negotiated settlement may occur.  When states make 
concessions, they presumably compromise their ideal outcome by offering the rebels 
concessions in exchange for a quicker or more certain resolution to the civil war.12   
                                                 
12 A reasonable argument can be made that the option of offering a compromise at some point may be a 
central part of the strategy utilized by the state, thereby enabling the state to make concessions while still 
obtaining their ideal outcome.  This research, however, assumes for the purposes of simplicity that this is 
not the case. 
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One way combatants involved in a civil war compromise is by giving up or forgoing at 
least a part of their ideal outcome in order to bring about a quicker or more certain 
outcome.  Obviously, compromise can (and frequently does) occur on both sides of the 
dispute in order to hasten the end of fighting.  Knowing that compromise can occur and 
measuring how much compromise has actually occurred, however, are completely 
different concepts.  In order to determine those factors that compel a combatant to 
compromise a lot, a little, or not at all, the first step is to determine how much 
compromise has taken place. 
 Measuring how much compromise actually occurs is difficult because ideally it 
requires knowing the preferred outcome of each participant without considering the costs 
or the probability of success associated with the conflict.  The most obvious way, it 
seems, to address the problem may be to take the publicly stated goals of the leaders of 
each side at face value and compare them to the political resolution each side is willing to 
accept.  However, while public proclamations may appear to clearly and definitively state 
the true goals of combatants, the ideal outcome for each participant may, in fact, be 
obfuscated for several reasons.  First, publicly-stated goals may be artificially inflated in 
hopes that the party to the conflict may be able to gain more than their ideal outcome.  If 
combatants understate their true goals at the outset, the rebels and the state run the risk of 
achieving less than they could otherwise achieve.  Second, combatants may modify their 
publicly-stated goals in order to affect the amount of societal support available to a side.  
By making grandiose claims about what they want to achieve, combatants may be able to 
attract the support of the more radical elements of society.  Similarly, combatants may 
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also run the risk of alienating the moderate elements of their support group by making 
claims that segments of their support find too extreme.   
 A third reason that combatants may misrepresent their true intentions goes to the 
issue of external support.  In cases where either the rebels or the state seek the support of 
external actors, they may augment their publicly stated intentions in order to attract or 
maintain the support of external parties.  On the other hand, in other cases the presence of 
outside actors may encourage the combatants to make less extreme demands publicly in 
order to avoid any form of international retaliation or retribution.  Fourth, either side may 
publicly overstate their ideal goals in order to draw attention to their position.  By 
expressing their position in an extreme form, either side may increase the amount of 
attention their side receives either domestically or internationally.  And lastly, this 
approach presents an additional potential problem of identifying which leaders 
legitimately speak for the group.  In cases where more than one leader has made public 
statements on behalf of the group and where one or more leaders have made conflicting 
statements, determining which statement is actually the true ideal becomes problematic.  
 Clearly there are good reasons for not taking the publicly-stated goals of 
combatants literally.  The problem becomes determining what their actual goals really 
are.  In the case of the rebels, this is difficult (if not impossible) because no concrete and 
objective criteria exist for determining what the ideal political outcomes of the 
combatants actually are.  For the state, however, such criteria do exist – the pre-war status 
quo. Presumably, a state wants to preserve the existing status quo, otherwise it would not 
be engaging in combat to avoid acquiescing to the demands of the rebels.  By taking the 
pre-war status quo of the state to represent the initial goals of the state, the difficulties 
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associated with measuring compromise decrease rapidly.  The task becomes one of 
measuring how much change the state is willing to accept in order to bring about the end 
of conflict. 
 In order to assess the degree to which combatants involved in a civil war 
compromise their ideal political outcome, this research will focus on the extent to which 
the state makes concessions to the rebels.  Thus, this research focuses exclusively on the 
degree to which the state compromises and does not address the issue of the degree of 
compromise made by the rebels.  It should also be noted that this measurement is 
explicitly based on the assumption that if the state agrees with or supports the political 
demands of the rebels, civil war would be an unnecessary event.  By creating an index 
that describes the extent to which the state acquiesces to the rebels, the creation of a 
reasonable indicator of compromise is possible.  Such data does not, however, currently 
exist and so must be created.   
 An ordinal-level categorical variable has been created to measure the degree to 
which the state successfully negotiates political concessions with the rebels.  This 
variable, called simply “maximum concessions”, was developed by gathering, analyzing, 
and coding the political concessions contained in the signed agreements intended to end 
every instance of civil war meeting the operational definition that started between 1945 
and 1992.  “Maximum concessions” is coded along a seven-point index that ranges from 
no compromise being offered by the state, at one extreme, to the abdication of control of 
territory by the state, at the other extreme.  The proposed coding scheme to be used is 
developed below and sketched in Table 4.2 and developed in more detail below. 
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Table 4.2 
Coding categories for the dependent variable “maximum concessions” 
Value Type of concession made by the state to the rebels 
0 No political changes offered by the state.  (Rebels capitulate) 
1 Negligible or symbolic changes only – indicates a resolution in which 
only minimal concessions are offered to the rebels; a “face-saving” deal 
only 
2 Policy change – represents changes in the policies and decisions made 
by the government offered as a concession to the rebels 
3 Expanded political representation – individuals and groups are given 
legitimate status within the political system 
4 Guaranteed political representation – Groups are guaranteed positions 
within the executive (Cabinet-level or above), legislative, or judicial 
branch 
5 Changes in autonomy – full or partial transfer of power or decision-
making authority from the central government to a regional government 
or other political decision-making body  
6 Secession of territory – the state cedes its claim of sovereignty over a 
territorial region or group of people  
 
The construction of this index contains several general categories of concessions that 
have been offered by the state and accepted by the rebels.  The development and ordering 
of the categories is intended to capture variations in the degrees to which the rebels gain 
influence in the decision-making processes of the government as it affects the entire state 
or a portion of it.  Three general types of changes are considered in the development of 
this measurement – policy changes, changes in the process by which government officials  
 
Figure 4.1 
Relative severity of state concessions 
 
        Policy                                     Power-sharing       Territory 
       Least severe                      Most severe 
 
are selected, and changes addressing the control of territory.  The categories are ranked 
according to the increase in severity of the concessions from the perspective of the state, 
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which is diagramed in Figure 4.1 below.  Deals that grant more influence over decision-
making are considered to be more severe and therefore receive a higher ranking, while 
less valuable concessions receive a lower one. 
 
No political concessions 
 The extreme value of 0 represents an absence of political concessions offered by 
the state.  A score of 0 is assigned to a civil war when one of two outcomes occurs.  First, 
in this cases in which no negotiated settlement exists, a score of 0 is assigned.  This 
includes instances in which one side defeated the other on the battlefield and no terms of 
settlement were ever signed and cases which are ongoing as of December 31st 1999.  In 
those cases where a negotiated settlement was concluded, the agreements only address 
the process by which fighting ends and troops are removed from combat rather than 
actual political changes, while the agreements in which these terms are enumerated are 
more correctly referred to as cease-fires, according to the definitions utilized in this 
research.   
 The inclusion of a measure that does not denote the presence of state concessions 
along political lines (an essential component of the definition of state concessions, 
according to the operational definition adopted by this research) may seem unnecessary, 
but is justified on methodological grounds.  As previously mentioned, the data analyzed 
herein consists of all civil wars that started between 1945 and 1992 without regard to the 
mechanism of resolution.  This was done to avoid biases that may simultaneously affect 
both the likelihood that a negotiated settlement occurs as well as the terms of a resulting 
agreement.  It becomes necessary, then, to differentiate between those civil wars that 
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ended by a negotiated settlement containing political concessions and those that did not 
end with the state granting concessions.  Given the emphasis of this research – 
identifying the factors that influence concessions made by the state to the rebels – all 
cases in which no negotiated settlement occurred or where a negotiated settlement does 
not contain concession will receive a score of 0. 
 The categories of concessions represented by increasingly higher values (1-6) 
represent greater degrees of political concessions offered to the rebels by the state.  These 
scores are ordered according to the degree to which each type of concession represents a 
substantial change in the pre-war political decision-making process.  Lower scores 
indicate relatively less change, while the higher scores demonstrate greater degrees of 
change.  At the lower end of the scale (1-2) are policy changes, which indicate a change 
brought about by rebel pressures, but ones that do not directly expand the decision-
making authority of the rebels.  This category captures concessions that address specific 
decisions, outputs, and policies of the pre-war government but that do not address to 
whom government decision-making authority applies or the process by which the 
decisions are made.  The intermediate levels (3-4) represent concessions in which the 
state agrees to expand the role of the rebels within the government.  In doing so, the state 
concedes to the rebels the ability to influence a variety of political decisions made by the 
state.  At the higher end of the scale (5-6) are categories that represent changes in which 
the state abdicates some or all of its political decision-making authority over a territory or 
group of people, thereby reducing the territorial jurisdiction of the state.  These scores are 
developed in more detail below. 
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Policy concessions 
 Of the three categories of compromise, policy concessions are considered to be 
the least severe.  Policy concessions are those that address changes in the specific 
decisions, outputs, and policies of the pre-war state but that do not include changes 
regarding the selection of the government or its jurisdiction.  In essence, policy changes 
represent “one-shot” deals because these changes do not provide the rebels with a 
permanent mechanism by which they may influence future political decision-making or 
increased control over any territory.  These types of concessions are limited to specific 
decisions made by the government but do not address the process by which decisions are 
made.  Therefore, these types of concessions are considered to be least severe from the 
perspective of the state because they represent only a point-in-time influence in the 
decision-making process of the state. 
 The severity of policy changes can, of course, can vary considerably in terms of 
its value to the state.  To account for this, the measurement of policy concessions will 
divide policy changes into two subcategories.  A score of “1” will be assigned to any 
concession that represents only a symbolic policy change, which is considered to be one 
that does not directly affect the political, social, or economic resources available to the 
group.  This category is primarily intended to capture concessions made by the state to 
the rebels that are limited to a “face-saving” deal, such as when the government of 
Malaysia agreed to recognize the civil rights of the Communist Party of Malaysia in 
exchange to a halt of the fighting in what is commonly known as the Malaysian 
Emergency (1948-1956).  Other low-level policy concessions would include granting 
political recognition to the rebel group, but not establishing any new political rights to the 
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group, or the creation of a holiday in commemoration of a rebel interest.  For example, 
amnesty was granted to the rebels at the end of the Chadian civil war (1979-1979), while 
the Angolan government extended amnesty for crimes against the state in its peace 
agreement bringing the 1975-1991 war to and end.  Cambodia, in its 1991 settlement 
guaranteed the right of refugees to return to their homeland and promise to protect human 
rights.  El Salvador, as a part of the New York Protocols of 1992, affirmed the legal and 
civil rights of all Salvadorans.  Each of these represents what is categorized as a low-level 
policy concession.  Clearly the issues at hand may be of utmost importance, especially to 
the rebels and their supporters. However, the direct costs to the state in these cases are 
minimal as each represents a minor concession relative to the other forms of compromise.  
Since the emphasis of this research is on the concessions made by the state, it follows that 
the value of the concessions should be viewed from that perspective.  And while political 
costs may be great, when viewed in terms of the expenditure of resources that is required, 
these types of concessions are relatively minor.  This value, then, represents the least 
severe form of compromise the state can offer because it does not involve the reallocation 
of political, social or economic resources. 
 A score of “2” is assigned to agreements in which the greatest concession made 
by the state to the rebels is the expansion of the rebels’ access to political, economic, or 
social resources.  Also included in this category is a reorganization of the state’s military 
forces to include rebel soldiers, a concession which was made in several cases including:  
Angola (1975-1991), Cambodia (1978-1991), Chad (1989-1996), the Philippines and 
several others.13   Examples involving the reallocation of resources include promises 
                                                 
13 It could easily be argued that a reorganization of the military exceeds the limits of this category because 
of the obvious security implications involved.  The cases in which this occurred presented a difficult 
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made by the Philippine government to increase social welfare spending and to protect 
natural resources in the Mindanao region, promises made by the Guatemalan government 
for assistance in the resettlement of refugees as a part of The Agreement on a Firm and 
Lasting Peace (Guatemala City, 1996), a clause in the Sitges Agreement ending the 
Colombian civil war (1948-1962) whereby the government pledged a 10 percent increase 
in funding for education, and relocation assistance for refugees in Bosnia (1992-1995). In 
each of these cases, the state must either revise its pre-existing allocation of spending or 
concede access to resources.  While these types of concessions may not be as politically 
contentious at times, the direct costs to the state do increase.  Therefore, this type of 
concession is considered to be more severe than symbolic changes because it represents a 
material change to the rebels’ access to and claim on the political, social, and economic 
resources of the state.  It is less severe than both factors affecting the makeup of the state 
and territorial control because these changes do not grant the rebels a permanent 
influence on the government. 
 
Power-sharing concessions 
 In the second category of concessions – power-sharing, where changes in the 
make-up and selection of government officials are extended – the state concedes some 
access to the decision-making process of the entire state.  Here the state essentially 
concedes a seat at the table to the rebels, thereby enabling them to influence a wide range 
of decisions that come before the government.  However, the severity of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
choice.  The decision was made to include military reorganization in the policy category because such a 
concession (a) required the state to reallocate resources in order to make the changes; and (b) because the 
changes did not alter the power-sharing arrangement of the former adversaries in the post-civil war political 
system. 
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concessions can vary as well and so this category is also subdivided into two 
subcategories.  A score of “3” is assigned to the case if rebels are granted the opportunity 
to become decision-makers, but are not guaranteed such a role.  Examples of such events 
include settlements that allow for the participation of a rebel associated political party, 
the granting of multi-party elections, or an expansion of voting rights.  Such was the case 
in the Vientiane Agreement between Laos and the Pathet Lao in 1973 where the existing 
monarchy is replaced with a coalition government, free and competitive elections 
extended by the Sandinista government of Nicaragua to the Contra rebels in 1990, and 
the constitutional reforms required by the resolution of the Guatemalan civil war of 1963-
1996.  The emphasis on this type of concession is on the right to but not a guarantee for 
political participation.  Thus, this case is considered to be more severe than policy 
changes because it allows the rebels the opportunity to permanently gain influence, but it 
less severe than the following subcategory, in which the rebels are guaranteed 
participation.   
 In cases where the rebels are guaranteed a high-level decision-making role in the 
post-war government, a score of “4” is assigned.14  To be considered a high-level 
appointment, the positions must be legislative seats, positions in the executive branch at 
the cabinet level or above, judicial positions at the appellate level, or the uppermost 
offices of provincial governments.  Examples of concessions leading to this score include 
events such as an agreement guaranteeing a portion of legislative seats being reserved for 
the rebels or the guaranteed appointment of a number of high-level officials to at least 
cabinet-level positions in the executive branch or the judicial system.  For example, the 
                                                 
14 This subcategory is based on Walter’s (2002, p. 64) variable POLPACT, which is an independent 
variable that tests the effect of a political pact on the outcome of mediation as it relates to the likelihood of 
a negotiated settlement. 
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Declaration of Sitges between the government of Colombian the National Front (which 
ultimately failed) required that an elected presidency alternate between Conservatives and 
Liberals every four years, while the Taif Agreement ending the Lebanese civil war of 
1975-1990 requires an equal split between Muslims and Christians in the Chamber of 
Deputies.  This subcategory is considered to be a greater concession than the previous 
subcategory because the state in effect ensures that the rebels gain a permanent role in 
state decision-making, but less severe because the state does not grant the rebels 
independent political authority or complete sovereignty over territory. 
 
Territorial concessions 
 The final category of concessions – those addressing control of territory – 
represent the most severe type of concessions made by the state15.  This is considered to 
be so because in this case the state gives up some or all of its territorial sovereignty and, 
as a result, forgoes access to the resources and benefits of that territory.  Again, two 
subcategories account for degrees of difference with the category.  Concessions that grant 
partial autonomy over a geographic area are coded as a “5” because these concessions are 
considered to be less generous than those that grant outright sovereignty.  Partial 
autonomy in this case means that the rebels gain or are granted some form of regional 
governing authority, ranging from administrative powers to the right of self-rule, but 
short of outright political independence.  This type of concession occurred in only three 
cases:  Bosnia (1992-1995), the Government of the Philippine versus Moros (1972-1996), 
                                                 
15 This variable is based on Walter’s (2002, pp. 62-63) variable TERRPACT, which is an independent 
variable that tests the effect of a territorial pact on the outcome of mediation as it relates to the likelihood of 
a negotiated settlement. 
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and Sudan (1963-1972).  Each of these is discussed in detail below.  These types of 
concessions are considered to more severe than concessions involving political 
representation because it grants the rebels decision-making authority over a geographic 
region, but less severe than full autonomy or secession.  
 The most severe form of concession categorized by this measure is the secession 
of territory or the granting of complete autonomy, which receives a score of “6”, was not 
observed.  However, the category was created to account for extreme concessions 
involving the control over territory, although such an event did not occur.16  When 
granted sovereignty over a piece of territory, the rebels become empowered with some 
degree of legitimate authority and are therefore able to influence a wide range of political 
decisions at the expense of that of the state.  In essence, the government created by the 
rebels replaces that of the state as the legitimate ruling authority.  This subcategory is 
considered to be the most severe because in this case the state gives up access to the 
resources and benefits of the region.17  The results of the data collection are summarized 
in Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4.3 
Occurrences of “maximum concession”, by type 
Level of concession Number of occurrences 
0:  No concession 64 
1:  Low policy concession 1 
2:  High policy concession 0 
3:  Low power-sharing concession 15 
4:  High power-sharing concession 8 
5:  Low territorial concession 3 
6:  High territorial concession 0 
                                                 
16 As the example of East Timor demonstrates, such concessions do occur.  In this case the government of 
Indonesia granted full and total independence in May of 2002 after a nearly twenty year attempt to establish 
peace failed.   
17 This category of concessions is largely based on the prevailing theme within the international relations 
literature that contends that territory is of utmost importance to the state. 
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  In sum, the measurement of compromise to be developed for this project focuses 
exclusively on the extent to which the state makes concessions to the rebels in order to 
construct a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement.  At the extremes are those 
categories that represent the capitulation of the rebels (a score of 0) to the the abdication 
of state authority over a piece of territory (a score of 6).  Intermediate categories will 
account for concessions involving policy changes (scores 1 and 2), the selection of 
government officials (scores 3 and 4), and the control of territory (scores 5 and 6). 
 
Measuring the independent variables 
 Seven hypotheses were discussed above that are used to test the applicability of 
bargaining theory to the resolution of civil wars.  Much of the information regarding the 
characteristics of particular conflicts and of combatants that will be used to test the 
hypothesized relationships has been gathered elsewhere.  Where possible, this research 
will make use of pre-existing data.  As with the case selection process, the gathering of 
data will integrate information from a variety of sources, including the Correlates of War 
Project, Hartzell and Hodie’s Institutionalizing Peace (2003); Walter’s Civil War 
Resolution Data Set (2002); Regan’s Civil War and Foreign Powers data set, Keesing’s 
Contemporary Archives, EUROPA World Book, The CIA World Factbook, SIPRI 
Yearbooks, and detailed case studies.  The measurement of these variables is discussed in 
more detail below.  
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Measuring costs and perceptions of success 
 One of the primary conditions that can lead to war, according to bargaining 
theory, is presence of private information each side has about their strength, tactics, and 
resolve.  Once war breaks out and as the fighting progresses, however, each side 
necessarily gives up information about these characteristics.  When a combatant’s 
adversary performs unexpectedly well, it should increase the demands it makes at the 
bargaining table.  Conversely, when a combatant performs unexpectedly poorly, that 
combatant should then decrease its expectations.  Success, then, should be reflected in the 
final terms of settlement.   
 Although difficult to measure directly, this research will use to commonly used 
proxies to account for success:  the number of deaths sustained by the state and the 
duration of the conflict.  To measure the total number of deaths sustained by the state in 
each conflict, the variable “State Deaths” is adopted from the Correlates of War Project.  
According to the COW codebook, “State Deaths” measures the “total battle deaths of 
state participants”.  COW data will also be used to measure the duration of the conflict. 
The length of the conflict in months will be calculated from the start and end dates listed 
in COW, with any month in which the conflict was ongoing being counted as a month. 
 
Measuring incentives to cheat 
 Bargaining theory also contends that the presence of incentive to cheat lead to 
war.  Based on the reasoning that the state will be more willing to make concessions if 
the agreement is likely to be followed,  Hypothesis 3 contends that the presence of a third 
party security guarantee will increase the extent to which states make concessions to 
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rebels.  To denote the presence of absence of a third-party security guarantee, a 
dichotomous dummy variable called “guarantee” will be created using Walter’s (2002) 
Civil War Resolution Dataset.  Walter (2002, p. 69) defines a third-party security 
guarantee as being present if a third party makes a “promise to enforce or verify post-
treaty behavior and provision of expected services.”  It must be noted that, for the 
purposes of this research, a third party security guarantee is not analogous to the broader 
term intervention but is instead a special type of intervention.   
To qualify as a third-party security guarantee, an intervention must meet two 
criteria.  First, an outside actor must provide “a verbal or written promise to verify or 
enforce post-treaty behavior once a settlement was signed” (Walter 2002, p. 65).  
Furthermore, merely making such a promise does not qualify as a guarantee, according to 
Walter’s coding:  “In order for an offer to be classified as a security guarantee, an outside 
state or international organization had to follow through with its promise and provide the 
expected services” (2002, p. 65).  In contrast, an intervention occurs when a third party 
provides assistance to combatants “with the aim of affecting the balance of power 
between the government and opposition forces” (Regan 2002, p. 10).  In other words, an 
intervention can include aid and support to one side to bring about a desired outcome or 
can be neutral to help settle the dispute, whereas a security guarantee by definition 
eliminates cases in which an intervention is biased towards the success of one side 
because the intended purpose is to ensure the implementation of the agreement. 
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Measuring indivisibility 
 Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 address matters of issue indivisibility, which, at 
least theoretically, make the conclusion of a compromise resolution more difficult.  
According to Hypothesis 4, territorial disputes are predicted to result in fewer 
concessions being made by the state to the rebels.  Conflicts in which the stated goals of 
the rebels are territorial independence will be coded as a “1” with all others being coded 
as a “0”, based on Walter’s (2002) Civil War Resolution Dataset.  Walter (2002, p. 61) 
defines a territorial war as one in which “the rebels aimed to secede from the original 
territory or demanded territorial autonomy”.  Territorial disputes are a legitimate, 
although imperfect, measure of indivisibility because territory is in effect indivisible, 
unless some mutually acceptable mechanism can be created by which access and control 
can be shared.  When the claim on the territory is valuable, combatants are unlikely to 
concede their claims unless forced to do so.18
 Hypothesis 5 predicts that ethnic conflicts will also present divisibility problems.  
According to this hypothesis, when combatants identify themselves according to their 
ethnicity fewer concessions will be made by the state to the rebels.  To denote this 
condition, this research will differentiate between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts, as 
coded by Walter (2002).  She defines an ethnic conflict as a civil war in which “the 
combatants broke down along ethnic lines” to account for ethnic divisions between the 
combatants (Walter 2002, p.59).  Ethnic divisions present a useful measure of 
indivisibility because ethnicity, as noted by Kaufmann (2001, pp. 452-453), “shrinks 
                                                 
18 This logic is contrary to that posed by Walter (2002, p. 13) who argues that “territorial wars will be more 
likely to reach a negotiated settlement than nonterritorial conflicts.”  However, the argument being put forth 
here is that conflicts over territory will be difficult, but not impossible, to resolve via a negotiated settlement 
and that the state will make such concessions only when necessary. 
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scope for individual identity choice”.  As he observes, two reasons exist for individuals to 
value their ethnic ties:  the threat of sanctions imposed by extremists within the society 
and the tendency of adversaries to impose its views of ethnic lines on its opposition.  As a 
result, combatants are likely to view the conflict in terms of ethnic divisions, which are 
unlikely to be negotiated away.  
 
Alternative explanations 
 Two hypotheses in addition to those drawn from bargaining theory have been 
developed from the literature addressing the conditions under which civil wars are more 
likely to be settled via a negotiated settlement.  As discussed above, this literature may 
provide additional insight into the factors that influence the content of a negotiated 
settlement.   Two variables are proposed to have and effect – the presence of a “mutually 
hurting stalemate” and the level of democracy exhibited by the state.  The measurement 
of these variables is discussed below. 
 According to Hypothesis 6, the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate, or a 
condition such that neither side is able to achieve defeat and both combatants incur costs, 
should increase the willingness of the state to make concessions to the rebels.  The 
literature contends that, as a result of this condition, the conflict is “ripe for resolution” 
and the combatants will perceive war as an inefficient or ineffective means by which to 
achieve their goals and therefore seek an alternative means of resolving the underlying 
dispute.  When applied to the content of the resolution, this theory logically indicates that 
combatants involved in a “ripe” conflict will be willing to offer concessions that are 
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greater than those offered in conflicts that have not produced a “mutually hurting 
stalemate”.   
 To indicate the presence of a “mutually hurting stalemate”, this research will 
follow the lead of Walter (2002), Zartman (1989), and Licklider (1995), who take the 
presence of a military stalemate as an indicator of a “mutually hurting stalemate”.   To 
indicate the presence of a stalemate, the variable “stalemate”, which denotes the presence 
of a stalemate at any time during a conflict, was drawn from Walter’s Civil War 
Termination Data Set.  To determine whether or not a stalemate existed in any given 
conflict, she “sifted through reports and historical accounts, noting each time the 
battlefield situation was described as ‘stalemated’ or at an ‘impasse’”.  With regards to 
the obvious subjective nature of the nature, she notes that “in most cases a consensus 
existed among historians as to whether the fighting ground to a halt”. 
 The final hypothesis predicts that states that the more democratic the state is, the 
more generous the concessions made by the state to the rebels.  When applied to the 
likelihood of a negotiated settlement occurring, this literature contends that democracies 
are more likely to conclude a negotiated settlement to appease public opposition, because 
their credibility enhances their ability to do so, and because democratic norms of 
behavior make them more accommodating.  When applied to the terms of settlement, this 
literature implies that democracies may be willing to grant greater concessions than non-
democracies to appease the public more quickly and because of an increased likelihood to 
compromise. 
 To measure the degree to which a state is democratic or authoritarian, this 
research will rely on the commonly-used “Polity Score” from the Polity IV Project.  This 
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combined score is derived from two composite scores that place indicate the degree to 
which each state is democratic (“DEMOC”) and autocratic (“AUTOC”).  Both DEMOC 
and AUTOC are eleven-point indicators that range from 0 to 10.  According to the Polity 
IV Project, DEMOC is computed based on the values of three indicators – the 
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive, while AUTOC has five components – 
the competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, 
constraints on the chief executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of 
participation.  To achieve the POLITY score, AUTOC is subtracted from DEMOC, 
producing a range from +10, or strongly democratic to -10, or strongly autocratic. 
 
Summary 
 The purpose of this chapter has been to shed light on the process by which 
abstract concepts are operationalized into concrete measures.  This was done to permit an 
informed and critical assessment of the techniques utilized.  The case list covers all civil 
wars that started between 1945 and 1992, with data collected through the end of 1999 in 
cases where the war was unresolved.  The dependent variable “compromise” is intended 
to quantify the degree to which states makes concessions to their rebel adversaries.  To do 
so, the texts of written agreements were coded along a seven point scale, a process which 
entailed the collection of original data.  The values for the independent variables were 
primarily drawn from existing sources and extended where necessary.  
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Chapter 5:  Evaluating trends and patterns 
 
 
 
 The purpose of this research is to identify the factors that influence the extent to 
which states make concessions as a result of civil war.  To do so, this research derives a 
possible explanation from bargaining theory.  This research can also be viewed as an 
evaluation of the applicability of bargaining theory to explain the factors that influence 
state concessions.  The data collected for these purposes have been analyzed in three 
stages.  First, basic descriptive statistics are presented in order to provide the reader with 
a familiarity with the data used herein and to serve as a benchmark for further analysis.  
This part of the discussion focuses on patterns and trends involving the onset and 
resolution of civil wars, while the second addresses patterns of state concessions.  The 
second stage of the analysis (addressed in Chapter 6) focuses on the extent to which 
states are willing to compromise, which is analyzed by utilizing a Tobit model to 
determine how much states are willing to concede.  And finally, the two most common 
types of concessions – policy and power-sharing – are then analyzed by a probit model.19  
The purpose of this is to focus on any variations in determinants between types of 
                                                 
19 Both the frequency with which territorial concessions were granted as well as their distribution between 
levels of high and low concessions made the application of inferential statistics impossible. 
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concessions.  Finally, territorial concessions are analyzed in Chapter 7 using a qualitative 
approach.  This is necessitated by both the small number of territorial concessions (three 
total) and the lack of variation between high and low levels (all are low). 
 
Descriptive statistics and graphical analyses 
 In what follows, a variety of descriptive information regarding concessions is 
presented.  The purpose of this is twofold.  First, detailed information regarding each of 
the variables is provided to make the analysis as transparent as possible.  The quality of 
any analysis is, of course, highly dependent on both the validity and the reliability of the 
measures employed.  The assessment of the validity and reliability of any variable is 
necessarily a somewhat subjective process and one that requires knowledge of both the 
means by which the information is gathered and the result of those efforts.  Therefore, in 
order to provide the reader with as much information as possible with which to assess the 
quality of the measures on which this analysis is based, the prevalence with which civil 
wars begin and the means by which they are resolved are discussed below. 
The second reason for this discussion is to address the presence of patterns and 
trends displayed within the data.  Of course, the purpose of inferential statistics and 
qualitative analysis is to capture the presence and the strength of these empirical 
regularities.  Descriptive statistics do, however, have their place.  Not only will such a 
discussion familiarize the reader with the data used to test theoretically-derived 
hypotheses (thereby validating or invalidating the theoretical conjectures), but will also 
serves as a baseline to which further analyses can then be compared.  The underlying 
purpose of this discussion, then, is to construct a framework for analyzing the 
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applicability of bargaining theory to understanding the factors that influence political 
concessions made by a state to its civil war adversaries and to provide the reader with the 
information necessary to conduct a critical assessment of this research effort. 
 
Comparing datasets 
 As previously discussed, the frequency with which civil wars result in a 
negotiated settlement rather than a capitulation is a highly contention issue.  Therefore, it 
is reasonable to begin an analysis of any such data with a discussion of the prevalence of 
negotiated settlements.  Using the methods developed in the previous chapter, this  
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research produced a dataset of 91 civil wars that started between 1945 and 1992.  Each of 
these wars was coded as being ended by a negotiated settlement or a capitulation or as 
being unresolved by December 31, 1999.  Of these wars, a total of 27 (29.7%) ended in a 
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negotiated settlement, while 59 (64.8%) ended in a capitulation and 5 (5.5%) were 
unresolved at the time of the cut-off.  Graph 5.1 above depicts these differences. 
In terms of assessing the quality of the data, however, it may be more valuable 
and informative to compare the prevalence of negotiated settlements in this dataset with 
that of similar efforts. Relative to the datasets on which this effort is based, this dataset 
demonstrates an intermediate likelihood that a civil war ends in a negotiated settlement.  
In her Civil War Resolution Dataset, Walters (2002) indicates that 13 out of 72 civil wars 
(or about 18%) were negotiated.  This is far less than the counts produced by Hartzell and 
Hoddie (2003), who count 38 negotiated settlements out of 103 civil wars (or about 
47%).  Relative to the results of other authors, this research produces a count that is 
relatively low.  These counts are further summarized in Table 5.1 that follows. 
Table 5.1 
Counts of negotiated settlements in civil wars, by author 
Author and date Time Frame  Settlements, # Settlements, % 
Walter (2002) 1940-1992 13 of 72 18 
Current dataset 1945-1992 27 of 91 30 
Stedman (1991) 1974-1981 20 of 56 31 
Pillar (1983) 1800-1980 6 of 19 32 
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) 1945-1998 38 of 103 47 
Modelski (1964) 1900-1962 80 of 100 80 
 
Trends and patterns in civil wars 
 Other meaningful observations regarding patterns and trends in the onset and 
resolution of civil wars may also be drawn by making comparisons across time and 
space.  In what follows, descriptive statistics and graphical analyses are used to identify 
differences and similarities in the behavior of civil wars temporally and geographically.  
Comparisons are made in the onset and resolution of civil wars both during and after the 
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Cold War in what immediately follows.  Differences in civil wars are then discussed 
according to the region of the world in which they occur. 
 
Negotiated settlements across time 
Temporally, the vast majority of the civil wars described in the dataset started in 
the 45 year period that roughly coincides with the Cold War era.  Clearly this is an 
expected pattern and is easily explained by the differences in the time spans.  However, it 
is interesting to note that a dramatic increase in the rate at which civil wars erupted 
occurred during the short time period following the Cold War.  Although it is difficult to 
precisely pinpoint the start and end of historical periods of time, this dataset indicates that 
80 of the 91 civil wars (or nearly 88%) began between 1945 and 1989, a time period that 
roughly coincides with the Cold War, while 11 (or about 12%) began in the relative short 
time span of 1990-1992 .  Such a difference is not surprising, especially given the large 
Graph 5.2  
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 variation in the time span of each historical period.  (See Graph 5.2 above).  However, a 
comparison of the rates at which civil wars began is much more enlightening.  According 
to this dataset, civil wars erupted at a rate of roughly 1.8 wars per year from 1945 to 
1992.  However, in the years following the Cold War (1990-92), this dataset documents 
outbreaks at the rate of 4 per year, more than a doubling of the Cold War rate.  Thus, the 
data indicate a marked and dramatic increase in the onset of civil wars in the period 
immediately following the end of the Cold War.20
An even more relevant observation for this project that can be drawn from 
historical patterns by examining the frequency with which civil wars come to an end.  Of 
the wars documented in this dataset, 26 (29%) were resolved (either by the defeat of an 
adversary or a negotiated settlement) in brief period of time following the Cold War 
despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of wars started prior to 1990.  
Comparatively speaking, 60 civil wars (66%) were resolved in more extensive time 
period between 1945 and 1989.  This translates into civil wars ending at the rate of 1.3 
wars per year drawing to a close during the Cold War and more than twice that rate – 2.6 
per year – following the Cold War.  Briefly, this raises the possibility of at least two 
explanations:  (1) that civil wars started during the Cold War are more likely to end after 
1990 simply because wars must, at some point in time, reach a conclusion; or (2) that 
changes in the structure of the international political system had some causal effect on the 
likelihood of a war to draw to a close.  
                                                 
20 It should be noted that this has been explained by Gurr (2002) as a short-term spike in the onset of civil 
wars, which he attributes to the eruption of political and ethnic tensions resulting from the end of the Cold 
War.  
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Graph 5.3
The resolution of civil wars by era, 1945-1999
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 A closer look at these historical patterns is even more informative regarding the 
means by which civil wars are resolved.  This information is summarized in Graphs 5.3 
and 5.4 below.  In the years following the Cold War, not only does the prevalence with 
which civil wars are resolved increase, the frequency with which wars are resolved by a 
negotiated settlement increases and does so at a greater rate than that of capitulations.  Of 
the 60 civil wars resolved between 1945 and 1989, an overwhelming majority of 51 
(85%) ended in the defeat of an adversary, while only 9 (15%) ended in a negotiated 
settlement.  The propensity of civil wars to result in a capitulation, however, reverses in 
the post-Cold War period.  After 1989, of the 31 wars resolved a clear majority of 18 
(58%) were resolved by a negotiated settlement while only 13 (42%) resulted in a 
capitulation.  Not only are civil wars more likely to be resolved in the post-Cold War, 
then, but they are also more likely to be resolved by a negotiated settlement.  This raises 
the possibility that change in the international political system brought about by the end 
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of the Cold War may have directly increased the likelihood of civil wars ending in a 
negotiated settlement in addition to the likelihood that they are resolved.   
Graph 5.4
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 In sum, several interesting patterns in the onset and resolution can be discerned 
from the data.  First, although the number of civil wars that started during the Cold War 
exceeds that of the post-Cold War period, the annual rate at which wars broke out 
increases substantially.  Second, the post-Cold War period demonstrates a greater 
likelihood that civil wars will come to an end, whether it be by capitulation or a 
negotiated settlement.  And finally, civil wars that end in the post-Cold War are more 
likely to end in a negotiated settlement and are more likely to do so than those that end 
during the Cold War period. 
 
Negotiated settlements across space 
 Useful information regarding the patterns and trends exhibited by civil wars may 
also be gained by examining how civil wars behave across space.  Globally, a high 
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degree of variation exists in the frequency with which civil wars occur, as summarized in 
Table 5.2 below.  Although a discussion of the possible explanations of why this 
variation exists is beyond the scope of this project, an analysis of the effects it may have 
on the content of negotiated settlements may prove to be informative.  Between 1945 and 
1992, the region of continental Africa experienced the most civil wars, with 30 outbreaks 
(33% of civil wars globally), followed closely by Asia at 28 wars (31% globally).  The 
fewest number of wars occurred in Europe, with 7 wars (8% globally), while intermediate 
values were posted by the Middle East (11, or 12%) and South America (15, or 16%).  In 
other words, a plurality of the civil wars included in this analysis occurred in Africa and 
over one-half (58 of 91, or nearly 64%) occurred in only two of the five regions of the 
world accounted for in this study.  Thus, this analysis is based on a geographic 
distribution of civil wars that can best be described as uneven, but one that reflects real 
world variation in the global distribution of civil wars. 
Table 5.2 
Geographical dispersion of civil wars, 1945-1999 
 Africa Asia Europe Middle East South America
Count 30 28 7 11 15 
Percent 33% 31% 8% 12% 16% 
 
 A comparison of the frequency of negotiated settlements indicates that Africa has 
by far the largest number of negotiated settlements (11 out of 30 wars), with Europe and 
the Middle East experiencing the fewest, with 5 each.  Such a pattern seems reasonable to 
expect, especially given that Africa has the largest number of civil wars and Europe the 
smallest (the Middle East has the second fewest, with 11).  If one were to assume that the 
prevalence of negotiated settlements does not vary according to world region, then it 
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would necessarily follow that the region with the largest number of civil wars would also 
have the most negotiated settlements.   
Table 5.3 
The resolution of civil wars by region and type, 1945-1999 
 Africa Asia Europe Middle East South America 
Capitulation 17 (57%) 21 (75%) 4 (57%) 8 (73%) 9 (60%) 
Negotiated settlements 11 (37%) 5 (18%) 3 (43%) 3 (27%) 5 (33%) 
Unresolved 2 (7%) 2 (7%) 0 0 1 (7%) 
 
Such a pattern, however, does not hold.  In fact, the data indicate the contrary.  An 
examination of the number of negotiated settlements relative to the number of civil wars 
within a given region indicates that Europe (which has the fewest occurrences of both 
civil wars and negotiated settlements) settle the most of its civil wars ending by a 
negotiated settlement, with 43%.  Asia, which has the second highest number of civil 
wars, settles the fewest of its civil wars by negotiated settlement with 18%.  Africa, 
which accounts for the highest number of civil wars by region, settles 37% of its civil 
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wars by negotiated settlement.  Thus, the frequency with which negotiated settlements do 
occur varies considerable from the overall measure of 30% globally.  Given this, it seems 
logical to at least tentatively expect that the likelihood of a negotiated settlement may be 
related to the region of the world in which the war is fought.21
However, when examined from a different perspective, a clearer pattern does in 
fact emerge.  As discussed above, the region that resolved the greatest portion of its civil 
wars by a negotiated settlement was Europe, while Africa had the second highest  
Graph 5.6
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percentage of its wars ending in that way, as indicated in Graph 5.6.  But when viewed 
from a global perspective, Africa accounts for both the greatest number and the highest 
percentage of negotiated settlements, as indicated in Graph 5.7 below.  From this 
viewpoint, African civil wars do in fact demonstrate a higher percentage of negotiated 
                                                 
21 It should be pointed out that this possible trend is based on a relatively small number of civil wars and 
negotiated settlements in Europe (7 wars and 3 settlements in Europe).  Therefore, any perceived 
relationship may be the result of a spurious correlation or be the result of a short-term trend.   
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settlements than any other global region, with about 40% of its civil wars from 1945 to 
1999 being resolved at the bargaining table.  In other words, a larger number and a larger 
portion of civil wars occurring across the globe are accounted for in the region of Africa, 
although Africa ranks second (to Europe) in the percentage of African civil wars that are 
resolved by negotiated settlement.   
Graph 5.7
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In sum, a basic and simple analysis of the outbreak of civil wars across space is 
indicates that the onset of civil war is, at best, uneven.  Similarly the distribution of 
negotiated settlement also indicates a high degree of variation and one with a different 
pattern.  The most interesting conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the frequency 
with which negotiated settlements occur varies according to how frequency is measured – 
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whether it is an absolute count or as a percentage of civil wars within a given region.  
Such an observation suggests at least the possibility that the likelihood of a negotiated 
settlement varies with geographical region, a pattern that might also extend to the type of 
concessions offered by the state to the rebels.  Given the limited data and crude measures 
on which such a conclusion would be based, however, a high degree of caution is 
warranted before making claims of causality. 
 
Trends and patterns in state concessions 
 Having discussed at length several trends and patterns in the onset of civil wars 
and the ways in which they are resolved, this discussion will now turn towards trends and 
patterns in the content of negotiated settlements.  In what follows, trends and patterns in 
the types of concessions that states offer to rebels in negotiated settlements are discussed.  
The first portion of this discussion focuses on the relative frequency with which different 
types of concessions occur.  The second and third sections build on the above discussion 
of temporal and geographic patterns in the frequency of negotiated settlements by 
applying the same framework to the occurrence of different types of maximum 
concessions. As with the above discussion, the purpose here is to familiarize the reader 
with the data that has been collected, to highlight the presence of regularities within the 
data, and to establish a baseline to which further analyses can be compared.  It should be 
emphasized that this research focuses exclusively on the maximum concession offered by 
the state to the rebels.  In what follows, the characteristics of the maximum concessions 
offered by the state to the rebels will be addressed.   
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Maximum concessions offered by states 
As previously discussed, each of the negotiated settlements under review were 
categorized according to whether or not the maximum concession made by the state 
addressed policy, power-sharing, or territorial concessions.  By examining the frequency 
with which each type of concession (policy, power-sharing, or territorial) occurs as the 
maximum concession offered by the state to the rebels, several observations can be made.  
As indicated in Graph 5.8 below, power-sharing concessions make up the vast majority 
of concessions made by states, while territorial concessions rarely occur and policy 
concessions (as a maximum) almost never occur.  Several implications can be drawn 
form this observation.  First, in the majority of civil wars ending in a negotiated 
settlement, the state is willing to expand the rebel’s access to the decision-making process  
Graph 5.8
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of the entire state by conceding changes in the make-up and selection of government 
officials, according to the definitions developed and utilized in this research.  Second,  
when negotiated settlements occur, the rebels are highly likely to gain status in terms of  
 106
their ability to influence the makeup and function of the post-war government, especially 
when compared to the gains they may make along policy or territorial lines.  Third, 
despite theoretical arguments to the contrary, states are willing to grant at least the  
control of territory to the rebels, at least in a few cases.  And finally, the terms of 
settlement rarely – almost never – are composed exclusively of policy concessions.  This 
carries with it two further implications:  (a) that the rebels in a civil war almost never 
accept only symbolic concessions or those related to the distribution of resources as am 
acceptable compromise; and (b) that states are willing to make meaningful and important 
concession to the rebels in order to end a civil war.  Overall, the observation that in all 
but case in which a negotiated settlement occurs, the rebels were able to extract 
concessions from the state that go beyond the lowest level of concessions operationalized 
in this research, which indicates that bargaining theory may have some explanatory 
power. 
 
Maximum concessions across time 
 As discussed previously, an analysis of the frequency with which civil wars and 
negotiated settlements occur indicates the presence of three trends.  First, the annual rate 
at which civil wars start increases dramatically from the Cold War period to the post-
Cold War.  Second, the rate at which civil wars come to an end increases, despite the 
vastly shortened time period that constitutes the post-Cold War period analyzed in this 
research.  And finally, those civil wars that end in the post-Cold War period are much 
more likely in end in a negotiated settlement than those that ended during the Cold War.  
In sum, it appears that the change in the international political system marked by the end 
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of the Cold War may possibly have some causal effect on when and how civil wars are 
resolved.  Although an explanation of why this is so goes beyond the scope of this 
research, this observation raises the question of whether or not this trend may have an 
affect the make-up of negotiated settlements as well. 
 A descriptive and graphical analysis of the data does suggest that the period of 
history during which a negotiated settlements occurs may have an impact on the content 
of the terms of agreement.  In addition to the observation that more negotiated 
settlements occurred after the end of the Cold War than before, a comparison of the type 
of settlements before and after the Cold War suggests several possible observations and is 
presented in Graph 5.9 below.  First, the number of policy concessions drops in the post-  
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Cold War, albeit from a total of only one during the Cold War.  This indicates that when 
states make concessions to their rebel adversaries, policy concessions (which are 
considered to be the least generous form of concession a state can make) are extremely 
 108
are during the Cold War and nonexistent in the short period following the Cold War.22  
Second, power-sharing concessions increased more than any other type of concessions 
(from 7 to 16 occurrences, or nearly a 44% increase).  This implies that rebels entering 
into a negotiated settlement after the Cold War ended were more likely to gain an 
increase in their degree of influence in the post-civil war state and were more likely to do 
so than they were to gain control over territory.  Third, the rate at which power-sharing 
concessions were granted increased from 7 of 9 concessions (about 78%) during the Cold 
War to 16 of 18 (or about 89%) after, while the percentage of territorial concessions 
remained steady across the time period (11% of the total number of concessions in each 
era).  This indicates that it is common for states to extent power-sharing concession to the 
rebels in negotiated settlements and that states are more likely to do so following the end 
of the Cold War. 
 
Maximum concessions across space 
 With regards to the geographical distribution of civil wars and especially 
negotiated settlements, the patterns presented in the discussion above were much less 
clear.  Africa accounted for the most civil wars (30 of 91, or 33%) with Asia following 
closely behind (28 of 91, or 31%) and cumulatively, these two regions accounted for over 
half (nearly 64%) of all civil wars globally.  Clearly these two regions bore the brunt of 
civil war onsets between 1945 and 1992.  However, the patterns regarding the prevalence 
of negotiated settlements were much less clear. Although Asia accounted for the highest 
percentage of civil wars occurring with a region reaching a negotiated end, Africa had the 
                                                 
22 Of course, this observation deserves a high degree of skepticism given the small number of cases, the 
relatively short post-Cold War period documented here, and the proximity of the settlements to the events 
that both constitute and brought about the change in the international political system.  
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highest percentage of all civil wars ending at the bargaining table.  Thus, given the lack 
of a clear pattern regarding the prevalence of negotiated settlements, it is difficult to 
predict what, if any, patterns the data may demonstrate in the frequencies of maximum 
concessions offered by the state and accepted by the rebels.   
 An examination of the data describing the maximum concessions offered by the 
state may, however, be of some use.  Several trends and patterns can be observed from 
Graph 5.10.  First, in each region of the world, the prevalence of power-sharing 
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concessions exceed that of territorial and policy concessions by far.  Such an observation 
is not surprising, given that (as discussed above) power-sharing concessions make up the 
vast majority of all concessions globally.  It does, however, emphasize the relative 
frequency with which these concessions are offered by states, which occur in the majority 
of cases across the world and in each region.  In terms of geographic distribution, Africa 
accounts for the largest percentage of power-sharing concessions as being the maximum 
offered by the state (with 9 of 23, or 39% of power-sharing concession).  Europe, on the 
hand, has the lowest percentage of power-sharing concessions, with 2 of 23 (slightly less 
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than 9%).  However, when viewed from the perspective of the ratio of power-sharing 
concession within a region to all concession with that region, both the Middle East and 
South America indicate the highest prevalence, each with 100% of the maximum 
concessions being power-sharing.  Africa, with its 90%, has the second most frequently 
occurring rate of power-sharing concessions as maximum.  It should also be noted that 
only Asia denotes the presence of all types of concessions as maximum.  Therefore, the 
geographic distribution of the maximum type of concession can best be described as 
being diverse, with two regions displaying only power-sharing concessions, only one 
region accounting for all three levels and the ranking of the region with the “most” 
power-sharing concessions being dependent on how “most” is measured.  Thus, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that patterns and trends in the maximum concession offered by 
state may vary on a regional but not a global level. 
 
Conclusions 
 The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, it is an attempt to familiarize the 
reader with the data on which further analysis is based.  Second, it intends to highlight 
trends and patterns in the data that may be useful in later stages of the project.  This 
discussion indicates that the prevalence of civil wars and negotiated settlements 
contained within the data is consistent with the data gathered by other researchers.  
Furthermore, the examination of the data indicates that both time and geography may 
impact the maximum concessions offered by states.  A formal analysis of both bargaining 
theory and the influence of temporal and geographic patterns is taken up in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Quantitative analysis of state concessions 
 
 
 
 In order to evaluate the utility of bargaining theory as an explanation of the 
factors that influence the maximum concessions granted by the state, this research will 
now turn its attention to the use of inferential statistics.  The benefit of using inferential 
statistics is that analyzing a large number of cases is made feasible.  The value of so-
called large-n studies is that they permit the identification of general patterns with a high 
degree of objectivity and increase the external validity of the research by drawing from 
an extensive list of cases.  In form, this chapter will begin with a brief review of 
bargaining theory, followed by an evaluation of the factors that influence the maximum 
concession offered by states.  The emphasis here is on identifying the type of concession 
offered.  This will include an overview of Tobit and probit models, a summary of the 
results, and a more in-depth evaluation of each variable.  The following section will 
address the results of the analysis of the factors that influence how much states concede 
within each type of concessions and will follow a similar format.  
The following analysis is conducted in three stages.  First, the basic concepts of 
bargaining theory are reviewed for the benefit of the reader.  Second, a Tobit model is 
used to analyze the factors that influence the type of concessions (policy, power-sharing, 
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or territorial) granted by a state to the rebels.  The point of this analysis is to determine 
which of the explanations discussed above is best for determining the types of 
concessions made by the state.  Third, a set of probit models are used disaggregate the 
factors that influence the degree of policy or power-sharing concessions (whether high or 
low) the state makes.  This permits an analysis of the variations in the determinants of 
state concessions between types of concessions.  The analysis of territorial concessions, 
however, will be analyzed in the following chapter solely on a qualitative basis in 
Chapter 7.  This is necessary because the limited number of territorial concessions and 
the lack of variation between high and low levels of territorial concessions. 
  
Factors that influence state concessions 
 To review, bargaining theory was developed as an explanation of the onset of 
conflict, which is viewed as being inefficient because of the inherent costs incurred by 
both sides.  The theory is both based on and an extension of more traditional rationalist 
explanations of war that explain conflict as the outcome of a comparison of perceived 
costs relative  to expected benefits.  At its core, bargaining theory contends that conflict 
is the result of potential combatants failing to identify one or more mutually acceptable 
resolutions short of war, or a bargaining space.  The central tenet of bargaining theory is 
that, through the process of fighting, combatants are able to develop a set of one or more 
solutions acceptable to both sides that were either unobserved by or unacceptable to at 
least one of the parties prior to the onset of conflict.  According to the theory, a 
bargaining space is unidentified and conflict erupts when at least one of three conditions 
is present:  a misperception of the costs of victory; the threat of cheating by one or both 
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sides; and the presence of aims that are not easily subdivided and shared.  This research is 
based on the notion that if costs, incentives to cheat, and the indivisibility of issues 
explain the onset of conflict, then they should also explain the end of conflict.  If this is 
so, bargaining theory should indicate the factors that influence the terms of settlement 
accepted by both the state and the rebels as an outcome of negotiations that bring war to a 
close.  Because of methodological difficulties, this research focuses exclusively on one 
side of the bargaining table by examining the concessions granted to the rebels by the 
state. 
 
Analyzing maximum concessions 
 As discussed above, bargaining theory will be evaluated on two levels.  First, the 
utility of bargaining theory as an explanation of the extent to which states make 
concessions to their rebel adversaries will be examined.  The point of this exercise is to 
identify those factors that influence the type of concessions the state grants to the rebels.  
The second stage evaluation of bargaining theory will focus on determining the extent to 
which the state makes concessions within each broader type of concession.  At this level, 
a distinction is drawn (according to the criteria developed in Chapter 3) between “high” 
and “low” concessions within policy and power-sharing concessions.  The second-stage 
analysis of territorial concessions presents a special case because the small number of 
territorial concessions (three) and the lack of variation within the category (all low) 
renders quantitative analysis unsuitable; qualitative methods will therefore be used.  It 
should be kept in mind that the measurement of the dependent variable is based on the 
assumption that the types of concessions are ordered from the perspective of the state – 
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policy concessions are less generous or extensive than power-sharing concessions, which 
are again less valuable than territorial concessions.  Also, it bears emphasizingat this 
point in the analysis the factors that influence the maximum concession made by the state 
are being analyzed, not how many.   
 
Analyzing maximum concessions:  the Tobit model 
 Methodologically speaking, the analysis of the determinants of state concessions 
presents a problem:  the data gathered on state concessions are censored.  The dependent 
variable, “maximum concessions,” is censored in that its measured value may not fully 
reflect the impact of its determinants.  The value of the independent variables may 
influence both the decision of whether or not to negotiate and the calculation of how 
much to concede, should the state decide to negotiate, but the response of the dependent 
variable may be unobserved.  Thus, the maximum concession offered by the state is 
censored because the value of the independent variables (the costs of fighting measured 
as the duration of the conflict, for example) may influence the concessions that a state is 
willing to make, but these effects go unobserved because the state (for whatever reason) 
does not negotiate23.  As a result, the true impact of the variable “duration” (or any other 
independent variable) on “maximum concessions” is ignored.  This of course presents a 
problem of model under-specification, in which a statistical model fails to fully account 
for causal processes it intends to capture.  As a result, traditional methods of analysis, 
such as ordinary least squares, are inappropriate. 
                                                 
23 Several obvious reasons that explain why a state may be willing to make concessions but not negotiate 
are apparent.  First, the rebels may choose not to consider or accept a negotiated settlement, thereby leaving 
the state to fight to a capitulation.  Second, while the state may be willing to make some limited 
concessions, they may be unwilling to open up the negotiation process to the rebels.  Third, public and 
political pressures external to the conflict may prevent the state from engaging in negotiations. 
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 Two possible solutions to this problem exist.  The first is to focus exclusively on 
those cases of civil war that produced a negotiated settlement.  This, however, is in itself 
problematic in that it would most likely introduce a selection bias into data because it 
assumes that there is a substantive and qualitative difference in those civil wars that end 
in a negotiated settlement and those that do not.  None of the existing empirical evidence 
on civil war, however, supports such an assumption.  In addition, this approach entails 
discarding the large amount of information that is readily available regarding the 
independent variables simply because the complementary observations for the dependent 
variable are unobservable.  Finally, this “remedy” fails to resolve the initial problem of 
under-specification because it does not allow for the inclusion of unobserved information. 
 A second approach, however, is available and is one that offers a remedy.  This 
approach utilized in this effort involves the use of statistical methods specifically 
designed to account for censored and truncated data.24  The Tobit model, developed by 
James Tobin in 1958 specifically to address the problem of censored dependent variables, 
represents the most straightforward way in which to address the issue (Breen 1996, p. 
12).  The use of a Tobit model to analyze the maximum concessions granted by states 
accounts for the censored nature of state concessions and allows the inclusion of 
information describing the independent variables that would otherwise have to be 
excluded. 
 To identify those factors that influence the maximum concessions made by states, 
this research will employ a series of Tobit models.  Each of these models is developed to 
assess the presence, strength, and direction of any relationships between the dependent 
                                                 
24 The difference between censoring and truncation is relatively straightforward:  data are censored when 
some, but not all, values of the all dependent variables are observed; truncation occurs when some or all 
occurrences of the dependent variable are unobserved. 
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variable on one hand and each of three groups of independent variables on the other.  The 
dependent variable in each of the models in an ordered categorical measurement of the 
degree to which the state made concession to the rebels.  The lowest level of this 
measurement indicates an absence of concessions or, in other words, a capitulation by the 
rebels.  As discussed in earlier chapters, more “generous” concessions include (in 
increasing order of “generosity”): policy, power-sharing, and territorial concessions.  The 
independent variables of the following models are derived from three theoretical sources:  
(1) bargaining theory, as developed above; (2) alternative explanations present within the 
literature; and (3) patterns and trends identified in the previous chapter.  In all, four 
models, summarized in the table below, are tested.  Model 1 consists solely of the basic 
bargaining theory model.  Model 2 adds the alternative explanations to the basic  
 
Table 6.1 
Summary of Tobit models 
Label Source of variables 
Model 1 Bargaining theory 
Model 2 Bargaining theory plus alternative explanations 
Model 3 Bargaining theory plus descriptive analysis 
Model 4 Bargaining theory, alternative explanations, and descriptive analysis 
 
bargaining theory model, while Model 3 replaces the alternative variables with those 
indicated by the descriptive analysis in Chapter 5.  Model 4 represents the most 
comprehensive model in that it includes variables specified by all three sources.  In the 
section below, a general overview of the findings is presented, and is followed by a more 
in-depth discussion of the statistical relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables.   
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Maximum concessions:  An overview of the findings 
In general, the findings presented in the table below indicate that, by itself, 
bargaining theory (as developed and specified in Chapter 3) has only limited value as an 
explanation of the factors that influence state concessions, but that its explanatory value 
is increased by the inclusion of additional variables.  In fact, in Model 1, only one of the 
variables generated by bargaining theory – guarantee, which indicates the presence or 
absence of a third party security guarantee – is indicated as having a statistically 
significant relationship with the maximum type of concession, which is both strong and 
positive.  In other words, the result of this analysis indicate that the costs of war incurred 
by the state (measured as the logged deaths and logged duration) and the measures of 
intractability (whether or not a conflict is over ethnic issues or territorial claims) have no 
statistically significant impact on the degree to which states make concessions.  On the 
other hand, the presence of a security guarantee enforced by an outside third party does 
have a strong and positive statistically significant effect on the degree to which the state 
is willing to grant concessions to its rebel adversaries.  This finding corroborates Walter’s 
(2002) Credible Commitment Theory, which contends that parties involved in a civil war 
are more likely to reach and implement a negotiated settlement when a third party 
promises to enforce the terms.  It does not, however, confirm the findings based on a 
rational choice approach that find that civil wars are more likely to be resolved via a 
negotiated settlement when the costs of war to the state are high. 
In Model 2, which adds to the basic model variables suggested by the democratic 
peace literature and by the “ripe for resolution” literature, “guarantee” continues to 
demonstrate a strong and statistically significant and is joined by “stalemate,” which 
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indicates the presence of a stalemate at any point in the conflict increases the maximum 
concession granted by the state.  This finding lends support to the theory that states will 
make more generous concessions when the combatants are more evenly matched, as 
evidenced by the presence of a “mutually hurting stalemate.”  Arguments derived from 
the democratic peace literature contending that cultural and institutional pressure will 
increase the extent to which a state makes concessions, however, are not supported.  The  
Table 6.2   
Results of Tobit analysis of “maximum concessions” 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Deaths (logged) .0825 
(.1835) 
-.0422 
(.1894) 
.09518 
(.1794) 
-.1084 
(.1341) 
Duration (logged) .3570 
(.2184) 
.3414 
(.2155) 
.1110 
(.2195) 
.05978 
(.1455) 
Guarantee 2.6457*** 
(.6683) 
2.521*** 
(.6464) 
2.1571*** 
(.6331) 
1.1468*** 
(.4231) 
Ethnic .2644 
(.7351) 
.3799 
(.7171) 
.0047 
(.7328) 
.1732 
(.5264) 
Territory -.8951 
(.8575) 
-.9457 
(.8418) 
-.7572 
(.8667) 
-.5404 
(.6253) 
Democracy  .0056 
(.0485) 
 .0350 
(.0341) 
Stalemate  1.406** 
(.7376) 
 1.545*** 
(.50452) 
Post-Cold War 
resolution 
  1.7080*** 
(.6392) 
2.9159*** 
(.4785) 
Africa   -.0899 
(.8677) 
-.0838 
(.4297) 
Constant -3.613*** 
(1.7620) 
-2.538 *** 
(1.7473) 
-3.2534** 
(1.6732) 
-.7269 
(1.1497) 
     
Log likelihood -83.552946 -81.691651 -79.669123  -61.112585    
Chi Square 
Probability 
Degrees of freedom 
27.27 
0.0001 
5 
30.99 
0.0001 
7 
35.04 
0.0000  
6 
72.15 
0.0000 
9 
Pseudo-R squared 0.1403 0.1594 0.1803 .3712 
**p<.05  ***p<.01     
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model does not indicate that a statistically significant relationship exists between the 
variable “democracy” and “maximum concessions.”  This indicates that the form of 
government does not affect the extent to which a state is willing to grant concessions.   
Model 3, which replaces the alternative explanations with variables derived from 
the descriptive analysis in Chapter 5, indicates that the timing of negotiations does have 
an effect but that geography does not.  The inductive argument that changes in the 
international structure (marked by the end of the Cold War) increase the willingness of 
states to grant more extensive concessions is supported by the strong and positive 
statistically significant relationship of “post-Cold War settlement” to “maximum 
concessions.”  The variable “Africa,” which is a product of the same inductive process 
and is intended to capture geographical variations in maximum concessions, it appears 
that whether or not a negotiated settlement is located in Africa does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the extent to which states grant concessions  
Model 4, which is the most comprehensive of the models, combines the variables 
from each of the three previous models.  This model replicates the findings of the 
previous models, with “guarantee” and “post-Cold War resolution” remaining significant.  
In general, this group of models shows a high degree of stability, which supports the 
validity of the findings because it demonstrates that the results are not sensitive to 
changes in the models and therefore the result of a spurious correlation.  Stability is 
demonstrated in several ways.  First, the statistical significance of each of the variables is 
consistent across each model – where statistical significance is demonstrated for a 
variable, it exists for all models.  The same patterns also holds for variables that do not 
indicate  a statistical significant relationship.  Second, with the exception of  “Deaths 
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(logged)”, the signs of each of the coefficients remain steady regardless of statistical 
significance25.  In the case of “deaths (logged)”, which does change signs (positive in 2 
models and negative in 2), the coefficient is extremely close to 0 and the changes are 
small.  Third, the increase in the adjusted-R2 as additional variables are added indicates a  
corresponding increase in the portion of variation of “maximum concession” that is 
accounted for by the various models.  Finally, the statistical significance of the log-
likelihood indicates that each of the models has some explanatory power.  In what 
follows, a more detailed examination of the statistical analysis of the utility of bargaining 
theory and alternative explanations is presented.   
 
Bargaining theory: perceptions of success 
 According to bargaining theory, one of the primary causes of conflict is the 
misperception of the costs of fighting, which makes the identification of a bargaining 
space impossible.  This research builds on that logic and contends that as fighting 
progresses, combatants gain more complete and more accurate information regarding the 
capabilities and resolve of their adversaries – what was private information at the start of 
the conflict becomes public – and the identification of a bargaining space becomes 
possible as combatants adjust their perceived expected utilities of fighting versus seeking 
a negotiated settlement.  It follows, then, that states that are less successful on the 
battlefield will adjust its expectations downward and be willing to extend more generous 
concessions to the rebels.  Costs, then, should be negatively related to concessions. 
                                                 
25 Both deaths and duration appear in the models as the natural log of their measured value.  This was done 
to reduce the extreme variation present in both of the variables, which resulted in a nearly normal 
distribution for each. 
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 This research uses two commonly used measures of costs as proxies for success – 
the number of deaths sustained by the state and the duration of the conflict.  The findings 
of the Tobit analysis indicate that the propositions developed herein from bargaining 
theory do not hold.  With regards to the number of deaths sustained by the state – “Deaths 
logged” – two problems exist.  First, in none of the 4 models are the coefficients 
statistically significant.  Thus it would be unwise to draw any causal inferences from 
these results because “maximum concessions” and “Deaths (logged)” do not co-vary.  
Second, in two of the models – Model 2, containing alternative explanations and Model 
3, the comprehensive model – the signs of the coefficients are opposite of that 
hypothesized, although the relationship is not statistically significant.26  In terms of 
statistical significance, the variable “Duration (logged)” fares even worse, as the sign is 
opposite the hypothesized direction in each model. . 
 
Bargaining theory:  Incentives to cheat  
 The second condition that, according to bargaining theory, makes the outbreak of 
fighting more likely is an incentive to disregard agreements, or as Walters (2002) puts it, 
an incentive to cheat.  If this is a problem prior to the onset of conflict, then it follows 
that it would also present a problem in the conclusion of a negotiated settlement.  One 
factor that may eliminate or decrease the propensity of adversaries to cheat is the 
                                                 
26 If the coefficients for “Deaths (logged)” and “Duration (logged)” had been statistically significant, the 
transformation of the variables in terms of per unit responsiveness would have made a standard 
interpretation of the coefficients difficult.  However, interpretation in terms of percent change would be 
relatively straightforward.  Taking the coefficient for “Deaths (logged),” which is .0825, as an example, the 
interpretation would have been “For every 1% increase in “Deaths (logged),” “Maximum concessions” 
would have increased by .0008 units. 
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presence of an third party to observe or enforce the implementation of the terms of a 
negotiated settlement.   
 The variable “guarantee” denotes the presence of a third party to enforce a 
settlement.  The results of the Tobit analysis indicate that efforts to decrease the 
incentives of the combatants to cheat does in fact increase the willingness of the state to 
grant more generous concessions to its rebel adversaries.  Although the coefficients vary, 
in each of the four models, “guarantee” does exhibit a statistically significant relationship 
with “maximum concessions.”  Furthermore, in each of the models the coefficient for 
“guarantee” demonstrates an effect on “maximum concessions” at a very high level of 
significance (p<.01).  In addition, the sign of the coefficient is in the hypothesized 
direction.  From this, we can conclude that when a security guarantee is present, the 
maximum concessions granted by the states will increase, as hypothesized.   
 This result, then, provides confirmatory evidence for the tenets of bargaining 
theory.  Determining the precise effect of a security guarantee on the maximum 
concessions offered by the state is, however, difficult for two reasons.  First, the 
dependent variable “Maximum concessions” is an ordinal level variable and as such lacks 
the presence of set intervals between categories, which renders an interpretation of the 
coefficients based on either unit or percentage change nonsensical because the numerical 
concepts do not translate across units of observation.  The second problem with exact 
interpretation is the variation of the coefficients across models.  This research, then, will 
simply conclude that, as specified, removing incentives to cheat does in fact make states 
willing to extend greater concessions to its rebel adversaries. 
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Bargaining theory:  Divisibility of the stakes 
 The third condition specified by bargaining theory that makes conflict more likely 
is when the stakes over which the combatants are fighting are not easily subdivided and 
shared.  According to Fearon (1995) and Lake (2003), issue divisibility is the easiest of 
the three conditions to overcome because of the possibility of issue linkage and 
payments, but can still prevent an obstacle to the resolution of disagreements short of 
fighting.  If problems of issue divisibility can lead to the onset of conflict, then it follows 
that their presence will also make conflict more difficult to resolve.  In terms of 
negotiated settlements, the presence of issue divisibility should lead to less generous 
concessions being granted by the state.   
 This research uses two indicators to denote the presence of indivisible issues – 
conflicts in which the combatants are organized according to ethnic group and those over 
issues of territorial control.  The results of the Tobit analysis presented above indicate 
that there is no direct relationship between either indicator of issue divisibility and the 
maximum concession granted by the state.  In other words, neither the presence of 
combatants organized according to ethnic group nor territorial issues demonstrates a 
statistically significant relationship with the variable “maximum concessions.”  
Furthermore, only the variable “territory” – which denotes conflicts over territorial 
control – consistently demonstrates the expected sign, while the sign for “ethnic” 
consistently exhibits a positive sign.  It should be noted, however, that the extremely 
small value of both coefficients (which are consistently near 0) fall within a 95% percent 
confidence interval that includes positive as well as negative values.  Thus, this research 
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do not provide empirical support for the proposition made by bargaining theory that issue 
indivisibility will lead to less generous concession being made by the state.   
 Based on these empirical observations, it appears that bargaining theory, as 
specified in this research, at best provides only limited theoretical guidance in explaining 
the determinants of state concessions.  Of those variables derived from this specification 
of the theory only one variable – “guarantee” – consistently demonstrates a  statistically 
significant relationship.  This observation indicates that there may in fact be a causal 
relationship between “guarantee” and “maximum concessions”.  Thus, some empirical 
support is provided for the use of bargaining theory as an explanation of the content of 
negotiated settlements. 
In addition to bargaining theory, existing literature suggests that democratic peace 
theory and explanations of the resolution of civil war based on the presence of a hurting 
stalemate may provide additional insight.  In addition, the descriptive analysis conducted 
in Chapter 5 also indicates that two inductively derived variables may be of value.  The 
quantitative analysis of these hypothesized relationships is discussed below. 
 
Alternative explanations:  Democratic peace theory 
 Democratic peace theory suggests that democracies may be willing to grant more 
extensive concessions than non-democracies.  For present purposes, two explanations are 
relevant.  First, leaders in democracies are more closely tied to the public, who are more 
likely to oppose a civil war because they more directly endure the costs of conflict and so 
may prefer a quicker or less costly resolution.  To appease the public, then, democratic 
leaders may be more willing to seek a negotiated resolution in order to minimize the price 
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paid by the public.  In addition, the democratic peace literature argues that leaders in a 
democracy may be more culturally disposed to compromise that their non-democratic 
counterparts.  Democracies, then, may be willing to grant more extensive concessions to 
their adversaries than their non-democratic counterparts. 
 To account for variations in the levels of democracy exercised by the states, this 
research uses a combined score that integrates both authoritarian and democratic 
characteristics that is drawn from the Polity IV Project.  This measure is applied to 
Models 2 and 4.  Both models indicate that the degree to which the state exhibits 
democratic or authoritarian characteristics is not directly related to the maximum 
concession offered by the state.  In both models, the coefficients are nearly zero and are 
not statistically significant, thereby indicating the lack of a direct causal relationship.  
The signs for the coefficient in each model are, however, in the expected direction 
(positive), although the 95% confidence interval for each model does include negative 
values.  Therefore, the empirical evidence on which this research is based does not 
support the contention that democracies will, in general, make more generous 
concessions to their rebel adversaries. 
 
Alternative explanations:  Mutually hurting stalemate 
 The literature also suggests that the conditions under which negotiations occur 
may be a factor in determining the extent of state concessions.  This is based on the logic 
that a conflict is “ripe for resolution” when neither is able to achieve victory, a condition 
which produces a “mutually hurting stalemate.”  Since neither side is able to achieve an 
absolute victory, according to this line of thinking, each side will be more willing to enter 
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into a compromise settlement.  If this logic holds true, then states that encounter this 
condition should be willing to grant more extensive concessions in order to gain a 
resolution.   
As with “democracy,” this hypothesis is tested in Models 2 and 4, both of which 
build on the basic model suggested by bargaining theory.  To indicate ripeness for 
resolution, this research codes civil wars according to whether or not a stalemate emerged 
between the adversaries.  The results of the Tobit analysis presented above indicate that 
states granted more generous concessions when the combatants were evenly matched (as 
evidenced by the presence of a stalemate).  In both of the models to which this variable 
was applied, the coefficients for “stalemate” are statistically significant at the p<.01 level, 
indicating that we can be more than 99.9% certain that their values are not the result of 
random variation.  Furthermore, in both of the models, the coefficients display the 
anticipated positive sign, indicating that a positive relationship exists between 
“guarantee” and “maximum concession.”  From this, we can conclude that when 
combatants engaged in civil war reach a stalemate, any negotiated settlement that results 
will, in general, be more likely to contain greater concessions from the state than in those 
wars that did not produce such a standoff.  This result, then, provides confirmatory 
evidence for the explanation produced by the “ripe for resolution” literature. 
Thus, the existing literature on civil wars produces two theoretical explanations 
with testable hypotheses that pertain to the factors that influence state concessions.  When 
combined with the theoretical model suggested by bargaining theory, it appears that there 
is no direct relationship between the type of state involved in the war and the type of 
concessions it will extent to the rebels.  On the other hand, there is some support for 
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explanations that contend that the conditions on the battlefield do directly affect the terms 
of settlement and that these explanations may in fact enhance the explanatory power of 
bargaining theory.  One final group of explanatory variables remains to be evaluated – 
those inductively produced by the descriptive analysis of trends and patterns in Chapter 5. 
 
Trends and patterns:  International political system 
 In addition to the above variables that are derived from bargaining theory and 
existing explanations, the descriptive analysis conducted in the previous chapter indicates 
the presence of additional trends and patterns that may help to untangle the factors that 
influence the maximum concessions granted by states.  Two of those variables – the 
effect of changes in the international political system (as evidenced by the conclusion of 
the Cold War) and the geographic location of the dispute (whether or not it is in Africa) 
are directly tested here.  The purpose of this portion of the analysis is to determine 
whether or not the observed relationships hold up to additional scrutiny and to guide 
future efforts in this area of research. 
 The first factor to be addressed is that of the effect of the international political 
system on the content of negotiated settlements.  It was observed that although fewer 
negotiated settlements occurred during the Cold War than after it, the annual rate at 
which civil wars increased dramatically 1989 (a date which roughly corresponds with the 
fall of the Soviet Union).  This suggests that changes in the international political system 
that can be attributed to the end of the Cold War may directly affect the likelihood of a 
negotiated settlement.  More relevant for present purposes, the descriptive analysis also 
indicates that the timing of a negotiated settlement may also directly affect the content of 
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those settlements – the concessions granted by states, in other words.  Generally 
speaking, any differences that may exist in the concessions granted by the state are at 
least possibly a result of the changes in the international political system brought about 
by the end of the highly competitive relationship between the two superpowers.  This is 
plausible because one aspect of the competition between the US and the Soviet Union 
was the involvement of third powers, whether as competitive attempts by both to mitigate 
the influence of each other or by one superpower to extend its own interests.  This leads 
to the non-directional hypothesis that changes in the international political system can be 
expected to affect the maximum concessions offered by the state. 
 The variable “post-Cold War” denotes whether a negotiated settlement was 
achieved prior to or after 1989.  Based on the Tobit analysis, it does appear that the 
timing of a negotiated settlement does positively affect the maximum concession offered 
by the state, and that states were likely to grant greater concessions after the end of the 
Cold War than before.  Thus, we can infer that changes in the international political 
system may in fact have a causal effect of the maximum concession offered by the state.  
More precisely, Model 3 and Model 4 both indicate the presence of a positive 
relationship between the variable “post-Cold War” and “maximum concession,” both of 
which indicate a p-value of less than .01.  These findings, of course, provide support for 
the contention that changes in the international political system affect the content of 
negotiated settlements. 
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Trends and Patterns:  Geographic variation 
 Another factor identified by the descriptive analysis of trends and patterns in 
Chapter 5 was the influence of geography of the maximum concessions granted by states.  
The analysis indicated that Africa has the most onsets of civil war, the most negotiated 
settlements, and the largest percentage of negotiated settlements.  In addition, Africa 
accounts for the largest percentage of power-sharing concessions as being the maximum 
concession granted by states, which may indicate the presence of regional variations.  
Several factors could account for these variations, including regional customs and 
political expectations, regional differences in types of government, the density of political 
or ethnically similar groups, or the distribution of resources.  For present purposes, the 
more important issue is whether or not the observations drawn from an examination of 
the data hold up to scrutiny, which leads to the non-directional hypothesis that maximum 
concessions vary by the geographic region in which they are fought. 
 To account for regional variations in the maximum concession offered by states, 
this research focuses on whether or not the civil wars were fought in Africa.  Therefore 
the claim being evaluated here is that civil wars in Africa may exhibit differences from 
civil wars fought outside of Africa.  This variable was applied to Models 3 and 4.  Based 
on the Tobit analysis of the data, it appears that geography does not directly affect the 
maximum concession offered by states.  In both models, the variable “Africa” fails to 
achieve statistical significance.  This indicates that maximum concessions in Africa do 
not vary significantly from those that occur in the remaining non-African regions of the 
world.  In other words, the lack of a statistically significant relationship between “Africa” 
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and “maximum concessions” suggests that the maximum concessions offered by states do 
not vary according to the region in which the wars are fought.   
 In sum, the purpose of this portion of the analysis has been to evaluate the 
effectiveness of bargaining theory as an explanation of the factors that influence that 
maximum concession offered by states to their rebel adversaries in civil wars.  To do so, 
the relationship between those variables suggested by bargaining theory and the 
maximum concessions offered by states has been evaluated in several different 
specifications.  Based on this evaluation, it appears that bargaining theory by itself 
provides some, but not alot of theoretical guidance in answering the question at hand.  It 
appears that the existing literature and the trends and patterns observed in the data do, 
however, add explanatory power.  
 
Analyzing levels of concessions:  The probit model 
 Having addressed the factors that influence the type of concessions made by 
states, this research will now turn its attention to untangling the factors that influence the 
level of concession within each concessions type.  Types of concessions at this stage are 
categorized according to whether or not they represent high or low levels of concession 
within each policy type.  In what follows, the differences between the levels of each type 
of concession are briefly reviewed, followed by a presentation and discussion of the 
methods and results of the quantitative (in the case of policy and power-sharing 
concessions) and qualitative (for territorial concessions) analysis. 
As discussed in more detail above, policy concessions, which address changes in 
decisions made by the state short of representation or jurisdiction issues, can be either 
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low or high.  Low level policy changes are those concessions that do not directly affect 
the political, social, or economic resources available to groups represented by the rebels 
and that are primarily symbolic in nature.  High level policy concessions are those that 
expand the access of the constituents of the rebels to expanded political, social, or 
economic resources.  Power-sharing concessions, which occur when the state concedes 
changes in the make-up or selection process of government officials, are similarly 
subdivided.  Low level power-sharing concessions occur when the state grants the rebels 
only the opportunity to expand their decision-making authority, but are not guaranteed 
such a change.  Conversely, high level power-sharing concessions are made when the 
state guarantees the rebel constituency a greater role in the decision-making process of 
the state.  Finally, territorial concessions, which address the control of territory, were 
coded according to whether partial (a low level concession) or full (a high level 
concession) autonomy was granted by the state.  No cases were documented in which full 
autonomy was granted by the state, so no high level territorial concessions appear in the 
dataset. 
To analyze the factors that influence the level of concessions, probit analysis will 
be used.  As before, to account for different theoretical arguments four models will be 
developed and tested.  With regard to policy concessions, however, one key difference is 
present in the models.  Because of the presence of nearly perfect collinearity between the 
level of policy concession and “territory,” which indicates the presence of territorial 
goals, the independent variable is dropped.  The use of a probit model is justified because 
the analysis intends to differentiate between two outcomes – high and low level 
concessions within each concession type.  Each of the four models is developed to assess 
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the presence, strength, and direction between the dependent variable (whether the 
concession is high or low) and the theoretically specified variables independent variable. 
 
Levels of power-sharing concessions: An overview of the results 
 In general, the results of the quantitative tests presented below indicate that with 
the exception of the effect of the number of deaths incurred by the state, bargaining 
theory does not accurately predict the level of power-sharing concessions granted by the 
state.  In addition, neither the alternative explanations presented by the existing literature 
nor the factors identified by the descriptive analysis indicate the presence of the expected 
relationship.  As indicated below, the number of deaths incurred by the state 
demonstrates a positive and statistically significant relationship with the level of 
concession offered by the state, which lends empirical support to the relationship 
suggested by bargaining theory.  The remaining results, however, either indicate a lack of 
a statistically significant relationship or one that is opposite in direction from that 
suggested by bargaining theory.  In fact, with regard to the effect of the duration of the 
conflict and the presence of a guarantee, a statistically significant relationship exists but it 
is in the opposite direction of that suggested by bargaining theory.  Furthermore, the 
relationships suggested by alternative explanations and the descriptive analysis indicate 
that a statistically significant relationship does not exist between the level of power-
sharing concession granted by the state and explanatory variables, which means that we 
cannot be certain that the coefficients are not the result of random variation within the 
data.  In what follows, a more detailed accounting of the results are presented. 
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Levels of power-sharing concessions:  The empirical results 
 As indicated by the Chi-squared test, which tests the proposition that the fully 
specified model is a better predictor of outcomes than a model consisting of only an 
intercept term, each model is statistically significant at the .05 level or above.  This 
indicates that the variables in the model have some explanatory power of the variation in  
Table 6.3  
Probit results for power-sharing concessions 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Deaths (logged) .5619* 
(.2972) 
.6997** 
( .3268) 
..6452** 
( .3463) 
.8293** 
( .3643) 
Duration (logged) -.7227* 
(.4009) 
-.7875* 
( .4456) 
-.7952* 
( .4705) 
-.6882 
( .4306) 
Guarantee -2.105** 
(.8238) 
-2.4302** 
( .9974) 
-2.4648** 
( 1.0818) 
-2.5688** 
( 1.0186) 
Ethnic .3307    
(1.030) 
.0272 
(1 .2303) 
.3150 
( 1.0219) 
.2816 
( 1.2281) 
Territory .3383 
(1.2790) 
.8517 
(1.751) 
1.2517 
(1.0210) 
1.0246 
(1.9735) 
Democracy  -.1426 
( .1422) 
 -.1680 
( .1265) 
Stalemate  
 
-.8706 
( .8680) 
 -1.4624 
( 1.3066) 
Post-Cold War 
resolution 
  -.5277 
(1.0210) 
-1.3152 
( 1.2449) 
Africa   1.0301 
(1.1266) 
-.0749 
( 1.1056) 
Constant -2.1694    
 (2.3136) 
-3.4047 
( 2.7590) 
-2.904 
( 2.6903) 
-3.9703 
( 3.012) 
     
Log likelihood -10.1492 -8.3682 -9.6314 -7.6303 
Chi Square 
     Probability 
     Degrees of freedom 
12.81 
.0253** 
4 
16.37 
.0220** 
6 
13.84 
.0541* 
6 
17.84 
.0370** 
8 
Pseudo-R squared .3868 .4944 .4181 .5390 
Notes: n=24 
            *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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the dependent variable.  The exact level of significance, does, however, vary, with Model 
2 (the basic model plus alternative explanations) faring the best and Model 3 (which adds 
the variables derived from the descriptive analysis to the basic model) performing the 
worst.  This indicates that the hypothesis that a model containing only the intercept 
provides a better explanation of the outcome is a less than 5% chance for Models 1,2 and 
4 and a less than 10% chance for Model 3.   
Another feature of interest is the amount of variation in the dependent variable 
explained by the dependent variable.  Loosely interpreted, the pseudo-R squared, which 
is the coefficient of determination, indicates the amount of variation in the outcome 
explained by the dependent variables varies for each model, as is to be expected.  These 
values range from a high of 53% for Model 4 to a low of 39% for Model 1, indicating 
that Model 1 explains a relatively low portion of the variation in the outcome while 
Model 4 explains the most.  This is not surprising, given that the reported pseudo-R 
squared is McFadden’s R-squared, which increases as the number of variables in the 
model increase.  Given this, a more informative comparison can be made between Model 
2, which accounts for nearly 50% of the variation, and Model 3, with 42%, which 
indicates that of these two models, Model 2 performs better because it explains a greater 
amount of variation in the dependent variable “maximum compromise”.  This discussion 
will now turn to an analysis of the individual variables. 
 As with the Tobit model utilized above, a direct and meaningful interpretation of 
the coefficients of the variables is problematic.  This is so because the reported values  
are a ratio of the log-odds ratio are themselves difficult to interpret and because the 
dependent variable is ordinal, which means tat the difference between a high and low 
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power-sharing concessions are not mathematically precise.  However, the direction and 
statistical significance of the relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable can be assessed. 
 
Bargaining theory:  Perceptions of success 
 As previously discussed, one of the primary contentions of bargaining theory is 
that combatants adjust their expected utility of war as  they gain information regarding 
their perceived likelihood of success.  Based on the contention that shorter wars and wars 
in which the state incurs fewer causalities indicate the likelihood of the state being 
successful, the hypotheses being tested here are that “deaths (logged)” and “duration 
(logged)” will be positively related – that is, high power-sharing concessions should be 
more likely to occur as deaths and duration increase.  In the case of “deaths (logged),” the 
results indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship in each of 
the models, thereby indicating providing support to the contention made by bargaining 
theory that states are willing to extend more generous concession to the rebels when the 
costs of war are high.   
 When costs are measured in terms of the duration of the conflict, however, the 
results are contrary to what would be expected by bargaining theory.  In three of the four 
models, a statistically significant relationship exists between “duration (logged)” and the 
occurrence of high level power-sharing concession, but is negative in all four of the 
cases.  In other words, the state is less likely to grant a high level power-sharing 
concession when a war drags on.  This contradicts the argument put forth by bargaining 
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theory.  Thus, when it comes to the costs of war and state power-sharing concession, the 
results are at best mixed. 
  
Bargaining theory:  Incentives to cheat 
 When it comes to incentives to cheat, bargaining theory contends that combatants 
will be less likely to enter into a negotiated settlement as long as their adversary is 
capable of ignoring the agreement.  Alleviating such concerns should, according to 
bargaining theory, make a negotiated settlement more likely.  Building on the hypothesis 
that concessions will be greater when a security guarantee is present, it follows that states 
should be willing to grant greater power-sharing concession when the incentive to cheat 
is removed.  To measure the incentive to cheat, this research includes “guarantee” to 
denote the presence of an outside party to enforce the agreement. 
 As with the length of the conflict, the results contradict bargaining theory.  The 
presence of a security guarantee demonstrates a statistically significant relationship to 
high power-sharing concessions, as bargaining theory suggests, but it is a negative 
relationship rather than a positive one.  This indicates that, rather than being more likely 
to extended greater power-sharing concessions in the presence of a security guarantee, 
states are instead less likely to do so.  Although the coefficients vary in each of the four 
models, each is consistently statistically significant at the .05 level of significance, which 
indicates the presence of only a small (5%) likelihood that the results are based on 
random error with the data.  Thus, the results of this research call into question the 
contention made by bargaining theory that states will be more likely to grant higher 
concessions when a security guarantee is present. 
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 Bargaining theory:  Divisibility of stakes 
 Bargaining theory also weakly asserts that conflict is more likely when the gains 
are not easily subdivided.  Just as the presence of indivisible issues may make more 
conflict more likely and more difficult to resolve, if bargaining theory is correct, then 
conflict fought over indivisible issue should lead to less generous concession being made 
by the state.  Applied to power-sharing concession, this implies that low power-sharing 
concessions should be more likely than high ones when the conflict is fought over 
indivisible issues.  Two variables were developed in this research to account for the 
presence of divisibility problems – conflicts in which the combatants aligned themselves 
according to ethnicity )denoted “ethnic”) and conflict fought over territorial control 
(“territory”). 
 Based on the empirical observations on which this research is based, there is not a 
statistically significant relationship between issue indivisibility and the presence of a high 
power-sharing concession.  When looking at the alignment of the combatants, in each of 
the models “ethnicity” fails to achieve statistical significance.  Furthermore, the 
coefficients for “ethnicity” are all positive.  In other words, the evidence indicates that 
states are more willing to grant high level power-sharing concessions when the 
combatants are organized along ethnic lines, although there is a more than acceptable 
chance the results are produced by random variation within the data.  Thus, when taken at 
face value, these results run dispute the contention made by bargaining theory that 
indivisible issues will negatively effect the extent of concessions granted by the state. 
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When looking at indivisibility from the perspective of control over territory, the 
results are similar.  In each of the four models, none of the coefficients achieve statistical 
significance.  Each of the coefficients is also positive, which indicates an increased 
likelihood of a high level power-sharing concession when the adversaries are fighting 
over the control of territory.  Once again, this empirical evidence contradicts the 
contention made by bargaining theory that territorial conflicts will result in greater 
concessions.  The empirical evidence, then, finds to the contrary of bargaining theory 
when issue indivisibility is present. 
 Thus, this research fails to produce empirical evidence in four of the five variables 
associated with bargaining theory.  Only one – the number of deaths incurred by the state 
– appears to have a direct relationship with the degree of power-sharing concessions 
granted by the state.  On two of the measures – the duration of the conflict and the 
presence of a third arty security guarantee – the evidence indicates the presence of a 
direct relationship that is opposite  of that predicted by bargaining theory.  And with 
regard to issue indivisibility, statistically the findings are inconclusive and any 
relationship that may exist appears to in the opposite direction of that predicted by 
bargaining theory. 
 
Alternative explanations:  Democratic peace theory 
 If the application of the literature that constitutes the democratic peace theory is 
correct in its contention the democracies are likely to grant greater concessions, then it 
logically follow that states that exhibit greater degrees of democracy will also be more 
likely to grant high level power-sharing concessions rather than low level ones.  Based on 
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an analysis of the relationship between the occurrence of high level concessions and 
“democracy,” however, the empirical evidence does not support this argument.  As can 
be seen in the table above, in both Models 2 and 4 (the two models in which the variable 
appears) the coefficients indicate the presence of a negative relationship between the 
level of democracy and the presence of high level power-sharing concessions.  In other 
words, this analysis indicates that more democratic societies are less likely to extend a 
greater decision-making role to their rebel adversaries than are less democratic or more 
authoritarian states.  Once again, however, the coefficients to do not reach the accepted 
standards for statistical significance, which means that there is an unacceptably high 
likelihood that the results are a function of random error.  Thus, this research indicates 
that democratic peace theory as developed and applied here at best does not demonstrate 
a causal relationship between the level of democracy exhibited by the state and the level 
of concessions granted to the rebels and at worst contradicts the direction of the 
relationship should it in fact exist. 
 
Alternative explanations:  Mutually hurting stalemate 
 Another factor proposed by the existing literature that addresses the extent of 
concessions is the conditions under which a negotiated settlement is sought.  If, as 
discussed above, states are willing to extend greater concessions when is becomes clear 
that neither side is able to achieve a clear-cut victory, it follow that high level power-
sharing concessions will be more likely to occur when a conflict is “ripe for resolution,” 
as indicated by the presence of a “mutually hurting stalemate.” 
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 As with the tests of the variable “democracy,” the coefficients of the variable 
“stalemate” indicate the presence of a negative relationship with the degree of power-
sharing concessions.  This indicates that states are less likely to grant a high level power-
sharing concession when the combatants are evenly matched on the battlefield.  However, 
once again there is reason to doubt that validity of this relationship, as statistical 
significance is not achieved for “stalemate” in either model.  Thus, it appears that the 
evidence does not support the contention made by the existing literature that conflicts that 
are “ripe for resolution” are likely to grant greater power-sharing concessions. 
 
Trends and patterns:  The international political system 
  The descriptive analysis of trends and patterns within the dataset (Chapter 5) 
indicated the presence of changes in both the frequency with which negotiated 
settlements occurred and the content of those settlements.  This analysis indicated that 
states granted greater concessions to their rebels adversaries following the end of the 
Cold War.  In order to determine whether or not this observed relationship hold up to the 
enhanced scrutiny of inferential statistics, the variable “post-Cold War” settlement was 
developed to distinguish those wars that were resolved after 1989.  This variable is 
included in Models 3 and 4 in order to determine the extent and direction of any 
relationship. 
 Contrary to the observations drawn in Chapter 5, which indicate that states were 
more likely to grant power-sharing concessions after the end of the Cold War than before, 
the results of this research indicates that when controlling for the influence of other 
factors, states are actually less likely to grant the rebels increased influence in political 
 141
decision-making.  As demonstrated in the table above, the relationship between “post-
Cold War” and the likelihood of the state extending a high level power-sharing 
concession is negative.  This indicates that states are less likely to extend high level 
power-sharing concessions after the Cold War than they were during it.  However, the 
coefficient of the variable fails to achieve statistical significance, meaning that we cannot 
be very certain that the relationship does in fact exist and is not due to random variation 
within the data.  Therefore, the inferential statistical analysis calls into question the 
conclusion that greater concessions are more prevalent in the post-Cold War period, 
while the lack of statistical significance is contrary to the contention that the shift from a 
multi-polar international political system affects the content of negotiated settlements. 
 
Trends and patterns:  Geographic variation 
 Another factor identified in Chapter 5 that appears to have an effect on the content 
of negotiated settlements is the location in which the war was fought.  Specifically, it was 
shown that Africa accounts for the largest percentage of negotiated settlements in which 
power-sharing concessions represent the maximum concession granted.  Logically, this 
raises the possibility that states in Africa are more likely to grant high level power-
sharing concessions than low level ones. 
 To account for the effect of geographic variation in the content of power-sharing 
concessions, the variable “Africa,” which indicates whether a conflict was in Africa or 
not, was included in Models 3 and 4.  The results of this analysis are mixed and 
questionable.  First off, the problem of statistical significance again makes it difficult to 
determine whether or not a direct relationship does actually exist between the level of 
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power-sharing concession and geographic area.  Furthermore. A comparison of Models 3 
and 4 cloud the issue by returning contradictory results.  The coefficient for “Africa” 
indicates the presence of a negative relationship, which implies that high level power-
sharing concession are less likely to occur in Africa than in other parts of the world.  
Conversely, in Model 4 the coefficient is positive, thereby indicating an increased 
likelihood of such a concession.  Therefore, this analysis cannot support the contention 
that the level of power-sharing concession vary with geography. 
 
Levels of policy concessions: A dissection of the models 
The next concession type to be addressed are those concessions that represent a 
one time concession made by the state to the rebels.  These policy concessions are 
considered to be the least severe type of concession because they represent only a point-
in-time concession by the state, whereas power-sharing and territorial concession 
permanently expand the decision-making role of the rebels with the state.  These 
represent “one-shot” concessions because they do not increase the long term influence of 
the rebels with the decision-making process.  In essence, policy concessions are those 
that fall short of power-sharing and territorial concessions.  Policy concessions that 
represent only symbolic changes are considered low level policy concession, whereas 
high level policy concessions expand the rebels’ access to political, social, or economic 
resources which expand the rebel’s access to political, social, or economic resources. 
The quantitative analysis of the determinants of the likelihood of high versus low 
levels of policy concession also utilized a probit model.  As before, four models 
containing various specifications of theoretically derived variables were tested.  In this 
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case, however, each combination proved to be an inadequate explanation of the factors 
that influence the state’s choice between high and low level policy concessions.  Each of 
the four models failed to achieve statistical significance, as indicated by results of the 
likelihood ratio test.  This test determines whether the specified model has explanatory 
power.  To do so, a constrained model in which all the coefficients of the model are set to 
0 is estimated.  In practice, this creates a model consisting of a dependent variable and an 
intercept term and produces the hypothesis that all the coefficients in the model equal 0.   
Table 6.4 
Probit results for policy concessions 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Deaths (logged) .3829 
(.2943) 
.25581 
(.3379) 
.4063 
(.3115) 
.5880 
(.5511) 
Duration (logged) .8161 
(.5746) 
.9189 
(.6534) 
1.0737 
(.7668) 
1.4338 
(1.1575) 
Guarantee -1.1632 
(.9462) 
-1.100 
(1.0596) 
-1.135 
(1.1904) 
-1.8458 
(1.7904) 
Ethnic 1.4817 
(1.0895) 
1.6201 
(1.1536) 
1.7752 
(1.1986) 
2.3660 
(1.6246) 
Democracy  -.0300 
(.0676) 
 .0814 
(.1360) 
Stalemate  .5985 
(.9702) 
 .1635 
(1.0906) 
Post-Cold War 
resolution 
  .3044 
(1.0638) 
1.1170 
(1.6936) 
Africa   1.0349 
(.9273) 
1.3784 
(1.1796) 
Constant -6.7552 
(4.2108) 
-6.1786 
(4.5023) 
-8.8611 
(5.5006) 
-12.8522    
(10.0356) 
     
Log likelihood -8.8702 -8.6186 -7.9675 -7.6864 
Likelihood ratio test 
Chi Square 
     Probability 
     Degrees of freedom 
 
4.75 
.3136 
4 
 
5.26 
.5114 
6 
 
6.56 
.3636 
6 
 
7.12 
.5237 
.3166 
Pseudo-R squared .2113 .2337 .2916  
Notes: n=20 
            *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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If this constrained model is rejected, the conclusion that the fully specified model as 
calculated provides a better explanation than a constrained model.  In each of the tests 
conducted, the full model fails to achieve statistical significance.  This means that we 
cannot be certain that the variables in the models do in fact have an effect on the 
dependent variable – the likelihood of a high level policy concession.  Therefore, the 
results of these statistical tests are at best inconclusive and at worst misleading.  This 
discussion, then, will turn to an examination of the model.   
Of the many explanations that exist for the failure of this group of models, two 
likely candidates will be addressed.  One possible explanation discussed below focuses 
on the theoretical constructs on which the models are based.  It is entirely possible that 
the application of the theories developed in this research strayed too far from their 
original intent – which is to explain either international conflict or the resolution that 
results in civil wars.  Because these theories were not intended to explain state 
concessions, it is at least possible that the use of these theories represents model 
misspecification.  In other words, it may be that the variables identified are not in fact 
related to the level of policy concessions granted by the state.  Another possible 
explanation addresses the patterns contained within the data.  Given the complexity of the 
determinants of state concessions that end civil wars, another possible explanation is that 
the data are not sensitive enough to adequately represent real-world patterns.  In this case, 
causal relationships between the dependent variable and some or all of the independent 
variables may exist, but a high degree of variation clouds the relationship.  Each of these 
potential explanations is developed in more detail below.   
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To date, an expansive amount of literature has been developed that addresses 
international conflict and civil war.  The bulk of this research, however, focuses on the 
onset and resolution of these very different types of conflict.  The purpose of this research 
has been to focus exclusively on a very precise type of outcome – state concessions 
within civil wars.  Given that the theories on which this research is based represent a 
significant portion of the accumulated knowledge of political science community, it is 
plausible that the theories that have been developed to explain the onset and resolution of 
conflict are equally applicable to developing an explanation of the process by which 
states decide whether or not to grant policy concessions and, if so, to what extent.  
However, it is equally justifiable that this attempt represents a case in which the theories 
are too extremely transformed from their original intent.  Just because a theoretical 
explanation and a set of variables have been demonstrated an ability to understand the 
onset and resolution of conflict does not necessarily mean that the same relationships can 
be expected to be observed when examining the choice between high and low policy 
concessions.  It could be the case that the theories on which this research rests does not 
adequately explain this choice.  If the application of the theory is incorrect, then it 
follows that the theoretically identified variables will not demonstrate the hypothesized 
relationship.  The remedy to this problem is, of course, a different theoretical 
specification of the models.  If this is in fact the case, then the value of this research is 
that it has demonstrated the inapplicability of these theories to the task at hand.   
 It is, however, equally plausible that the theoretical models do have explanatory 
power.  If the above explanation for the failure of the models to achieve statistical 
significance is in fact incorrect and the theoretical models do in fact model the real world, 
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the question then becomes – why don’t the statistical analysis reflect the real-world 
relationships between the variables?  The most direct answer to this question lies in the 
statistical processes on which this research is based.  As previously mentioned, the 
likelihood ratio test assesses the chance that the fully specified statistical model 
outperforms a constrained model.  The constrained model is one in which all the 
coefficients are held to 0, which in practice produces a model containing only a 
dependent variable and an intercept term.  In the case of the four models presented here, 
statistical significance is not achieved, which indicates that the fully specified models do 
not perform any better than the constrained model in explaining the relationship between 
the dependent variable and the independent variables.  A closer examination of the 
models indicates that none of the variables in the fully specified models achieve 
statistical significance.  This does not mean that there is no relationship, but only that we 
cannot say with a degree of certainty that a relationship exists.  In other words, the results 
are indeterminant in that we can not say with a high degree of certainty that the 
relationship exists, just as we cannot say that it does not exist.  When the coefficients do 
not reach accepted norms of statistical significance (that the chance of the results being 
an outcome of random variation within the data is less than 1 in 20), they are statistically 
equivalent to 0.  This means that each of the fully specified models (where no coefficients 
reach statistical significance) essentially represents a model where the coefficients of all 
the independent variables are 0.  In other words, each of the fully specified models is the 
same as its constrained model.  It becomes clear, then, that each fully specified model 
cannot outperform its corresponding constrained model. 
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 The issue, then, is not necessarily whether or not a relationship exists, but whether 
or not we can observe any relationship that may exist given the limits of the data.  As 
indicated in the table above, the standard error of the estimates for each of the 
coefficients is relatively large.  This decreases the likelihood that a statistically significant 
relationship results even if a relationship is actually present.  Maximum likelihood 
estimation procedures, where are used to estimate the parameters of a probit model, 
calculates the standard error of the estimate.  This descriptive statistic, which is the 
square root of the variance of the estimate, indicates the degree of dispersion of the set of 
estimated values for each coefficient.  When the standard error is high relative to the 
value of the mean, it indicates a high degree of variation within the set of estimations for 
that coefficient.  This means that we are less likely to observe any relationship that exists 
within the data.   
 To explain, MLE estimation procedures use an algorithm to conduct a 
specification search to determine the combination of coefficients that is most likely to 
produce the data.  In doing so, a set of values for each coefficient is produced.  The 
variance of this set of values is produced, from which the standard error is calculated.  
When there is a high degree of variation with the set of estimated coefficients, a large 
standard error results.  This does not mean that no relationship exists, but only that any 
relationship that does exist is difficult to identify.  Thus, when the standard error of any 
estimate is high, we are less confident that the relationship does in fact exist.  This 
uncertainty is most directly observed in the computation of hypothesis testing, which is 
done to determine whether or not a certain level of statistical significance (i.e. certainty) 
is achieved. 
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 In hypothesis testing, the test statistic used is the ratio of the coefficient to the 
standard error.  As the size of the standard error increases (the further from 0 it is, in 
other words) the more certain we can be that the coefficient is in fact different than 0.  As 
the size of the coefficient relative to the value of the standard error increases, the degree 
to which we can be confident in our results increases.  However, when the standard error 
is large (when there is a high degree of variation in the set of estimated values for a given 
coefficient, in other words) relative to the size of the coefficient, we become less certain 
in our results.  The low level of statistical confidence, however, does not suggest that no 
relationship exists, but only that it is difficult to distinguish between the null hypothesis 
(that the coefficient is equal to 0) and the alternative (that it is not equal to 0).   
 In each of the models being addressed here, the size of the standard error relative 
to the size of the estimated coefficients is rather large and, in some cases, exceeds the 
value of the coefficient itself.  As a result none of the individual coefficients in the 
models reach standard levels of statistical significance.  This occurs because we cannot, 
with a high degree of certainty, distinguish between 0 and the coefficient produced by the 
probit model.  This produces a model in which all of the coefficients are 0, which in 
practice produces exactly the same constrained model tested in the likelihood ratio test.  
Therefore it is not possible for us to reject the null hypothesis of the likelihood ratio test 
that the full specified model does not perform better than the constrained one.  These 
results, then, indicate that the models do not adequately identify the presence of a 
relationship, which is different than demonstrating the absence of the relationship.  The 
theoretically derived models presented above, then, may in fact provide correct 
explanations. 
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Chapter 7:  Qualitative analysis of territorial concessions 
 
 
 
 
 Only three civil wars in this study resulted in a state granting territorial 
concessions to its adversary – Sudan (1963-1973), the Philippines (1972-1996), and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995).  This outcome represents common ground and an area 
of mutual support for the proponents of both bargaining theory and other international 
relations theorists.  When viewed through the lense of bargaining theory, the near-total 
lack of territorial concessions provides clear and direct support for the contention 
commonly found in international relations literature that states value territory above all 
else.  This is so because the logic of bargaining theory dictates that states will grant 
concessions they hold in great value only when the circumstances are extreme.  If the 
contention that states value territory above all else is taken at face value, then the lack of 
territorial concessions itself lends direct support to bargaining theory.27   
 The relative lack of territorial concessions does, however, present a problem.  As 
a result of the few occurrences and the lack of variation in the levels of these concessions 
(all are low), quantitative analysis of territorial concessions is simply not an option.  
                                                 
27 This point borders on being a tautology.  The point, however, is not to make an argument of causality, 
but merely to point out the common ground between two theoretical perspectives. 
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Therefore, these three cases will be discussed in qualitative narratives intended to 
emphasis the process by which the states decided to grant territorial concessions.  The 
purpose of these narratives is twofold.  First, each narrative will be utilized to 
highlighting the process by which Sudan, the Philippines, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
decided to extend territorial concessions as a means of ending their respective civil wars.  
Second, each will be used to determine the extent to which bargaining theory, the 
alternative explanations proposed by existing literature, and the variables identified by 
the descriptive analysis identify general causal factors that compel the abdication of 
territorial sovereignty by a state.  Compared to the quantitative analysis approach utilized 
above, the benefit of qualitative analysis is that it allows for a detailed examination of the 
historical record to identify the factors that influenced the states’ decision to grant 
territorial concessions.  The downside to this approach is that the extent to which these 
findings is, at best, severely limited because each of the three cases represents what is 
essentially a unique event.  The cases of Sudan (1963-1973), the Philippines (1972-
1996), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) are discussed below. 
 
Sudan 
Despite its contentious success and eventual collapse,28 the Addis Ababa 
agreement that brought the first Sudanese civil war to an end is an informative case in 
that it highlights many of successes and failures of the theoretical conjectures being 
                                                 
28 The agreement was implemented and led to the establishment of the High Executive Council in Sudan 
in1972.  The Council proposed a new constitution in line with the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
which was adopted in 1973.  The southern region of Sudan, which had been granted autonomy in the peace 
settlement, went to the polls and elected a Regional People’s Assembly in November of 1973, which was 
followed by the election of a country-wide National Assembly in April of 1974.  Conflict diminished, but 
did not disappear.  The Addis Ababa agreement was widely seen as failed when, in June 1983, the country 
was re-divided into three smaller areas and, in September of that year, Islamic law was established.  
(Europa 1990, p. 2378) 
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tested.  In terms of the peace process leading to the acceptance of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, Sudan represents what has been described by some scholars as being “a 
rather unique process” (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993, p. 63).  As such, it presents a 
special case in an effort to determine the factors that influence the concessions granted by 
states, but one that serves to illuminate the difficulties of developing a systematic theory 
of the process.   
Sudan is a country whose history and complex demographics make it ripe for 
identity-based conflict (Deng 1995, p. 78), a contention that is upheld by its long history 
of civil unrest and domination by external powers.  Geographically, Sudan is a large 
country whose borders overlap Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, thereby creating 
boundaries that include both Northerners, who are predominantly Muslim and live in a 
hot and arid climate, and Southerners, whose culture and religious views more closely 
approximate Sub-Saharan animist and Christian religious views and who reside in a lush 
and fertile equatorial climate (Brogan 1998) 29.  The resulting ethnic divisions are 
sharpened by the relative prosperity of the Northern Sudanese (brought about, in part, by 
the British “Southern Policy,” which attempted to promote the interest of the 
Southerners) and the historically common tendency of the Northern-influenced 
government to try to extend its cultural, religious, and political influence to its southern 
citizenry (Deng 1995, pp. 78-81; Rothchild and Hartzell 1993, pp. 64-68). 
Historically, Sudan’s modern history of civil war and domestic unrest traces its 
roots back to 1819, when the country first came under Egyptian rule.  The link with 
                                                 
29 Rothchild (1997, p. 214-215) describes the categorization of the Sudanese as being either “Southern” or 
“Northern” as being an “oversimplification that greatly distorts reality” and reflective of “subjective and 
symbolic factors at least as much as objective reality.”  In part, this criticism of the commonly-used 
terminology is based on a more detailed analysis of the ethnicity of the inhabitants of the two regions. 
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Egypt quickly drew Sudan into colonial politics when, in the early 1870s, Egypt became 
a British colony (Brogan 1998, Europa 1990).  Sudan became a pawn in the colonial 
great power rivalry between Britain and France, although neither side a strong strategic 
interest in the country (Brogan 1998).  Despite the lack of strategic importance of Sudan 
to either great power, competition over Sudan was the focal point of a rivalry that nearly 
led to a clash between the European powers.  In an effort intended to simultaneously 
extend British influence at the expense of Egypt, to put down a Sudanese uprising, and to 
“frustrate the French,” British and French forces faced-off at Fashoda in 1898.  The clash 
ended without bloodshed when a force of 120 Africans led by 8 French officers spent two 
years marching across Africa only to be told to “politely but firmly told to go home” by 
British forces. (Brogan 1998, p. 105).   
Civil war in this African state begins similarly to many African civil wars – with a 
failed political independence.  Talks beginning in 1953, which included representatives 
for northern interests but explicitly excluded a southern voice, placed both Britain and 
Egypt in the position of competing for the loyalty of the northern parties (Brogan 1998).  
In 1954, Britain and, under British pressure, Egypt began the process that brought about 
political independence for Sudan as a parliamentary republic in 1956 (Europa 1990, p. 
3960).  Southern spokespersons called for a federal system that would protection the 
culturally distinct South from Northern Arab and Islamic pressures but were continually 
ignored (Deng 1995, Rothchild and Hartzell 1993).  For example, when a committee was 
appointed by the Legislative Assembly in 1956 to draft a constitution, only three of the 
forty-six members were from southern Sudan and, not surprisingly, those three voices 
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were overwhelmed when they the reiterated demands for constitutional protections for 
the south (Deng 1995). 
Political troubles soon combined with ethnic tensions when General Ibrahim 
Abboud led a military coup in 1958 that overthrew the British-installed civilian (Deng 
1995, pp. 80-81).  A Northerner, the general immediately began a campaign to eliminate 
potential challengers and embarked on a policy of Arabization and Islamization in the 
south, which resulted in post-colonial Sudan being primed for civil war by the desire 
northern leaders to force the assimilation of the south and the insistence of the south on 
the presence of a dual identity maintained through federalism (Deng 1985).  When 
southern demands continued to be ignored, a separatist revolt that forced the issue of 
national identity was sparked (Rothchild and Harzell 1993).  By 1963, the rebellious 
southerners had organized under the banner of Anya Nya (meaning ”snake venom” in 
one of the southern dialects), a resistance movement whose goal was political 
independence and who received external support from Dinka tribes of the south internally 
and by Congolese rebels and the governments of Ethiopia and Israel externally (Brogan 
1998).  An intense and bloody war resulted, in which the northern army, despite its better 
training and superior arming, found itself unable to quell the rebels because of the 
expansiveness of the region (Brogan 1998, p. 106).  Estimates of the number of deaths 
range widely, from a low of 250,000 (Correlates of War) to a high of 400,00 (Brogan 
1998).   
The tide turned, however, with regime change.  In response to widespread rioting 
and social discontent, the Abbud government relinquished control and turned power over 
civilians under the leadership of Prime Minister Sir el-Khatim el-Khalifah, who relaxed 
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tensions and invited southerners to a Round Table Conference in Khartoum.  At this time, 
several grievances were aired by the Southerners, with proposed remedies including a 
federal system uniting the two disparate regions, a process through which the Sudanese 
people chose a collective identity, and separation into distinct political entities (Deng 
1995).  Although none of the initiatives were implemented, the proposed federal system 
ultimately served as the foundation for the 1972 Addis Ababas Agreement (Brogan 1998, 
Rothchild and Hartzell 1995).  When a May 1969 coup brought another general, Jaafer 
Nimeiri, to power, movement towards reconciliation continued (Deng 1995).  In contrast 
to Abbud, General Nimeiri, who was associated with the Communist party and advocated 
a socialist agenda for Sudan, was more inclined to pursue peace, and ultimately decided 
to bring the war to an end (Brogan 1998).   
In June of 1969, Nimeiri advocated a set of initiatives that drew on the 
propositions of the Round Table Conference and included both territorial and policy 
concessions that would eventually produce a viable agreement and regional autonomy 
(Rothchild and Hartzell 1995).  Concession offered by the state included amnesty for the 
southern rebels; the creation of programs to improve the social, economic, and cultural 
affairs of the south; and the creation of a Ministry of Southern Affairs (Brogan 1998).   
Over the next several years, Nimieri continued to seek peace with the secessionist 
rebels, a process that ultimately produced the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1973.  This 
agreement (temporarily) brought to a close decades of conflict that characterized post-
independent Sudan.  In addition to implementing the proposals made by the Round Table 
Conference, this agreement combined three southern provinces into a single entity and 
established a High Executive Council and People’s Regional Assembly with jurisdiction 
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over southern affairs in Juba (Brogan 1998).  According to the text of the 1972 
agreement, the authority of the Regional Assembly included maintaining public order and 
regional security, levying taxes and duties, and exercising independent budgetary 
authority.  The result was a system of government in which the central government 
maintained control over defense issues and foreign affairs, but otherwise left the south 
with a high degree of autonomy (Brogan 1998).  In other words, the government of 
Sudan granted low-level territorial concessions in the form of autonomy to its rebel 
adversaries. 
 
Why concessions? 
Why did Nimeiri and other Northerners agree to territorial concessions that 
restricted northern access to the south and divided the state into two parts, especially 
when their predecessors refused to do so?  The answer to this question of course involves 
a combination of interdependent factors.  As previously discussed, the decision of what 
kind of concessions to extend is contingent on the decision by the parties to seek a 
negotiated resolution in the first place.  This analysis will therefore begin with an 
overview of the factors that made negotiations possible, then move on to a discussion of 
the terms of settlement with an emphasis on explaining why Sudan choose to extend 
territorial concessions . 
According to Rothchild and Hartzell (1993) and an extension of that work by 
Rothchild (1997), five conditions made the Sudanese environment favorable for a 
negotiated settlement:  (1) a clearly identifiable leadership was in place on both sides; (2) 
the conflict had evolved into a stalemate in which neither side was able to gain the upper-
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hand; (3) leaders on both sides were politically motivated to seek a resolution; (4) 
external pressure to resolve the dispute was being applied; and (5) a mediator had stepped 
forward to help the adversaries reach a mutually acceptable resolution.   Each of these is 
discussed in more detail below. 
The first precondition – the presence of a clearly identifiable leadership 
representing both sides – is, of course, necessary for fruitful negotiations to begin.  Both 
sides of the table must be occupied by representatives who are able to speak on behalf of 
those they represent and to commit on their behalf.  Although initial proposals to 
negotiate were opposed by members of the Nimeiri regime, several top leaders resigned 
to protest the move to resolve the conflict.  Rather than forestalling negotiations, as 
intended, the resignations enable Nimeiri to develop a cohesive front in support of 
negotiations within his regime (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993).  In addition, his willingness 
to act decisively in the face of opposition further enabled his position, as did his ability to 
demonstrate his power and popularity through a referendum after overcoming a 3-day 
loss of power at the hands of communists in 1971  (Deng 1995, pp. 90-91).   
On the southern side, a similar difficulty was overcome.  Although facing strong 
differences of opinion, the disparate groups of rebels were willing to loosely ally 
themselves under the leadership of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and 
General Joseph Lagu (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993).  He, in turn, was able to overcome 
the split between those who were willing to accept a settlement and those that advocated 
fighting for full independence and ultimately serve as the southern representatives in talks 
with the government (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993, Rothchild 1997).  The result was a 
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necessary first step towards negotiations – each side managed to overcome internal 
difference to choose leaders who were able to negotiate on their behalf. 
 Second, given its limited resources and questionable hold on power, the 
government of Sudan faced a difficult task with increasing costs – eliminating the rebels 
or forcing a capitulation.  This put the government in a position that “made it difficult, if 
not impossible, for the government to win an outright military victory over the South” 
(Rothchild 1997, p. 219).  This produced a stalemate in which “neither the Sudanese nor 
the SSLM possessed, or seemed likely to muster, the resources necessary to escalate itself 
out of an impasse at an acceptable cost” (Rothchild 1997, p. 219).  The presence of a 
stalemate, in which neither side was able to achieve its goals and both incurred a variety 
of losses, produced a situation that predisposed the opposing leaders to seek a mutually 
acceptable compromise, even though by doing so neither side would be able to fully 
achieve their goals (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993). 
Third, both Nimeiri and Lagu were politically predisposed to a negotiated 
settlement (Rothchild 1997).  For Nimeiri, bringing the conflict to a close was politically 
necessary in order for him to achieve his greater goals.  Having alienated supporters on 
both sides of the political spectrum, Nimeiri had little choice but to seek out the center, 
which necessitated making overtures to the south (Brogan 1998).  In addition, Nimeiri 
was faced with the likelihood that the war would continue to be a drain on the resources 
of Sudan, a situation that could ultimately lead to his downfall.  On the southern side, 
Lagu also viewed military conquest as unlikely and was therefore determined to seek a 
negotiated settlement (Deng 1997, p. 221).  Having been able to pull together the 
independent factions that constituted the southern rebellion under his political and 
 158
military leadership, Lagu was able to embark on what he saw as his best option given the 
limited armaments and training available to the rebels (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993).  
Thus, while leaders on both sides had the option of pursuing their goals in whole, each 
also had the ability and the motivation to seek a compromise solution. 
Fourth, the conflict drew the attention and involvement of two regional actors – 
Ethiopa and Uganda, both of whom had a stake in the outcome of the conflict (Rothchild 
1997, p. 222).  Rather than playing a proactive role by encouraging peace, however, 
decisions made by both of the neighboring countries indirectly pressured the government 
and rebels of Sudan to seek peace (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1993).  Ethiopia’s own 
secessionist movement was intricately entangled in the Sudanese civil war.  Ethiopian 
rebels used neighboring Sudan as a conduit for the smuggling of arms and as a place of 
refuge, a move which prompted Emperor Haile Selassie to return the favor by allowing 
support to flow through Ethiopia to the Sudanese rebels.  This game of tit-for-tat, 
however, turned cooperative when, in 1971, Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to stop aiding the 
rebellious factions in each others country (Rothcild 1997, p. 223).  The result of this was 
to apply pressure Nimeiry regime and the rebels to seek a negotiated settlement.  In the 
case of Uganda, the Sudanese rebels gained the support of Idi Amin, who had recently 
overthrown the president of Uganda, Milton Obote.  Supporters of President Obote, who 
were preparing for an attempt to restore the president, received aid and support from 
Sudanese troops.  In return, Amin allowed supplies destined for Anya Nya to pass 
through Uganda.  However, in 1971 Uganda and Sudan mutually agreed to cease 
supporting each others rebels.  The effect of this agreement was to eliminate an important 
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source of supplies for the Sudanese rebels, which thereby increased the difficulty of the 
strategic position.   
The final precondition addressed by Rothchild and Hartzell (1993) and Rothchild 
(1997) was the presence of an outside mediator.  Although not viewed as a necessary 
condition for fruitful negotiations, the presence of a third party to facilitate 
communications between parties and to point out opportunities is generally associated 
with an increase in the likelihood of success (Walter 2002).  In the Sudanese conflict, two 
mediators were available:  the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa 
Conference of Churches (AACC) (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993).  Both parties, which had 
a history of involvement in relief efforts and goodwill missions, were able “to assess the 
implications of changes in leadership, the emergence of identifiable bargaining parties, 
and other events as they took place and make the most of opportune moments in order to 
advance the negotiation process”  (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993, p. 77).   
Taken together, each of these five factors contributes to what Rothchild and 
Hartzell (1993) and Rothchild (1997) term “favorable preconditions” to successful 
negotiations.  As with most civil wars, the first Sudanese conflict represents a complex 
web of causes that individually and collectively make such conflicts recalcitrant and 
difficult to resolve.  Added to the mix of domestic rivalries, scarce resources, and 
interested third parties are the territorial demands made by the rebels and the reluctance 
of any state to cede control over people, resources, and territory.  Given these difficulties, 
it is somewhat surprising that talks actually produced a settlement that was acceptable to 
both parties.  The discussion, then, will turn to the factors that made an agreement 
possible. 
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 Why territorial concessions? 
Having decided to pursue a negotiated settlement, why did the government of 
Sudan decide to, for all practical purposes, abdicate its sovereignty over a piece of its 
territory?  To address this question, three explanatory factors are developed below.  The 
first stems form the nature of the conflict itself, the second addresses the decision makers, 
and the third draws on Walter’s (1992) credible commitment theory and directly 
addresses bargaining theory. 
First and foremost, the conflict was at its roots was based on the ethnic and 
cultural differences between was considered the Arab north and the African south.  The 
dispute was a complex one in which “class, culture, ethnicity and region in Sudan all 
tended to coincide and to reinforce one another” (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993, p. 67, 
original italics removed).  Southern rebels were unwilling to relinquish claims for some 
degree of independence, yet the government was unable to defeat them.  Given the 
inability of the Sudanese government to conquer the rebels (or at least its unwillingness 
to expend the necessary resources to do so), Sudanese leaders were forced to choose 
between two options: continue to fight, and thereby continuing to expend resources and 
incur costs or make territorial concessions to appease their adversaries.  Had the 
government of Sudan made concessions that feel short of regional control of the south by 
Southerners, it is unlikely that the rebels would have acquiesced considering their 
demonstrated commitment.  This is evident because, by the time the Addis Ababa 
Agreement was concluded in 1971, dissatisfied southerners and rebel groups had been 
protesting their treatment by the north since before independence and appeared unlikely 
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to acquiesce.  Territorial concessions, it seems, were necessary if the rebels were to be 
appeased.  Therefore, one part of the explanation of why Sudan relinquished direct 
territorial control is that it offered the government a means by which to resolve the 
conflict and remove itself from civil war.  
Secondly, the stalemate that emerged between the two adversaries put the rebels 
in the position of being able to continue their struggle.  For political and strategic reasons, 
the ability of the rebels to withstand the Sudanese army effectively removed (or at least 
made unattractive) the state’s option of continuing what appeared to be an unending fight.  
Starting from a small band of malcontents, under the leadership of Lagu, the southern 
forces (in particular the Anya Nya) demonstrated their ability to withstand the state’s 
forces.  Rather than facing certain defeat, the rebels had grown stronger over the course 
of the conflict (growing to include between 10,000 and 12,000 troops), gained domestic 
support, and even drawn international attention to their cause (Rothchild and Hartzell 
1993, pp. 73-74).  Although there is reason to question the likelihood that they would 
succeed in defeating that Sudanese army, the rebels were able to gain a position that 
enabled them to hold off the state and force it to expend already limited resources.  The 
state made territorial concessions, then, for two reasons:  (1) the opposition clearly 
demonstrated that those were the only type of concessions that were acceptable; and (2) 
granting such concessions, although costly, enabled the government of Sudan to bring an 
end to the conflict. 
Third, domestic politics and leadership choices played an important role.  Not 
only was regime change required to reorient the government of Sudan to consider seeking 
peace with the rebels, but the need for domestic support played an important role.  
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Opposition to a peace agreement continued to be present in the government after Nimeiri 
took control, but for domestic political reasons he was motivated to ignore the opposition 
of anti-settlement factions and seek an agreement.  According to Deng (1995, p. 90), 
Nimeiri had alienated both the right and the left and was building on the 
support in the center, which his advisors suggested could include the 
South as the strongest alternative political and military power base.  
Nimeiri was persuaded of this against the opinion his military advisors and 
senior officers, some of whom resigned in protest from the Revolutionary 
Command Council, to the executive authority within the regime.  
 
Thus, in this case, domestic political considerations clearly play an important role, a 
variable that is overlooked in the quantitative analysis above.   
This is a factor that extends beyond the leadership level to include the makeup of 
the negotiating team as well.  The choice of Abel Alier as the southern representative 
within the government was critical to the success of the negotiations (Deng 1995, p. 91).  
Alier’s appointment as the leader of the Sudanese negotiating team injected the 
deliberations of “a southerner whose modesty, loyalty, and commitment to a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict had been tested” (Deng 1995, p. 91).  His role was considered 
crucial in many respects because “it was taken as a positive sign of the government’s 
seriousness of purpose,” and because his proposals for regional autonomy “became the 
basis for the final accord” (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993, p. 71). 
On the other side of the table leadership played an important role as well.  The 
ability of General Lagu to assume the position of military and political leader enabled 
him to convince various rebel factions that a united front was necessary and that the need 
to reach a negotiated settlement was inevitable.  Doing so enabled him to negotiate an 
effective agreement with the state.  “Once Lagu consolidated his position of political and 
military leadership with Southern ranks, he was able to overcome the reluctance of some 
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of his commanders to begin negotiations and to respond positively to government 
overtures (Rothchild and Hartzell 1993, p. 71)  
What, then, does this tell us about the applicability of bargaining theory as an 
explanation of the concessions made by states in a state of civil war?  This analysis 
contends that bargaining theory does in fact provide theoretical guidance for 
understanding the decision to grant low level territorial concessions, albeit indirectly.  
Several of the factors proposed by bargaining theory and alternative explanations do 
appear to have influenced the decisions made by the government of Sudan, while others 
are overlooked. 
Clearly one of the primary factors that brought about the possibility of territorial 
concession was the leadership of both the state and the rebels.  The choice of leadership, 
however, is not a factor that enters into the decision-making calculus of bargaining 
theory.  It does seem reasonable to expect some leaders to be more open to the prospect 
of bargaining (to be risk averse, in other words) than others.  This would indicate that the 
degree to which the factors proposed by bargaining theory influence the human decision-
makers is not uniform.  Willingness of the leadership to bargain, then, is a factor that may 
influence both the decision to negotiate and the concessions offered by the state that is 
overlooked by bargaining theory.   
One of the primary factors that, according to bargaining theory, influences the 
terms of settlement is the misperception of the costs of fighting.  Although the costs of 
the conflict do not appear to directly influence the decision to grant territorial 
concessions, it does appear that the inability or unwillingness of the Sudanese 
government to devote the necessary resources necessary to achieve a capitulation put it in 
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the position of facing a long-tern conflict or having to grant concessions.  Given the 
demonstrated resolve of the rebels and their reluctance to accept anything short of partial 
autonomy, costs, then, indirectly put the state in the position choosing between fighting 
or granting autonomy.  Had the state been able or willing to devote the resources 
necessary to achieve capitulation, the outcome may have been different.  Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that while costs the costs of fighting did not directly 
determine the terms of settlement, they did increase the likelihood of a negotiated 
settlement, the only form of which that was acceptable to the rebels (and therefore the 
only effective type) was territorial concessions.   
Bargaining theory also contends that an incentive to cheat decreases the 
willingness of a state to extend concessions.  As Walter (2002) contends, one possible 
way to overcome this problem is through the promise of enforcement by a third party to 
enforce the agreement or to ensure the security of the combatants once they lay down 
their arms.  When such a security guarantee is present, bargaining theory contends that 
state concessions will be greater.  In the case of Addis Ababa Agreement, such a promise 
was in place, although it was a relatively weak one30.  Ethiopian Emporer Haile Selassie 
offered the guarantee of his government to the security of the Sudanese rebels would be 
protected and, furthermore, personally pledged that “Anya Nya returnees would not 
suffer reprisals” (Walter 2002, p. 97).  Thus, through Selassie’s promise, the security of 
the rebels was ensured and the threat of broken promises was significantly reduced by the 
backing of a regional power.  In effect, the agreement was made that much more 
attractive to the rebels.  This case, then, appears to corroborate the contention made by 
bargaining theory.   
                                                 
30 Walter (2002, p. 97) points out that the Somali guarantee was the weakest one of fourteen in her study. 
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The third factor proposed by bargaining theory that may affect the outcome of 
negotiations – that conflicts over indivisible stakes are more difficult to resolve – are 
present in two forms.  Both serve as the basis for hostilities in this conflict.  The primary 
issue over which this civil war was fought was, of course, territorial control.  
Furthermore, the combatants on each side were organized along ethnic lines.  Both of 
these factors represent what are considered by bargaining theory (as developed for the 
purposes of this research) to be indivisible stakes.  In this case, however, the difficulties 
presented by these indivisible stakes were overcome, albeit at high costs to both sides.  In 
fact, the organization of combatants along ethnic lines may have actually increased the 
likelihood of a negotiated settlement, albeit indirectly.  As discussed above, one of the 
preconditions that lead to successful negotiations was the presence of a clearly identified 
leadership on both sides.  Although discontent regarding the decision to negotiate was 
present at first, both Nimeiri and Lagu were able to develop a fairly high degree of 
consensus within their respective ethnic constituencies.  In this case, it appears that the 
negotiation process was made easier by the uniform composition of the groups, which 
were ethnically homogenous and therefore more cohesive.  Because each side was (to a 
high degree) in agreement, little intra-side debate or opposition was present, which made 
a territorial concession an acceptable way in which to resolve the conflict. 
With regard to the explanations developed from the existing literature, the 
presence of a stalemate clearly had a strong impact on the content of the negotiated 
settlement.  As discussed above, the inability of either party to marshal the required 
strength to decisively defeat its opponent brought about a situation in which both sides 
were compelled to seek a compromise solution or face the continuation of a long-term 
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struggle.  This, of course, made the likelihood of a negotiated settlement possible given 
the inability of either side to defeat the other produced a limited the range of choices, all 
of which entailed making a compromise in order to end the war.  Given that the issue was 
territorial control, it follows that the stalemate significantly increased the chances of the 
highest level of concessions because if victory was seen as a possibility in the future, the 
state may have been more willing to fight the rebels to their defeat.   
The level of democracy, on the other hand, appears to have played at best a 
limited role.  The decision by Nimieri to seek a negotiated settlement by offering 
autonomy was, in part, the result of his need to gain domestic political support.  The 
historical record, however, strongly suggests that Nimeiri was acting in his own best 
interests and not responding to the demands of the populace, as the democratic peace 
literature suggests. 
The remaining variables addressed in the quantitative analysis above that account 
for the timing and location of the negotiated settlement specifically address the likelihood 
of state concessions relative to other times and places.  Of course such a comparison 
cannot be made based on a single case.  Therefore, this analysis will only make two 
observations.  First, this case represents the sole territorial concession in Africa (and only 
one of three globally).  And second, the concessions occurred during the Cold War, 
which is statistically unusual in that a dramatic increase in the rate of negotiated 
settlements followed the end of the Cold War.  It should be noted, however, that unlike 
many other civil wars occurring during the Cold War, the superpower rivalry had little if 
any direct effect on the course of the conflict. 
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 In sum, the completion of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 represents an 
unusual case of a negotiated settlement in that the political and military condition 
predisposed the conflict to a resolution at the bargaining table.  In most cases of civil war, 
the conditions are much less likely to bring about a negotiated settlement.  This case, 
then, sets a low standard for theory testing.  For the purposes of illustration, though, such 
a case is useful for identifying the process by which the terms of settlement are 
determined.  Its uniqueness, though, makes drawing generalizations difficult.  The 
discussion now turns to the case of territorial concessions in the Philippines (1972-1996). 
  
The Philippines 
On September 2, 1996, major strides towards peace were taken to end the civil 
war in the Philippines when the Final Peace Agreement was signed by representatives for 
the government and the Moro National Liberation Front, one of several groups fighting 
for greater political independence for the Moro. Success, however, was limited because 
several other Moro groups continue to fight.  Although racially and linguistically similar 
to the ‘Filipino majority,” the Moro are united by a historical connection to the Moors of 
Spain and their Muslim religion.  The resulting peace, however, was only partial as a 
result of the many groups claiming to represent the Moros. 
 
The onset of war 
The history of the Moro people, which predates conquest of the Philippines by the 
Spanish in 1565 and transcends rule by the United States and occupation by the Japanese, 
is one marked by continual claims for autonomy for the island of Mindanao and the Sulu 
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archipelago (Brogan 1998, Uppsala Conflict Database).  Although effectively under 
control under American rule, tensions in the newly independent Philippines grew with the 
continued migration of predominantly Catholic Filipinos into the region (Muslim and 
Cagoco-Guiam, 2003).  By the late 1960s, tensions increased dramatically as the Moro 
became frustrated by the challenges brought about by Christian Philippine migration into 
the area.  Although they accounted for roughly 75 percent of the population of Mindanao 
at the turn of the century, the influx of outsiders reduced their proportion to 
approximately 25 percent of the population of Mindanao by the late 1960s (Uppsala 
Conflict Database).  The most productive agricultural lands were taken over and natural 
resources were extracted with the Moro seeing little in return (Muslim and Cagoco-
Guiam, 2003).  Because of the loss of land, as well as the resulting increase in 
competition for natural resources and the loss of cultural identity, the Moro reiterated 
demands for greater autonomy to the government and did so with force by shifting into a 
state of open rebellion (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 2003). 
In September 1972, the long-simmering conflict reached new heights as President 
Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in the region as a response to widespread 
communal violence (Brogan 1998).  The move sparked the creation of the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), a secular movement that traces its origins to the Muslim 
Independence Movement (MIM) that organized along tribal lines press claims for 
independence in response to the killing of 28 rebellious recruits (MAR: Assessment for 
the Moros in the Philippines).   One month later, the MFLN moved to the forefront of the 
Moro movement by launching the first organized Moro counter-offensive against the 
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government and, by 1975, had established itself as a popular movement representing the 
interest of the Moro people (Uppsala Conflict Database).   
Marcos responded with a two-pronged approach by simultaneous seeking socio-
economic reform while at the same time suppressing Muslim agitation by instituting 
martial law (Brogan 1998).  These reforms included the reconstruction of devastated 
land, initiatives intended to support Moro investment and development activities, 
resettlement assistants for refuges, and the provision of social welfare programs but are 
unsuccessful at reducing tensions.  Martial law sparked a widespread Moro revolt and the 
conflict quickly broadened into full-scale civil war in which incurred by both sides 
(Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 2003).   
The MNLF was very successful at attracting support internally and externally, but 
faced dedicated opposition by government forces.  By 1974, between 50,000 and 60,000 
rebels had been recruited and placed in fighting positions, while external military support 
flowed through Malaysia from Libya and the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) provided political support (Brogan 1998).  In response, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) reorganized itself to counter the growing strength of the Moro rebels 
(consisting of the MFLN and several associated factions) by creating the Central 
Mindanao Command and the Southern Command (Stankovitch 2003).  The government 
forces launch a full-scale attack in February of 1974, being particularly effective by 
imposing between 500 and 2,000 deaths in a two-day siege of the southern town of Jolo 
(Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 2003).  The fighting between the two adversarial groups 
soon produced a stalemate (Stankovitch 2003). 
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A failed peace 
In an effort to bring about a resolution, President Marcos initiated efforts to begin 
negotiations by holding direct talks with MNFL Chairman Nur Misuari and MNLF 
leaders in the field (Brogan 1998).  In addition to the stalemate, Marcos was facing 
international pressure from the Organization of Islamic Conferences and oil producing 
Muslim states, who were threatening an embargo in support of their religious brethren 
(MAR:  Assessment for the Moros in the Philippines).   To improve his image abroad, 
Marcos began a public relations campaign to court support in the Muslim world that 
included establishing or improving relations in twenty Muslim countries, sending Imelda 
Marcos as a special emissary to Libya, and establishing social and cultural exchanges 
with Egypt (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003, Stankovitch 2003).  In addition, the 
president also made overtures to the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Meeting.  His efforts 
paid off, as the OIC pressured the MNLF to decrease its demands from full independence 
to autonomy (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003). 
Conducted under the auspices of the OIC with final negotiations taking place in 
Libya, the Tripoli Agreement was signed by representatives of the Philippine government 
and the MFLN on December 23, 1976 (MAR:  Assessment for the Moros in the 
Philippines).  According to the text of The Tripoli Agreement, the Republic of the 
Government of the Philippines:  agreed to grant autonomy to thirteen southern provinces 
and southern nine cities; permitted the southern provinces to establish their own judicial 
(based on Islamic law), executive, legislative systems; and to allow the provinces to 
establish their own security force (Tripoli Agreement 1976).  As a safeguard, the 
government insisted that the agreement empower it to take the necessary steps to 
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implement the agreement (Stankovitch 2003).  Additional concessions from the state 
came in the form of amnesty being granted to the rebels and guaranteed positions within 
the government for rebel leaders to allow them to surrender while saving face, which 
occurred in talks leading up to the negotiations (Stankovitch 2003).   
Support for the reduction of demands was contentious within the MNLF.  While 
some MNLF leaders surrendered their arms to accept government posts, others, including 
Chairman Misuari (the signing representative of the Moro) continued to seek full political 
independence for the Moro region (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003).  As a result, two 
splinter groups – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National 
Liberation Front Reformed – emerged and continued to independently seek greater 
reforms (Uppsala Conflict Database).   
The implementation of the accord, however, was less than perfect.  Both the 
MFLN on the government began to accuse each other of insincerity and deceptive 
practices (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003). Marcos implemented reforms that 
established two regional governments, but did not take the steps necessary to implement 
autonomous rule (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003). Peace was short-lived and the 
conflict resumed within months, although sporadic talks continued. 
Leadership changes in the government of the Philippines, however, eventually 
turn the tide back towards peace.  By the mid-1980s, the strength of the long-simmering 
communist insurgency gained strength, ultimately leading to the removal of Marcos from 
office.  Facing intense military attacks, legal challenges, and popular discontent, Marcos 
called for elections and is challenged by Corazon Aquino (Brogan 1998).  Although he 
declares himself the winner (as result of what many considered to be a fraudulent vote 
 172
count), his victory was short-lived and he ultimately is forced to resign in the aftermath of 
a failed coup attempt (Brogan 1998).  Corazon Aquino claimed the presidency and 
proposed widespread reforms, including a new constitution, regional autonomy for the 
Moro, and a ceasefire (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003).  The MNLF agreed to meet at 
the negotiating table and, despite challenges from the MILF, soon gained recognition 
from the government to speak on behalf of the Moro.  Talks between the government and 
the MNLF, which were accompanied by attacks by the MILF, continued into 1997, but 
eventually broke down when the government unilaterally imposed autonomy despite 
MNLF and MILF objections (MAR:  Assessment for the Moros in the Philippines).  In 
1987, the Philippine Congress passed legislation allowing the disenchanted areas to 
engage in a plebiscite to determine the status of the disputed territories, but only four 
regions accepted the conditions Uppsala Conflict Database).  The effort, however, was 
opposed by both the MNLF and the MILF because it was too limited and because they 
were not given the opportunity to participate. 
Open conflict continued a various levels of intensity until 1992, when political 
change once again and brought about the possibility of peace.  Fidel Ramos was elected 
president in February and immediately began to seek a resolution to the decades-old 
conflict (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003).  Ramos took initial steps to garner 
international support for a permanent resolution when, as a candidate, he met with Libyan 
leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi (Stankovitch 2003).  Upon his election, Ramos 
immediately called for peace and appointed a presidential commission to develop a 
program to offer amnesty to the rebels to begin negotiations.  In October, representatives 
of the new government met with the MNLF in preliminary negotiations.  A ceasefire was 
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adopted in 1993 and, although they did not directly take part in the talks, the MILF 
agreed not to oppose the peace process (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003).  On 
September 2, 1996, the Final Peace Agreement was signed with the intention of 
implementing the terms of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.  Although the MILF did not 
participate, the agreement was largely successful and formed the groundwork for future 
talks between the MILF and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.   
 
Why territorial concessions? 
The territorial concessions contained in the Tripoli Agreement and implemented 
by the Final Peace of Agreement of 1996 represent the outcome of a decades-long 
process that is marked by starts and stops.  Clearly the process by which the terms of the 
agreement were accepted by the warring parties does not represent a smooth or linear 
process.  In fact, in many ways it exemplifies the difficulties of reaching and 
implementing such an agreement.  Nor was it a peaceful process.  Although the level of 
violence varied considerably, it was at time of the agreement very heated and 
cumulatively very costly to both sides.  Government estimates place the number of deaths 
at approximately 120,000 people, with more than a million left homeless and at the height 
of the conflict in the 1970s, over 75 percent of the government’s troops were deployed to 
address the unrest (Uppsala Conflict Database).  Adding to the cost was the length of the 
conflict – approximately three decades.  Nor was the Final Agreement the end of the 
story.  To this day, occasional acts of violence occur between the Moro and their 
Christian neighbors, albeit at a significantly diminished level, despite a series of 
agreements being adopted between the MILF (Stankovitch 2003). 
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 Why then did the Government of the Republic of the Philippines agree to give up 
control over a resource rich part of its country?  The simple answer is, of course, to gain 
peace.  A more complete answer, however, is presented below.  In what follows, four 
factors leading to lasting territorial concessions are addressed:  the determination of the 
rebels; the presence of a stalemate; the willingness of leaders on both sides to resolve the 
dispute; and the presence of third parties. 
 The first factor that contributed to the willingness of the government of the 
Philippines to make concessions appears to be the demonstrated commitment of the 
rebels.  Moro claims for territorial independence extend back to the beginnings of 
Spanish rule in the mid-16th century (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003).  Claims for 
Moro independence were pressed against the US government during the colonial period, 
which culminated with an unfulfilled request for Moro autonomy when the Philippines 
were granted independence.  So, by the time the independence of the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines was granted by the US in 1946, a long history had been 
established.  By the late 1960s, tension had increased in response to inward migration of 
Philippine Christians and armed struggle organized under the leadership of the MNLF 
resulted (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003).  In this respect the Moro claims for self-rule 
presented the government of the Philippines as a problem that was not likely to “go 
away” on its own.  In fact, several attempts were made by the government to appease the 
Moro and their leadership prior to both the Tripoli Agreement and the Final Peace 
Agreement.  Nearly three decades of violence, however, demonstrates the unwillingness 
of the rebels to be swayed and the inefficacy of a military solution.  This left the state 
with two options – defeat or appease its adversary. 
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 Government forces, however, were unable to defeat its enemy and by 1974 the 
conflict had produced a stalemate (Stankovitch 2003).  The onset of a stalemate marks a 
turning point in the armed conflict – because neither side was able to achieve its goals on 
the battlefield they turn to the negotiating table.  The Tripoli Agreement marks a 
significant milestone towards peace, but one that does not prove to be immediately 
successful.  Two factors diminished the successfulness of the Tripoli Accords.  First, the 
downgrading of demands from independence to autonomy produced dissention within the 
ranks of the Moro.  The result was the fractionalization of the movement, which 
ultimately forced the government with deal with demands from different, yet related, 
groups.  Second, the Accords provided little detail about what was meant by autonomy 
and how it was to be established.  As a result, different interpretations of the document 
made implementation difficult.  In many respects, attempts to implement the accord 
resembled a continuation of the bargaining process as each side made demands of its 
adversaries.  The vagueness of the document provided leaders of each side with political 
ammunition to continue to seek their ultimate goals.  Reaching an agreement, then, does 
not necessarily indicate the resolution of a dispute. 
 Final implementation did not occur until the government had demonstrated its 
willingness to seek a settlement acceptable to the rebels and the rebels had indicated their 
willingness to live by such an agreement.  The rise of Corazon Aquino to the presidency 
brought to power a leader who was willing to ensure regional autonomy for the Moro that 
would be constitutionally guaranteed.  While considered a step in the right direction, the 
changes were also viewed as insufficient by the rebels.  The establishment of a ceasefire 
and the return of Misuari to the Philippines, however, seem to indicate a willingness on 
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the part of the MNLF to seek a resolution.  Talks under Aquino, however, were not 
productive and marked by frequent episodes of violence, a factor that did not change until 
the election of President Ramos to the Philippine presidency.   
To Ramos, peace was the focal point of his administration.  In contrast to 
initiatives under Aquino, Ramos addressed the specific demands of the Moro and the 
MNLF.  This included adopting the principles of the Tripoli Agreement and granting the 
Moro the ability to address the political, social and economic inequalities of the region 
(Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 2003).  Doing so, however, only appeased the MFLN 
faction of the Moro.  The government, then, had to also accept the presence of other rebel 
groups with unresolved demands on the same issue.  Therefore, a necessary step toward 
territorial concessions was the presence of a leader willing to meet the demands of the 
rebels. 
Finally, the presence of third parties made important contributions to the context 
of the negotiation process in several ways.  First, the Islamic oil-producing states who 
sympathized with the marginalization of the fellow Muslim played a coercive role 
(Santos 1999).  When it appeared that the Marcos regime was unwilling to seek a 
negotiated settlement, the threat of an oil embargo added to the potential costs that would 
be incurred should the government decide to continue to fight.  Of course, Marcos was 
able to minimize these potential costs by successfully embarking on a foreign policy that 
improved his image and bargaining position in the Muslim world (Stankovitch 2003).  
Second, both the Organization of Islamic Conference and the government of Libya 
helped keep the negotiations on track through the provision of good offices (Santos 
1999).  By doing so, they were able to step in propel talks forward when necessary.  
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Third, the OIC was also instrumental in encouraging the Moro to accept autonomy as an 
acceptable resolution (Santos 1999).  Thus, the involvement of third parties played a 
supporting role to what concluded as a successful resolution of a territorial dispute.   
In sum, claims for an independent Mindanao ultimately extracted territorial 
concessions from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.  The process by 
which a resolution was achieved, however, was a complex one that evolved over time.  It 
was a process that can also be viewed as being only partially successful because it did not 
represent an entire solution, but one acceptable to only a subset of the disaffected Moro.  
It does, however, highlight the role of increasing costs to the state as a factor that affects 
the context of the decision to make concessions, but not necessarily the concessions 
themselves.  Finally, it emphasizes the importance of a stalemate as a necessary 
precondition for talks to occur.  In what follows, the Dayton Peace Accord is discussed. 
 
Bosnia (1992-1995) 
 The negotiation process that formally brought an end to the Bosnian civil war 
(1992-1995) is one that bears little resemblance to that of the Sudanese and Philippine 
peace processes.  Entered into force with the signatures of Alijia Izectbegovic of Bosnia, 
Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia in Paris on December 14, 
1995, what is commonly known as the Dayton Peace Accords was the result of 21 days 
of intense negotiations in Dayton, Ohio (Brogan 1998).  The terms of the agreement, 
which includes territorial, power-sharing, and policy concessions, effectively subdivides 
the former Yugoslav Republic into two separate political entities – the Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb Republic of Bosnia – each of which maintains a high 
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degree of independence (Europa 1998). However, the motivation to conclude such an 
agreement did not come from the combatants themselves.  Instead, as discussed below, 
the accord represents the enormous and concerted effort on the part of the international 
community to end a campaign of ethnic cleansing and protect the strategic interests of the 
world powers more so than it does the efforts or desires of the combatants themselves.   
 Studying the terms of this agreement is informative for several reasons.  First, 
since it represents the first ethnic secessionist movement in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, it may provide guidance for understanding the process by which other post-Cold 
War agreements are made (Saideman 2001).  Second, the complex interplay of domestic 
politics and ethnic identity can further inform our understanding of the role of identity 
politics in civil wars generally and those that end in territorial concessions specifically.  
Third, this case highlights the role that the international community can play in the 
resolution of civil wars and so may provide lessons to policymakers.   
 
The Bosnian civil war 
 The war that has been described as “the worst outbreak of violence in Europe 
since World War II” (Kaufman 2001, p. 165) is a conflict whose roots can be traced back 
to the Roman Empire (Brogan 1998, p. 439).  A conglomeration of 6 independent 
republics – the republic of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, 
and Montenegro, with Serbia consisting of the two autonomous regions of Kosovo and 
Montenegro – the pre-civil war Republic of Yugoslavia enjoyed a relatively peaceful and 
prosperous period from the end of the World War period until the death of its wartime 
resistance leader Joseph Broz Tito.  Under Tito, the political structure of Yugoslavia was 
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highly decentralized along ethnic lines, a characteristic that increased in importance 
during the 1960s and 1970s and contributes to the ethnic problem of the 1990s (Snyder 
2000).  Following the death of Tito, who had been the primary restraint of ethnic and 
ideological tensions, a period of economic decline combined with uneven development 
among the republics made the country ripe for conflict (Saideman 2001, p. 105).   
Historically, the roots of the modern conflict can be traced back to ethnic rivalries 
flamed by a competition among political leaders (Saideman 2001).  In particular, modern 
ethnic tensions are commonly attributed to the actions of Slobodan Milosevic, who 
appealed to the minority Serb’s sense of national identity as a means by which to defeat 
political challengers in the Communist Party and demanded that Kosovo and Vojvodina 
lose their autonomous status.  Tension turned into open hostility between the ethnic 
groups when, in June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, thereby 
creating a permanent split in the Yugoslav republic (Brogan 1998).  The response of the 
now Serb dominated Yugoslav army (and controlled by Milosevic) was a failed attempt 
to force the separatists to reconsider by invading Slovenia.  Fighting almost immediately 
spread to Croatia, where federal forces were more successful and able to impose order 
and, ostensibly, ‘protect’ the Serb minority that resided there.  Order, however, was 
quickly replaced by mass execution and ethnically motivated killings of Croats.     
The reaction of the international community was, at this point, limited and 
avoided the use of force (Foyle 2005).  The United Nations – in response to US pressure 
– immediately imposed an arms embargo on all of the former territories of Yugoslavia in 
hopes of preventing escalation, an action which ultimately served to protect the 
advantage of the better-armed Serbs (Brogan 1998, pp. 448 – 449).  Soon after, the 
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United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established to implement a US-
sponsored ceasefire agreement (Foyle 2005).  By March of 1992 ethnic conflict had 
expanded as Bosnian Serbs, who feared being dominated by Bosnian Muslims, armed 
themselves and fought to include their region in the newly formed partnership between 
Serbia and Montenegro, the  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kaufman 2001).  Such a 
move, however, was equally threatening to Bosnian Muslims, who would lose their status 
as the largest ethnic group.   
Fueled by recognition of an independent Bosnia from the European powers and 
the US, Muslims and Croats in the country stepped up their efforts, only to be 
overwhelmed by Serbian-backed militias.  The conflict quickly turned from one for 
control to one of ethnic cleansing as Bosnian Serbs turned against their former neighbors 
(Saideman 2001).  In an effort to remain neutral, the UN maintained a strict role as 
observers, although the Security Council did impose economic sanctions and an arms 
embargo against Serbia in 1992 and worked to ensure the supply of food and medicine 
for Bosnian Muslims (Foyle 2005).  Official and public international attention increased 
in response to events such as the publication of images of a Serb attack on the 
marketplace in Sarajevo, Serb attacks on UN protected safe havens, and attacks on UN 
peacekeepers. 
 
Compelled to negotiate 
 The extreme aggressiveness of the Serbs ultimately prompted a reaction from the 
West, which eventually led to a negotiated settlement.  In response to the attack on the 
Sarajevo marketplace, the US, which had viewed the conflict as a regional problem that 
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was ancillary to its strategic interests, responded by pressuring its North American Treaty 
Organization (NATO) allies to issue an ultimatum to the Serbs to force an end to the 
attacks on the Bosnian capitol or face air strikes from NATO forces (Foyle 2005).  The 
move was successful in that Serb forces withdrew from Sarajevo, but it failed to deter the 
continued attack of the Serbs on their ethnic adversaries as well as UN peacekeepers.  
Soon thereafter, the US increased the level of its direct involvement by encouraging the 
Muslims and Croats to join forces against their mutual adversary, a move which produced 
a defensive pact but not one that gave the Muslims and Croats the necessary strength to 
defend themselves.   
 Within the US and the international community, support grew for some type of 
response. Public support for the direct involvement of US troops, however, was minimal.  
Clinton, who was motivated by campaign promises and public statements to pursue a 
resolution and was concerned by the effect that the lack of US action was having on its 
international reputation, engaged his advisors to develop a solution to the predicament 
(Foyle 2005).  In July of 1995, the Serbs rejected a proposal by European Union 
representative Cyrus Vance that would have reduced their territorial holdings from nearly 
70 to 49 percent of the country (Brogan 1998, pp. 449-450).  Multilateral efforts by the 
US, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France to resolve the conflict offering to end all 
sanctions in place against Serbia in exchange for Serb recognition of boundaries of 
Bosnia and Croatia were rejected as well (Foyle 2005).   
Tensions within the NATO alliance grew as European powers pushed for the US 
to allow UNPROFOR to expand its use of force or to replace European troops with 
American forces.  The American president, however, was reluctant to put troops on the 
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ground out of a fear of public opposition and concerns levied by his advisors (particularly 
Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Colin Powell) regarding the lack of clear objectives and 
open-ended time frame (Foyle 2005).  After intense deliberations, the Clinton 
administration adopted an “endgame strategy” that ultimately became known as “lift and 
strike” as a means by which to compel the Bosnian Serbs to seek a negotiated settlement 
to the conflict (Foyle 2005, p. 19).  Presented to European leaders by National Security 
Advisor Anthony Lake, “the policy offered carrots and sticks:  the Bosnian Serbs would 
face extensive bombing if they refused to negotiate; the United States would unilaterally 
lift the arms embargo but would then disengage from the region if the Muslims refused to 
negotiate a settlement.  In addition, Western economic sanctions would be lifted against 
Yugoslavia if it recognized the independence of Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia” 
whereas “regional economic assistance would follow an agreement (Foyle 2005, p. 19).  
Pressure on the adversaries increased when the US Senate approved a resolution ending 
the arms embargo against, a measure which was adopted in quick succession by the US 
House of Representatives. 
International pressure on the combatants increased when Serb forces attacked the 
UN-designated “safe area” at Srebrenica, one of six that had been established two years 
earlier to provide refuge for Bosnian Muslims, in an attack that resulted in the death of 
8,000 men and boys (Brogan 1998, pp 450-451).  In response, NATO forces led by the 
US targeted a variety of Serbian military installations throughout Bosnia in a bombing 
campaign that lasted from the end of August through October 1995, which opened the 
way for a Muslim-Croat offensive.  Having been able to gain access to armaments from 
abroad (particularly from Middle East Muslims) in spite of the arms embargo, the 
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Muslim-Croat forces were effective in regaining territory and quickly recaptured 1300 
square miles before the UN and NATO demanded a halt to the offensive (Brogan 1998, 
pp 450-451).   Under intense pressure from the international community, the leaders of 
the three adversarial groups agreed to meet in Dayton, Ohio, to seek a negotiated 
settlement. 
Under the watchful eyes of the representatives of the US, Britain, France, 
Germany, Russia, and a representative from the EU, the parties negotiated and itialed an 
agreement (which included eleven annexes in addition to the main agreement) on 
November 21 and signed the document into force in Paris on December 14, 1995 
(Kaufman 2001).  In doing so, the signatories adopted a complex agreement that that 
included territorial, power-sharing, and policy concessions; instituted a ceasefire; invited 
a NATO force to implement the terms of settlement; established a timetable for elections; 
committed the parties to the adoption of a new constitution for the newly created 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; established the boundaries of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic of Bosnia (The Dayton Accords, 1995). 
 
Why territorial concessions? 
 The territorial concessions contained within the Dayton Accords represent the 
outcome of what can (once again) best be described as a unique process.  To begin with, 
the onset of ethnic rivalries was trigged by the actions and statements of political leaders 
jockeying for power, a condition attributed to the lack of a dominant ethnic majority in 
any of the decentralized regions within the former Yugoslavia (Kaufman 2001).  Second, 
the onset of violence was triggered by appeals to ethnic divisions which ultimately 
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brought about the dissolution of the state.  Because of this, any resolution required an 
additional element – the development of a new state structure, which in this case involved 
two highly decentralized and ethnically homogenous political entities replacing the 
previous five (Saideman 2001).  Third, the pre-existing high degree of ethnic followed by 
savage conflict and massive numbers of relocations (internally and externally) forced the 
parties to address the additional problem of relocation (Brogan 1998).  Clearly each of 
these factors contributed to an environment in which a negotiated settlement was highly 
unlikely to be successful.  In fact, the actions of the adversaries point directly to a goal of 
not only capitulation, but of genocidal elimination of its adversaries. 
 Why, then, did territorial concessions emerge as the solution?  In contrast to the 
process by which territorial concession were developed in Sudan and the Philippines, 
where domestic pressures existed for both sides to seek a resolution by expanding their 
own bargaining space to include the demands of their adversaries.  In this case the entire 
negotiated settlement can be directly attributed to external pressures plied by the US, the 
various European powers, Russia, NATO, and the UN.  In fact, a strong argument can be 
made that the territorial concessions were a direct result of campaign promises made by 
US president Bill Clinton, who was under public pressure to follow through on his 
criticisms of US policy under George Bush (see, for example, Foyle 2005).  Had the US 
not adopted its policy of “lift and strike,” thereby pressuring the three adversaries to seek 
a negotiated settlement, and had the European powers and Russia not considered an  
intervention to be in their best interests, it is highly likely that the Bosnian civil war 
would have continued until at least one side had been eliminated.  External political 
decisions, then, and not any of the covariates of state concessions addressed by 
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bargaining theory or the existing literature brought about territorial concessions in the 
case of Bosnia. 
 
Conclusions:  Factors that affect the likelihood of territorial concessions 
International relations theory consistently claims that territory is of utmost 
importance to states.  The evidenced garnered from the negotiated settlement of civil 
wars corroborates this view.  Only three civil wars resulted in increases in autonomy (a 
low-level territorial concession), while in no cases did the state give up its sovereignty.  
Given the small number of civil wars in which territorial concessions are granted, it is 
difficult (if not impossible) to generalize observations from the evidence.  However, the 
three cases discussed above do point to some commonalities, as discussed below.   
First, each of the cases above points to the importance of a stalemate as a 
necessary precursor to territorial concessions.  The necessity of a stalemate is in keeping 
with both bargaining theory and Zartman’s condition that a “mutually hurting stalemate” 
is necessary for a negotiated settlement to occur.  With regard to bargaining theory, the 
basic logic is that combatants will make concessions only when the utility of doing so 
exceeds that of not doing so.  This implies that states will make large concessions only 
rarely and only out of necessity.  Based on this logic, we can expect states to be willing to 
accept relatively high costs prior to giving up territory and to only make territorial 
concessions when it is absolutely necessary to do so.  In the each of the three cases 
addressed above, the presence of a stalemate indicated the inability of the state to impose 
it will on its adversary.  It also indicates the ability and willingness of the rebels to 
continue fighting.  As a result, the states were faced with a choice:  continue fighting 
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(without success) or make a territorial concession.  In order to avoid continued warfare, 
Sudan, the Philippines, and Bosnia were each forced to give up they cherish the most – 
land.   
The presence of a stalemate in each of these cases also supports Zartman’s 
contention that negotiated settlements will occur only when neither side is able to achieve 
their goals militarily and both sides incur costs by failing to resolve their differences.  
Here Zartman focuses on the condition under which negotiates settlements are more or 
less likely to occur.  This research adds to that by extending the logic to the terms of 
settlement.  If combatants are willing to enter into a negotiated settlement only when the 
above two conditions hold, then by extension we should expect large concessions to 
occur only when the incurred costs are high.  The above cases support such a contention. 
Second, the evidence suggests that international actors and third parties can play 
an important role in the decision to grant enhanced territorial independence, but that their 
effect varies widely.  The role played by third parties in these three cases does, of course, 
vary considerably.  In Sudan and the Philippines, outside parties played a role that can 
best be described as supporting.  In the case of Sudan, Ethiopian Emperor Selassie 
encouraged a settlement and personally pledged to enforce the agreement.  In this sense, 
his role, while important to the resolution of hostilities was limited in that it was not 
coercive to either side.  A similar role was played by Libya in the Philippine resolution.  
In contrast, though, the OIC played a coercive role by threatening to limited oil exports to 
the  Philippines, a move which would have had direct economic effects and increased the 
costs of the war to the Philippine government.  In other words, the OIC not only 
encouraged a settlement, but used its influence to bring it about by altering the 
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preferences of the Philippine government.  Finally, in the Bosnia case, outside actors (the 
US, the UN, and European powers), not only encouraged territorial concessions, but 
compelled Bosnia to make them.  This case represents the most extreme degree of 
influence in these three cases.  However, had the outsiders not acted, it is likely that, 
rather than giving up territory, the combatants would have continued fighting until one 
side or the other was eliminated.  So in the Bosnian cases, the role of outside actors can 
easily be cited as a cause of, and not just a contributing factor to, territorial concessions. 
The third common factor in each of these cases goes directly to he individual level 
of analysis.  In each of these cases, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement and the 
willingness to extend territorial compromises is strongly influenced by leadership.  This 
indicates that the human decision-making process (which bargaining theory fails to 
consider) is at least as important as systemic conditions (which bargaining theory 
emphasizes).  This indicates that the preferences of states cannot be viewed as simply the 
product of raw mathematical calculations because in each of these three cases who was in 
charge was an important contributing factor to both the decision to settle and the decision 
to offer territory as a part of that settlement. 
In sum, the small number of cases makes it difficult to make generalizations about 
the factors that influence a state’s decision to offer territorial concessions to end civil 
war.  However, some common factors emerge – the presence of a stalemate, the 
involvement of external third parties, and a leadership willing to give up territory.  Based 
on these observations, it seems reasonable to view these conditions as precursors to 
territorial compromise, albeit cautiously.  
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Chapter 8:  Summary and conclusion 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this research is to identify the factors that influence the 
concessions made by states to the rebels to end a civil war.  As such, its emphasizes the 
resolution of the underlying political disputes that produce militarized conflict within a 
state.  By doing so, this research intends to contribute to our understanding of civil wars 
as a political event by highlighting the link between militarized conflict and the 
resolution of underlying political disagreements.  It therefore addresses a topic that is of 
interest to a wide variety of scholarly communities, including civil war specialists, 
international relations theorists, peace study scholars, area specialists, and policymakers.  
Despite the substantial amounts of research dedicated to understanding civil wars as both 
a political and military event, it also addresses a facet of civil wars that, to date, has 
received little (if any) scholarly attention. 
Understanding the determinants of the concessions states make to end a civil war 
makes several important contributions to the field of political science.  First, this research 
expands our existing understanding of the conduct and resolution of civil wars.  It does so 
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by shifting the emphasis of the study of civil wars from when a negotiated a negotiated 
settlement is likely to occur to how the terms of settlement on which a settlement is based 
are determined.  Second, it provides insight into the process by which battlefield 
successes or failures are translated into political accommodations between competing 
adversaries.  As such, it goes directly to the heart of the matter of the resolution of civil 
wars by emphasizing the resolution of the underlying political disagreement.  Finally, it 
highlights the extent to which states will make political concessions to appease their rebel 
adversaries.  If we are to truly understand civil wars as a political phenomenon, each of 
these represent important contribution. 
In what follows, the central arguments and assumptions that form the basis of this 
research are addressed.  This is followed by a recapping of the results of the empirical 
analysis.  Finally, the basic conclusions of this research are summarized. 
 
The argument revisited 
 In order to develop an explanation of the factors that influence the concessions 
made by states involved in civil war, this research builds on the logic of bargaining 
theory, but integrates explanations present in the existing literature and from variables 
that were inductively derived from an examination of the dataset.  Bargaining theory, 
which draws from and extends rationalist theories of conflict, contends that conflict 
occurs when two actors involved in a dispute are unable to successfully identify a 
bargaining space, or a set of possible resolutions that are acceptable to both parties.  In 
this sense, bargaining theory views conflict as a breakdown or failure because both sides 
would be better off if they were able to resolve the conflict short of fighting.  Bargaining 
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theory contends that this breakdown occurs when at least one of three conditions are 
present:  private information, an incentive to cheat, and indivisible stakes.  This research 
applies bargaining theory in reverse by arguing that if conflict is likely to occur when 
these conditions are present, then combatants should be able to identify a bargaining 
space when the conditions are addressed.  If this is so, then peace should result when the 
preconditions for war are addressed and the resulting terms of settlement (measured as 
state concessions) should reflect the ability of adversaries to gain concessions from each 
other. 
 In addition, this research integrates two additional sources of explanations.  First, 
it draws from existing literature to identify alternative explanations for state concessions.  
This produces two factors that may influence concessions made by state: the level of 
democracy of the state and the presence of a stalemate.  The level of democracy, the 
democratic peace literature agues, should positively affect the maximum concessions 
offered by the state because of cultural and structural pressures to resolve conflicts 
quickly and with a minimum of costs.  Similarly the presence of a stalemate should make 
the state more willing to grant greater concessions because it represents the opportunity 
to end the fighting and gain some (but not all) of its goals.  The second source of 
alternative explanations is the product of the process of induction.  The data collected for 
this research indicate that both the timing of a negotiated settlement (whether during or 
after the Cold War) make negotiated settlements more likely and that the location of the 
settlement (whether inside or outside of Africa) also affects the relationship.   
As discussed in more detail below, this analysis provides some support for the use 
of bargaining theory as an explanation of the factors that influence state concessions.  
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However, it also suggests that a clearer and more accurate picture of the complex 
relationship can be gained by integrating the explanations drawn from existing literature 
and the inductive process.  The results are summarized and discussed in what follows. 
 
Recapping the results 
 The empirical analysis of the use of bargaining theory and the alternative 
explanations was conducted in two stages on a dataset specifically constructed for this 
purpose.  The dataset described every civil war that met the Correlates of War definition 
of a civil war and started between 1945 and 1992.  The first stage of the analysis 
attempted to determine the factors that influence the type of the maximum concession 
made by the state by using Tobit analysis on all incidences of civil war within the dataset.  
For this purpose, the maximum concession in each of the written agreements was coded 
along an ordinal scale that distinguished between policy, power-sharing, and territorial 
concessions.  The ordering of categories was based on the assumption that policy 
concessions, which involve one-time concessions, are least valuable to the state and the 
rebels.  Power-sharing concessions, which increase the access of the rebels to the political 
decision-making system, were considered to be more important than policy concessions 
because they in effect grant the rebels long-term and wide-ranging influence in the affairs 
of the state.   Territorial concessions concern what states considered to be most valuable 
(territory) and therefore most generous.   
For the second stage of the analysis, each maximum concession was categorized 
according to whether it represented a high or low level concession for that type of 
concession (policy, power-sharing, or territorial).  This stage focused the analysis on only 
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those civil wars that ended in a negotiated settlement and only those that produced each 
type of maximum concession.  Probit analysis was used to asses the presence of a 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables in each case 
where policy and power-sharing concessions appeared as the maximum concession, 
while the relatively small number of territorial concession (three) required the use of 
qualitative methods.   
 To empirically test the propositions of bargaining theory and the alternative 
explanations, a set of seven formal and two informal hypotheses were developed.  Data 
on the independent variables was utilized from existing data sources (such as the 
Correlates of War dataset, Walter’s 2002 Civil War Resolution Dataset, and Hartzell and 
Hoddie’s 2003 data from Institutionalizing Peace).  This effort produced a set of 91 civil 
wars, 27 of which ended in a negotiated settlement.  The hypotheses and empirical results 
of the analysis are summarized below. 
 Bargaining theory contends that one of the preconditions for war is when private 
information regarding a potential combatant’s abilities or resolve is present.  This makes 
it difficult for an opponent’s adversary to accurately determine what the real costs of 
conflict are going to be.  Furthermore, bargaining theory contends that political actors are 
most likely to hide or disguise there true abilities or intentions when conflict is likely.  
While this may be so, it stands to reason that once conflict actually occurs, participants 
immediately begin to gain information about the true abilities or intentions of their 
adversary.  As a result, while both sides are not able to accurately measure their expected 
utility for fighting versus not fighting prior to the onset of fighting, both become better 
able to do so once the fighting starts.  In other words, once war begins information is 
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necessarily passed between opponents.  As each side gains new information about their 
opponent, each becomes better able to assess its expected utility and may therefore revise 
is preferences (or, in other words, adjust its bargaining space which increases the set of 
mutually acceptable resolutions).  This leads to the general conjecture that the more 
successful a state is at fighting, the less generous it will be at the bargaining table.  This 
research used to commonly used proxy measures to account for success:  deaths sustained 
by the state and the duration of the conflict.  These measures were justified on the 
grounds that the more successful a state was at fighting, the fewer deaths it would incur 
and the quicker it would end the war.  This logic produced two hypotheses, both of which 
are reproduced below: 
H1:  As the number of deaths suffered by the state involved in civil war 
increases, the political concessions to the rebels will be more extensive.   
 
H2:  The longer a civil war lasts, the greater the political concessions 
offered by the state to the rebels will be. 
 
The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that neither the number of deaths a 
state suffers nor the duration of the conflict exhibit a statistically significant relationship 
to the maximum concession offered, despite the fact that some analysts (e.g. Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003, Mason and Fetts 1996) have indicated that these variables are related to the 
decision to negotiate.  Several explanations exist as to why this may be so.  First, it could 
be that the decision-makers of states do not integrate the number of deaths suffered or the 
duration of the conflict into their decision-making calculus of what type of concession to 
offer the rebels.  In other words, the explanation proposed by bargaining theory may 
simply be erroneous in that no relationship exists.  This could indicate the presence of 
emotional, rather than the rational decision-making process proposed by bargaining 
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theorists.  If this is so, then we cannot (or at least should not) expect statistical analysis to 
indicate the presence of a relationship that does not in fact exist.  Second, decision-
makers may include these measures of success as a part of the process, but not in the way 
prescribed by bargaining theory.  For instances, it may be that the leaders of states 
involved in civil wars are sensitive to the number of deaths suffered and the duration of 
the conflict, but view them as sunk costs.  In an effort to recoup these costs, leaders may 
be less likely to negotiate in the first place because by negotiating, they would be walking 
away from costs they have already incurred.   
However, when looking at the effects of these measures of success on the level of 
concession, the view is somewhat different.  In the case of power-sharing concessions, 
the number of deaths suffered by the state and the duration of the conflict indicated 
opposite influences on the level power-sharing concessions, with deaths being positive 
and duration being negative.  This indicates that states are more willing to grant the rebels 
guaranteed access to the political system when the conflict is long or when the rebels are 
able to impose a high number of deaths on the state.  This finding supports the contention 
of bargaining theory.  When examining the probit results for the level of policy 
concession, however, it appears that neither of these variables demonstrates a 
relationship.  The most straightforward conclusion, then, is that the measures of success 
have only a specific effect – on the decision of what types of power-sharing concessions 
to extend.  When looking at the qualitative analysis of territorial concessions, it appears 
that deaths and duration condition the decision to grant territorial concessions.  This is so 
because in two of the three conflicts addressed (Sudan and the Philippines), the duration 
was extremely long and because in all three of the conflicts (Sudan, the Philippines, and 
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Bosnia) the number of deaths incurred by the state was high. Thus, while there is some 
evidence to suggest that the success in war influences the decision of whether or not to 
negotiate, this analysis indicates that success does not directly condition the maximum 
concession offered by the state, although it may influence the degree of power-sharing 
that is extended and possibly the decision to extend territorial concessions. 
 The second contention put forth by bargaining theory is that conflict is more 
likely to occur when an incentive to cheat is present.  If this is so, then removing the 
incentive should lead to peace.  The presence of a security guarantee (or what Walter 
2002 calls a “credible commitment”) should enable adversaries to be more successful at 
the bargaining table.  To account for the presence of a security guarantee, this research 
borrowed from Walter (2002), who codes a “credible commitment” to be present when an 
outside actor promises to enforce an agreement reached by combatants at the bargaining 
table.  This led to the following hypothesis: 
H3:  Political concessions made by the state to the rebels will be greater 
when a third-party guarantee is present. 
 
The results of the Tobit analysis of the effect of a “credible commitment” on the 
maximum type of concession the state is willing to offer supports the contention of 
bargaining theory.  It appears that reducing the incentive to cheat, states are willing to 
grant greater concessions to their adversaries.  Such a finding is also in line with Walter’s 
(2002) contention that negotiations are more likely to produce a settlement and the 
settlements are more likely to be implemented when a “credible commitment” is present. 
Two prominent explanations for this relationship exist.  First, it may be that states 
are more willing to grant greater concessions when a “credible commitment” is in place 
because it increases the likelihood that the state will get what it bargained for – peace for 
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political concessions.  In this way, “credible commitments” may act more like insurance 
that encourages states to extend greater concessions.  A second possibility is that 
“credible commitments” may resolve what is commonly referred to as a security dilemma 
(Snyder and Jervis, 1999).  As Licklider (1993) points out, in the aftermath of a civil war, 
the former adversaries must live either in the same state or as neighbors.  This creates at 
least the possibility of renewed conflict.  However, when a “credible commitment” is in 
place and implementation is insured, then both the state and the rebels may feel more 
protected, thereby resolving the security dilemma.   
When considering the level of concession granted within each type of concession, 
the results are somewhat less clear.  In cases in which the state grants power-sharing 
concessions, this analysis indicates that the state is more likely to grant a high rather than 
a low level concession.  This means that when a “credible commitment” is present, states 
are more willing to guarantee the rebels a place in the decision-making process of the 
state.  Again, this may point to the insurance effect or the resolution of a security 
dilemma, both of which are discussed above.  In the case of policy concessions, however, 
no relationship was found.  Of course, as discussed in Chapter 6, this may be because no 
relationship exists or the failure of the model to detect a relationship that does in fact 
exist.   
When considering territorial concessions, the lack of variation between high and 
low territorial concessions in the presence of security guarantees indicates that states are 
not more likely to relinquish full sovereignty over territory, even in the presence of such a 
promise.  In the three cases addressed by this research, Walter (2002) codes only two 
(Bosnia and Sudan) as having a credible commitment, while such a promise is not in 
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place in the case of the Philippines.  However, the promise of Ethiopia to ensure the 
implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement was one described by Walter (2002, p. 68) 
as being “weak”.  Viewed from this perspective, an argument could be put forth that 
states would be more likely to grant full territorial independence when a strong “credible 
commitment” is in place.  Thus, the findings of this analysis support that of Hartzell and 
Hoddie (2003), Walter (2002), and Mason and Fetts (1996), who contend that guaranteed 
enforcement of treaty provisions increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. 
The third and final contention put forth by bargaining theory is that conflict is 
more likely when the stakes at issue are not easily shared.  The basic logic is that not all 
issues are equally easy to subdivide and share which makes it difficult for the combatants 
to identify a bargaining space.  However, it should be noted that the presence of 
indivisible stakes is considered by some (Lake 2003, Fearon 1995) to be the weakest 
proposition made by bargaining theory because such problems can be overcome by 
linking multiple issues together or side payments.  This research used ethnic conflicts and 
territorial disputes to signify the presence of indivisible issues.  While these two measures 
represent only a partial list of indivisible issues, and are imperfect proxies at that, they do 
adequately address the issues at hand.  Ethnic conflicts, in which combatants are 
organized along the lines of a shared identity, are between two adversaries who are 
distinguished by immutable cultural and physical characteristics.  As a result, these types 
of conflicts may be more susceptible to problems of issue divisibility.  In the case of 
territory, it represents a reasonable proxy for issue indivisibility because land is 
something that is not easily shared.  This logic produced the following two hypotheses: 
H4:  Territorial disputes will result in less extensive concessions being 
made by the state to the rebels.   
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H5:  Conflicts in which combatants are organized along ethnic lines will result in 
less extensive being made by the state to the rebels. 
 
The Tobit analysis of the effect of indivisibility indicates that there is no effect on 
the maximum concession offered by a state.  Neither ethnicity nor territory appears to 
have a statistically significant effect on maximum concessions.  Thus, this component of 
bargaining theory (as developed and tested here) does not hold up to empirical scrutiny.  
This may indicate the complete absence of a causal relationship.  On the other hand, it 
may substantiate the claims that issue invisibility can be overcome through linkages and 
side payments as proposed by Fearon (1995) and Lake (2003).  This explanation would 
imply that combatants are more concerned with the overall terms of settlement and not 
just one or two issues.  Determining the presence or absence of such decision-making, 
however, is beyond the scope of this study. 
 When it comes to levels of policy and power-sharing concessions, there again 
appears to be no relationship between indivisibility and levels of concessions, as neither 
probit model indicated the presence of a statistically significant relationship.  In the case 
of territorial concessions, however, an argument can be made that states were unwilling 
to completely grant territorial independence to the rebels but instead extended only partial 
autonomy.  This outcome, as previously discussed, indicates strong reluctance on the part 
of the state to subdivide and share its territory. 
 This analysis also includes explanations generated from existing within the 
literature and an examination of variables inductively generated from the data in addition 
to the variables proposed by bargaining theory.  The first of these is the presence or 
absence of a stalemate as a precursor to negotiations.  Within the literature, it has been 
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proposed by Zartman (2001) that negotiated settlements are much more likely to occur 
when the adversaries find themselves in a position such that neither is able to gain the 
upper hand on the battlefield and both incur costs.  One way of removing themselves 
from this position is by entering into a negotiated settlement in which both sides are able 
to partially achieve their goals driving the fighting as well as peace.  If this is true, then it 
follows that states involved in civil war may be more willing to grant greater concessions 
to their adversaries in order to bring about a resolution.  To account for the presence of a 
“mutually hurting stalemate” this researched borrows Walter’s (2002) measure for 
stalemate.  The proposed relationship between state concessions and the presence of a 
stalemate was tested by the following hypothesis: 
H6:  When a civil war produces a “mutually hurting stalemate”, the  
concessions made by the state to the rebel will be more extensive than  
when such a stalemate does not occur 
 
The results of the Tobit analysis indicate that the presence of a “mutually hurting 
stalemate” does in fact demonstrate a positive influence on the maximum concessions 
offered by states.  In other words, when states fighting a civil war choose to resolve a 
stalemate by entering into a negotiated settlement is appears that they are more likely to 
offer more extensive concessions than otherwise.  This lends support to the contention 
developed by Zartman (2001) and adopted by Walter (2002) and this research that states 
are willing to make a trade-off between fully achieving their goals and resolving a costly 
conflict when forced to do so, presumably because they can not achieve their goals 
through combat.  
However, when looking at levels of power-sharing and policy concessions, it does 
not appear that the presence of a “mutually hurting stalemate” influences the concessions 
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extended by the state.  This is so because neither probit model indicates the presence of a 
statistically significant relationship between stalemate and levels of power-sharing or 
policy concessions.  This indicates that while stalemates can influence the type of 
concession a state makes, it does not influence how much of a particular concession type 
is extended.  As discussed above, it does appear that the presence of a stalemate does 
affect the extension of territorial concessions, but the lack of variation in the levels of 
territorial concessions prevents an analysis of a relationship.  Thus, the results of this 
analysis indicates that the presence of a stalemate is positively associated with the state 
extending greater types of concession, but that it does not influence the level within each 
type. 
The second proposition drawn from the existing literature addresses the level of 
democracy of the state.  Based on the logic of the democratic peace, it is argued that 
democracies may be more willing to extend concessions to resolve an ongoing conflict.  
Three explanations of why democratic states may be more willing to offer concessions 
exist.  First, decisions made by leaders in democracies are conditioned by the degree of 
popular support they receive.  Since citizens more directly bear the costs of civil war, it 
seems logical to expect that they will apply pressure to their leaders to end the war with 
the fewest costs as possible, which may be through a negotiated settlement.  Second, 
democracies are more credible because they are publicly bound by their proclamations, a 
contention which integrates the decision-making of the rebels and is therefore beyond the 
scope of this analysis.  Third, leaders of democracies are more culturally disposed to 
negotiation and compromise.  As a result, they may be more willing to work to resolve 
conflicts at the bargaining table.  This logic produces the following hypothesis: 
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H7:  The more democratic the state is, the more the concessions granted to 
the rebels will be. 
 
The results of the Tobit analysis indicates that the level of democracy of the state 
(as measured by its Polity IV score) does not directly influence the choice between types 
of concessions.  In other words, the findings of this research do not indicate that a 
relationship exists between the level of democracy of the state and the maximum 
concession it offers to the rebels.  Perhaps this is so because the leaders of the state do not 
identify the rebels as sharing the same predisposition towards the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts as they do.  Another possible explanation is that the citizens of the state are 
willing to support the leadership in its decision to fight a civil war to an end on the 
battlefield.   
 Similarly, the level of democracy does not appear to directly affect the decision to 
grant higher levels of concessions within each policy type.  The probit analysis of power-
sharing concessions does not support the contention that democracies will grant higher 
levels of concessions, as evidenced by the lack of a statistically significant relationship.   
In addition, the level of democracy is not addressed by any of the analyses of territorial 
concessions as a causal factor.  It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the level of 
democracy does not directly influence the concessions made by states. 
   The final two factors addressed by this research that may influence the 
concessions granted by states were derived inductively from the data.  This produced two 
possible factors:  the timing and location of the conflict.  The data indicate that that 
prevalence of civil wars ending in negotiated settlements increased after the end of the 
Cold War.  This raises the question of whether or not the timing of a negotiated 
settlement affected the concessions extended by states as well, which leads to the 
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informal hypothesis that state concessions are affected by the timing of the negotiated 
settlement.  
 The empirical analysis of the data indicates that the maximum concessions 
extended by states increase in those cases that were resolved following the Cold War, as 
indicated by the presence of the positive and statistically significant relationship.  While 
this observation may possibly be a spurious correlation generated from the data, there are 
theoretical reasons to expect the presence of a causal relationship.  One possible 
explanation is that the changes in the international political system brought about changes 
in the way civil wars are fought.  Specifically, when the competition between the US and 
the Soviet Union ended, it may be that many of the resources available to groups sharing 
a similar ideology to one of the two superpowers dried up.  As the case of Angola 
indicates, the superpower rivalry extended to civil wars.  In this case, the US provided 
political, military, and financial support to both the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 
while the Soviet Union provided similar support to the People’s Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA).  In part, US involvement was driven by a desire to 
counter the possibility of Soviet influence in the region (Brogan 1998).  However, in the 
post-Cold War world, such a rivalry obviously does not exist.  As a result of the Soviet 
Union’s demise, combatants can no longer turn there for support.  And because the US is 
no longer involved in a Cold War rivalry, it has less motivation to step in to support 
combatants.  The end of the Cold War, then, may have brought about a decline in the 
amount of external support available to one side or another.  If this is so, bargaining 
theory (as developed and applied here) contends that combatants would respond by being 
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more open to the possibility of extending concessions.  An in-depth discussion of this 
matter, however, is beyond the scope of this project and will be left for a later date. 
 Interestingly enough, the relationship between the timing of a negotiated 
settlement and maximum concessions does not hold when looking within specific types 
of concessions.  The results of this analysis do not indicate the presence of a relationship 
between the levels of either power-sharing or policy concessions. Thus, the general 
conclusion of this research is that the timing of a negotiated settlement only generally 
affects the concessions extended by states, but that the effect does not influence the level 
of concessions offered. 
 The final relationship to be discussed is that between the location of the civil war 
and the concessions offered by states.  The data indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa 
produces the greatest number of negotiated settlement.  This raises the possibility that 
differences in the patterns of state concessions in Africa could possibly influence the 
overall outcomes of this research.  Therefore, analyses were conducted to determine 
whether geography influenced state concessions. 
 The results of the Tobit analysis do not indicate a direct relationship between 
location and maximum concessions.  This finding is indicated by the lack of a statistically 
significant relationship between the variable Africa and maximum concession.  
Furthermore, the probit analysis indicates that the levels of power-sharing and policy 
concessions in Africa do not vary from other similar state concessions in a statistically 
significant way.  Thus, this research indicates that the location of a negotiated settlement 
does not directly affect state concessions. 
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Conclusion 
 The basic conclusion of this research is that bargaining theory by itself does not 
adequately identify the factors that influence state concessions.  It does, however, provide 
some explanatory power and can be enhanced by the inclusion of existing literature and 
the results of the inductive analysis.  This is most evident in the strong and positive 
relationship between the presence of a “credible commitment” and state concessions, a 
relationship that holds in both maximum and high level power-sharing concessions.  This 
indicates that states are reluctant to extend generous concessions, especially high level 
power-sharing ones, unless the incentive to cheat is addressed. Bargaining theory is also 
supported by the finding that high level power-sharing concessions are more likely to 
occur when the number of deaths suffered by the state is high or when the conflict is 
long.  This indicates the reluctance of the state to concede guarantee access to the 
political system unless the rebels are able to maintain a long or bloody war.   
Although the explanatory power of bargaining theory is limited, the existing 
literature addressing the presence of a “mutually hurting stalemate.”  This analysis 
indicates that states are willing to extend greater concessions when such a condition 
emerges on the battlefield.  This implies that states are willing to make greater 
concessions when it appears that doing so may be the only way to resolve a war.  In 
addition, it appears that the timing of the resolution may have a significant impact on 
state concessions.  This, however, is a matter that deserves further investigation. 
In sum, this research adds to our existing knowledge base by indicating that, in 
addition to being reluctant to enter into negotiated settlements in the first place, states are 
reluctant to extend generous concessions when doing so can be avoided.  In order for a 
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rebel group to gain significant concessions from the state, it must be able and willing to 
fight a long and protracted war against the state and achieve rough military parity on the 
battlefield.  In addition, several factors that influence the extent of state concessions are 
in large part out of control of either party.  These include the presence of a security 
guarantee and the timing of the resolution. 
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